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Abstract
In an economic system, the central bank is entrusted with the responsibility of
formulating monetary policy. Despite its important role and signiﬁcant contribution
in inﬂuencing the well being of other economic agents in the economy, in general, little
is known about a central bank's underlying behaviour in executing this task. Among
the key questions that the non-policymakers raise on this area are: How do central
bankers actually formulate monetary policy? Do they behave systematically and follow
any form of rule? What are the objectives that they want to pursue? How do they
prioritize these diﬀerent objectives? How does their policy behaviour evolve over time?
What happens if they act diﬀerently?
Existing studies which analyze a central banks' behaviour in formulating monetary
policy, are mostly concentrated on the experience of developed economies. However,
developing economies face a diﬀerent institutional structure, as well as a diﬀerent set
of constraints and shocks, hence, it would be interesting to analyze how a central bank
under this diﬀerent economic environment performs its monetary policy mandate. This
thesis looks at the behaviour of Bank Negara Malaysia (The Central Bank of Malaysia)
in formulating monetary policy in Malaysia during the period 1975-2005.
There are four major aspects of Bank Negara Malaysia's (BNM) policy behaviour that
are examined in this thesis. Firstly, with regard to its policy reaction function - does
BNM set interest rates according to some form of policy rule or purely on a discretionary
manner? After identifying the systematic component of its policy action, we try to
establish BNM's policy objectives and preferences. This will help in understanding the
rationale behind its policy action. The third aspect is whether BNM's policy behaviour
changes over time. Lastly, with the use of an estimated Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium (DSGE) model, we conduct some policy experiments to observe the possible
impact on the Malaysia's economic outcomes were BNM to behave diﬀerently to what
we envisaged its policy behaviour has been.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the economic system, a central bank is the economic agent entrusted with the
important responsibility of formulating and executing monetary policy. Acknowledging
that a central bank's actions can greatly inﬂuence the behaviour of economic agents
and to a large extent overall economic outcomes, the announcement of policy decisions
by a central bank generally attracts much attention and is closely scrutinized by a
large number of interested parties and observers. These announced policy decisions
reveal a central bank's assessment of the economy and more importantly, its current
and future monetary policy stance. Interested parties use this information in various
ways to organize and execute their aﬀairs. Despite being one of the most inﬂuential and
important participants in an overall economic system, central bank behaviour in
arriving at monetary policy decisions is not yet fully understood by non-policymakers.
Hence, analysis of a central bank's behaviour in formulating monetary policy is of consi-
derable interest to both academic researchers and ﬁnancial market participants. To gain
further understanding on this issue, the key questions non-policymakers raise regarding
a central bank's behaviour are: How do central bankers actually formulate monetary
policy? Do they follow any form of policy rule? What are the objectives they want to
pursue? How do central bankers prioritize these diﬀerent objectives? How does this
behaviour evolve over time? What happens to the economic outcomes if they behave
diﬀerently?
This interest has generated a large literature that attempts to describe, analyze and
evaluate a central bank's behaviour in formulating monetary policy over a speciﬁc
period of time. However, existing studies in this area are mostly concentrated on
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the experience of developed economies and not much information is known about the
outcome of the same exercise in the case of developing countries. Given the diﬀe-
rent institutional structure, as well as the diﬀerent nature of constraints and shocks
faced by central banks in developing economies, it would be an interesting exercise to
conduct the same studies on these countries. This thesis chooses Bank Negara Malaysia
(The Central Bank of Malaysia) as the case study for three reasons. Firstly, Malaysia
is categorized as a small open economy with a history of a low and stable inﬂation
rate. To a large extent, this achievement is a result of the sound conduct of monetary
policy formulated by Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM). Secondly, among the developing
countries, Malaysia underwent and completed the deregulation process of its ﬁnancial
system relatively early. Deregulation of the banking system began in the early 1970's
and banking institutions' interest rate was deregulated in 1978. Due to these factors,
from 1980 onwards, BNM conducted monetary policy in a more stable ﬁnancial environ-
ment which is one of the important determinants for eﬀective transmission of monetary
policy. Lastly, Malaysia has relatively good and long sets of time series data for the
empirical exercise.
There are four main objectives of this research. The ﬁrst objective is to identify and
analyze the systematic component of interest rate movement in Malaysia. We do so
by estimating BNM's reaction function using a simple interest rate rule. Second, is
to establish what are BNM's policy objectives and relative preferences in conducting
monetary policy. We model BNM's policy behaviour as the solution to the optimal
control problem and estimate the parameters of its loss function. The third objective
is to investigate explicitly the possible evolution in BNM's behaviour in executing its
policy mandate. For this, besides using the full sample covering 1975Q1-2005Q2, the
estimation exercises in this thesis are also conducted with three sub-sample periods
- 1975Q1-1986Q4, 1987Q1-1998Q2 and 1998Q3-2005Q2. Lastly, with the use of an
estimated Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model for the Malaysian
economy, we conduct a few policy experiments in relation to BNM's policy behaviour.
We analyze the possible impact to the economic outcomes if BNM was to behave
diﬀerently from the way we have understood them.
This introduction chapter is divided into three sections. Section 1.1 outlines the main
areas regarding a central bank's behaviour in formulating monetary policy that the
non-policymakers do not fully understand. Questions that we list in this section are
also applicable to the case of BNM. Thus, they serve as the main motivation of this
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thesis. Section 1.2 provides background information about the Malaysian economy.
It also provides a brief overview about BNM's roles and functions in the Malaysian
ﬁnancial system. Section 1.3 lays out the structure of this thesis.
1.1 What do we want to know about a Central Bank's
Behaviour in Formulating Monetary Policy?
In general, central banks' underlying behaviour in arriving at monetary policy deci-
sions is not fully understood by those who are outside the policy-making circle. On
this regard, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) outline two main factors that have led
to increased interest among economists in understanding how central banks conduct
monetary policy. Firstly, the eﬀect of monetary policy is shown in various empirical
studies to be signiﬁcant and important in inﬂuencing the aggregate activity in an econ-
omy. Leeper, Sims, and Zha (1996), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996) and
King and Watson (1996), among others, have found empirical evidence of the signif-
icant eﬀect of monetary policy shocks to the economy in the short-run. Due to its
importance in inﬂuencing economic outcomes, it is natural for economists to scrutinize
policymakers' behaviour in formulating policy decisions. Secondly, there has been con-
siderable improvement in recent years, in the underlying theoretical framework used for
policy analysis. The use of dynamic general equilibrium theory in models' construc-
tion provides better theoretical underpinnings to the analysis of monetary policy. This
approach address the Lucas critique - the ﬂaw of the policy evaluation exercise that
is undertaken using the traditional macroeconometric structural models which treats
parameters to be time invariant to the policy action (Lucas (1976)). As such, working
with theoretically consistent models provides a better framework for policy evaluation
exercises to be undertaken. It also establishes a better foundation for researchers to
extend their analysis on monetary policy from descriptive to normative perspectives.
Following these two premises, in the pursuit of gaining a better understanding of central
banks' behaviour in formulating monetary policy, the empirical literature has focused
on the following key questions:
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Q1. How is monetary policy formulated? Does a central bank's action follow
any form of systematic pattern or rules?
Acknowledging the fact that formulation of monetary policy is a complex procedure,
this question tries to determine a suitable framework that outside parties (i.e. those
not involved in the policy-making) can use to model a central bank's decision making
process. In eﬀect, the answer to this question is important as the starting point towards
understanding a central bank's behaviour in formulating monetary policy. The analysis
of a central bank's behaviour can be undertaken in an objective and logical manner if
the observed central bank's action could be modelled using a certain form of systematic
pattern or principles.
In this regard, a central bank's behaviour is generally modelled with a certain form of
monetary rule. It is either assumed the central bank sets the interest rate according to
some simple rule, along the lines of the simple interest rate rule suggested by Henderson
and McKibbin (1993) and Taylor (1993) (HMT); or the central bank is assumed to base
decisions on an optimal/complex rule derived from an explicit objective function along
the line used in Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), Svensson (1999) and Woodford (2003).
More detailed discussion on this issue is given in Chapter 2.
Q2. What are the objectives of monetary policy?
Although the answer to this question seems quite obvious for a central bank that
oﬃcially adopts the inﬂation-targeting framework, it is not clearly spelled out in most
countries that do not oﬃcially operate under this framework. Hence, it is informative
to uncover this explicit objective. In addition, it is possible a central bank has more
than one policy objective. Knowing exactly what these objectives are will form a basis
to better understand the possible balancing act policymakers face in executing their
mandate.
Q3. What are a central bank's relative preferences between
diﬀerent objective variables?
While the variables that are policy objectives (inﬂation, output, the exchange rate)
could be known, precisely how these stabilization objectives are traded-oﬀ is not well
known. Thus, in deciding the interest rate level, how much weight does a central bank
place in its loss function on each of these objectives? Information on the relative weights
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a central bank put on its objective variables can be used to classify the central bank
regime. On this point, Svensson (1999) categorized central banks into two types. A
central bank with the sole objective of achieving price stability will attach zero weight
to other variables in its loss function. Svensson termed this type of central bank as
the strict inﬂation targeters. In contrast, a central bank with multiple objectives
that allocates non-zero weight to variables other than inﬂation is known as a ﬂexible
inﬂation targeter.
The weights a central bank puts on the diﬀerent objective variables will also determine
the form of its reaction function, as well as the performance and evolution of economic
outcomes. For instance, Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) show that in the context of
the inﬂation forecast targeting framework, the higher the weight a central bank puts
on output stabilization, the slower the adjustment of the inﬂation forecast towards the
long-run inﬂation target. Hence, knowing what regime the central bank is operating and
the size of the weights it attaches to diﬀerent objectives will help in better understanding
its overall behaviour in making policy decisions. In addition, these policy preferences
play a central role in determining the dynamic response of the economy following a
particular shock. For example, how the economy responds to an oil price shock will
depend on the policy action taken by the policymakers. This policy response is largely
guided by the policymakers' underlying preferences on diﬀerent objective variables.
Q4. Evolution of central bank behaviour over time
There are three likely reasons for possible changes in a central bank's preferences
over time. Firstly, change could be attributed to changes in a central bank's top
management, who may attach diﬀerent weighting to diﬀerent objective variables. This
issue is particularly important for an independent central bank which is able to deter-
mine its own policy objectives and preferences. Secondly, diﬀerences in the preferences
between diﬀerent objectives could be attributed to the evolution of the macroeconomic
structure itself. For example, central bankers' ability to assess the true state of the
economy can be jeopardized by the diﬃculty of estimating the true potential output.
With increasing uncertainty on the actual state of the economy, policymakers'
preference to stabilize output around its natural level could be lower, in order to mini-
mize the possibility of compounding errors in policy action. Alternatively, due to an
increase in uncertainty, a central bank may increase its policy inertia by demonstrating
higher preferences for interest rate smoothing. This risk aversion action is consistent
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with the famous recommendation put forward by Brainard (1967). Thirdly, change in
policymakers' policy preferences could happen due to special economic circumstances
that requires a diﬀerent policy response from the central bank. The simplest example
for this is the way the ASEAN countries' central banks (including BNM) responded
to the 1997 Asia Financial Crisis. At that time, speculative attack on the regional
currency prompted most of the central banks in the region to raise interest rates with
the temporary objective of curbing short-term capital outﬂow. Perhaps, in the recent
(2008) Global Financial turmoil, we see the repeat of such behaviour from the central
banks around the world. Concern about the stability of the ﬁnancial system prompted
central banks to cut interest rates aggressively.
Q5. Policy Evaluation and Simulation
This analysis acts as a report card on the performance of a central bank in formulating
monetary policy. For example, to achieve price stability, Taylor (1993) argues central
banks must set interest rates by reacting to inﬂation more than on one-to-one basis.
As such, a central bank must set its instrument rule such that the coeﬃcient on inﬂation
is greater than unity  known in the literature as Taylor's Principle. In the case of
the US, several studies like Judd and Rudebusch (1998), Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(1998, 2000), Taylor (1999a) and suggest the high inﬂation experienced during the
1970's can be explained by the fact that the Fed's reaction function did not fulﬁll
Taylor's principle. More importantly, these studies try to evaluate a central bank's
policy success and mistakes and relate them to the past performance of the economy.
The outcome of this evaluation allows learning from past experience.
In Chapter 2, we will discuss the strategy to answer these key questions. It begins
by outlining an analytical framework that can be used to describe a central bank's
behaviour in formulating monetary policy. The empirical approaches employed in the
literature to answer the above questions, are then reviewed and discussed.
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1.2 Formulation of Monetary Policy in Malaysia in
Three Decades: 1975-2005
This section provides a short overview of the economic structure and the conduct of
monetary policy in Malaysia. It will be useful to give a general idea about the economic
environment in which BNM operates. Since the literature adequately covers the histo-
rical development of the Malaysian economy, we do not provide a detailed analysis
of this topic here. Interested readers are invited to refer to Salleh and Meyanathan
(1993), Athukorala (2001), Navaratnam (2003), Mahadevan (2007) and Ang (2008) who
provide detailed analysis of the historical economic development and transformation of
the Malaysian economy over the past 50 years. In addition, Gomez and Sundram (1997)
and Ritchie (2005) provide an analytical review about Malaysia's economic development
from the perspective of a political economy.
Similarly, areas related to the historical account about the conduct of monetary
policy in Malaysia, are reported in great detail in various BNM's oﬃcial publications.
In particular, two books published by BNM, Money and Banking in Malaysia (Bank
Negara Malaysia (1994b)) and The Central Bank and Financial System in Malaysia: A
Decade of Change 1989-1999 (Bank Negara Malaysia (1999)) provide detailed analysis
about BNM's role and function in shaping Malaysia's economic development between
1959-1999.
1.2.1 Snapshot of Malaysia's Economic Development
Malaysia is a developing economy. The economy is small and open with a total popu-
lation of around 27million. Malaysia's economic system is essentially driven by the
private sector, with the Government playing an active role in development planning to
promote balanced economic growth and social progress. The utilization and develop-
ment of the nation's natural, mineral and human resources, aided by political stability it
enjoys, has made Malaysia one of the relatively more progressive, prosperous and among
the fastest growing economies in Asia. Together, these factors have contributed to the
continuous improvement in the quality and standard of living among the Malaysian
population. The Malaysian economic development experience has also been unique
in many respects - the economy has managed to achieved consistently high rates of
economic growth with relative price stability. It also has a high level of national
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Table 1.1: Malaysia's Key Macroeconomic Indicators
1970 1980 1990 2000 2005
Real GDP (% change) 5.0 7.4 9.0 8.9 5.3
Inﬂation (%) 1.9 6.7 3.1 1.6 3.0
Population (million persons) 10.4 13.7 17.8 23.5 26.7
Labour force (million persons) n.a. n.a. 7.0 9.6 11.3
Unemployment rate 7.7 5.6 5.1 3.1 3.5
(% of labour force)
Composition of GDP (% share)
Agriculture 32.1 22.9 16.3 8.9 8.2
Mining 6.6 10.1 9.4 7.3 6.7
Manufacturing 14.0 19.6 24.6 31.9 31.4
Construction 4.0 4.6 3.5 3.3 2.7
Services 43.3 42.8 46.2 48.6 58.1
GNP Per Capita (RM) 1,071 3,734 6,206 13,333 17,715
Gross National Saving (% of GNP) 18.0 30.4 31.6 40.1 37.1
Gross Domestic Investment (% of GNP) 17.8 31.6 33.8 29.8 20.7
Trade balance (RM billion) 0.9 4.7 0.5 61.8 99.8
Total trade (% GNP) 81.2 100.5 139.5 217.9 200.2
Current account balance (% GNP) 0.2 -1.2 -2.2 10.3 16.4
Total External debt (% GNP) n.a. n.a. 40.3 51.2 41.4
Federal Government overall balance -4.1 -7.2 -3.0 -6.3 -4.1
(% of GNP)
BNM's net international reserves 6.3 5.4 4.1 4.5 7.8
(as months of retained imports)
Exchange Rate (end period)
US$/RM 3.077 2.217 2.698 3.800* 3.7780*
* Ringgit Malaysia (RM) was pegged to USD1=RM3.80 between 2 September 1998 to
21 July 2005
Source: BNM's publication and author's calculation
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Figure 1.1: Malaysia's Economic Development 1975-2005
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savings and investments together with sound ﬁscal management. This is comple-
mented with prudent monetary management by BNM. Statistics reported in Table 1.1
provide a general overview of Malaysia's economic development over the last four
decades. Movement of inﬂation, GDP growth, interest rates and exchange rates over
the 1975-2005 period is shown in Figure 1.1.
Malaysia is essentially a trade-oriented economy. In 1970, its value of trade (both
exports and imports) amounted to 80% of GNP and this has increased tremendously
over the years. By 2005, the value of Malaysia's trade was about 200% of its GNP.
The exports sector plays a dominant role in the Malaysian economy and is traditionally
the most important determinant of the state of economic activity in the country over
the short and medium term.
The Malaysian economy has undergone profound structural changes over the last 50 years.
Since Independence in 1957, the economy has diversiﬁed away from the heavy reliance
on the agricultural sector into a more broad-based and resilient economy with a well
diversiﬁed production structure. In the early 1960s, agriculture accounted about 40%
of GDP and over 60% of total employment and export earnings. However, follo-
wing the implementation of several policy measures in the 1960s and 1970s aimed at
export diversiﬁcation, the economy has become more broad-based. By the mid-1980s,
the manufacturing sector played a more dominant role in leading the growth process.
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By 1995, the manufacturing sector accounted for nearly 35% of total GDP, compared
with only 20 % in 1980 and a mere 14% in 1970. In contrast, contributions of the
agriculture sector declined steadily over the period. Starting from more than 30% in
1970, agriculture contributed less than 9% of the overall domestic output and 13% of
total employment in 2005.
The expansion in the manufacturing sector came predominantly from production for
exports purposes. The ratio of exports to total production (gross output) in manu-
facturing increased from around 10% in the early 1970s to over 65% by mid-1990s
(Athukorala and Menon (1999)). Rapid export orientation of domestic manufactu-
ring brought about a dramatic transformation in Malaysia's export structure, which
historically had been dominated by a limited range of primary commodities. In the
early 1970s, the share of manufactures in Malaysia's total exports was only 10% and
by the mid-1990s, the share increases to about 78%. Foreign direct investment (FDI)
played a pivotal role in the expansion of the manufacturing sector and in particular
manufacturing exports. Foreign ﬁrms accounted for over 45% of total manufacturing
value added and they accounted for over three-quarters of total manufactured exports
by the mid-1990s (Athukorala (1998)).
As mentioned before, Malaysia had consistently enjoyed a high rate of economic growth.
Overall real GDP grew by about 6.5% between 1975-2005. During 1988-1996, Malaysia
experienced a long period of economic boom where GDP grew at an average rate of
9.5%. There were two brief periods of economic recession. The ﬁrst, happened in 1985
following the collapse of commodity prices in the world market. The second recession
was more severe. In 1998, in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, Malaysia's
GDP contracted by almost 7.5%. The economy bounced back in 1999 and from there
on, enjoyed a more modest economic expansion.
1.2.2 BNM's Role and Stipulated Policy Objectives
BNM, like other central banks, has many roles and responsibilities in the ﬁnancial
system and in the economy at large. Besides being responsible for formulating and
conducting monetary policy, BNM is also the sole authority regulating and supervising
the banking and insurance industry in Malaysia.
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The principal objective of BNM is to promote monetary stability and a sound ﬁnancial
system. This objective is clearly deﬁned as item (iii) in the Central Bank of Malaysia
Act 1958 (Revised 1994):1
"i. To issue currency and keep the reserves safeguarding the value of the
currency;
ii. To act as a banker and adviser to the Government;
iii. To promote monetary stability and a sound ﬁnancial structure; and
iv. To inﬂuence the credit situation to the advantage of Malaysia."
From a legislation point of view, besides its role to formulate and to conduct mone-
tary policy, BNM views the multiple objectives of its formation as inter-related and
complementary (page 84, Chapter 4: The Central Bank: Objectives, Functions and
Organization Bank Negara Malaysia (1994b)).2 BNM, because of its ability to issue
currency, has the primary responsibility to ensure that domestic prices remain stable.
Monetary stability, in turn, is dependent on the existence of a sound and stable ﬁnancial
system for the eﬀective conduct of monetary policy. In contrast to matured industrial
economies that have developed sophisticated ﬁnancial systems, BNM has a wider role in
developing the ﬁnancial infrastructure. Of importance is also the need to promote the
soundness of the ﬁnancial system to allow the smooth functioning of the intermediation
process.
While BNM recognizes that the role of monetary policy is crucial in attaining price
stability, it also recognizes that price stability is not an end in itself. It is essential that
there is coordination and an optimum mix of monetary and ﬁscal policies, in order to
achieve growth with price stability. Hence, BNM works closely with other key agencies
within the Government, particularly the Ministry of Finance, to achieve this objective.
1Revision of the Act in 1994 does not involve any change in the way BNM conducts monetary policy.
The revision was conducted in conjunction to the introduction of the Banking and Financial Institution
Act (BAFIA) in 1994. BAFIA was introduced to enhance BNM's role as a ﬁnancial regulator to banks
and ﬁnancial institutions in Malaysia. See Chapter 4 of Bank Negara Malaysia (1994b) for details.
2While BNM's objectives (i), (ii) and (iii) of the Act are self-explanatory, item (iv) warrants fur-
ther explanation. BNM's stipulated objective To inﬂuence the credit situation to the advantage of
Malaysia" is related to BNM's mandate to mobilize ﬁnancial resources (in particular domestic savings)
for a productive use. This large scope involves BNM's role to develop the domestic ﬁnancial system,
i.e. banking system and capital market. See Chapter 4 of Bank Negara Malaysia (1994b) for details.
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Consequently, in performing its role, BNM regards itself to be independent within the
Government, but not of the Government (page 109, Chapter 3: Bank Negara Malaysia:
Objectives, Functions and Organization Bank Negara Malaysia (1999)). This means
that BNM has independence to make and execute policy actions that it sees ﬁt in order
to fulﬁll the objectives set by the Government.
1.2.3 Key Challenges in Formulating Monetary Policy
In general, the stance of monetary policy at any point of time reﬂects BNM's reaction
to the prevailing economic condition. We divide the description of key policy challenges
that BNM face in conducting monetary policy in Malaysia in the last 30 years into three
periods - 1975-1986, 1987-1996 and 1997-2005.
1.2.3.1 1975-1986: Managing High Inﬂation and Economic Recession
The unsettling and destabilizing international monetary conditions in the late 1970s
meant that monetary policy during the 1975-84 period was directed primarily at
maintaining price stability and ensuring a stable currency. In 1977-78, the interna-
tional environment was subjected to strains arising from high inﬂation and growing
imbalances in external payments among the major industrial countries. This led to
turmoil in international currency markets centering on the marked weakening of the
US dollar. Then, the international economic and ﬁnancial environment in the 1980s
posed a new dimension of challenges for the operation of monetary policy in Malaysia.
The world economy in the early 1980s was characterized by the global recession, high
energy prices in the wake of the second oil-price shock of 1979-1980, high global
inﬂation stemming from price pressures emanating from the oil price increases and
loose global monetary policy. Due to these factors, Malaysia's inﬂation during this
period started to gain momentum and reach its historical high of almost 9% in 1981
(see Figure 1.1).
By the mid-1980s, another challenge confronted Malaysia's policymakers. With inﬂa-
tion no longer a threat, the sharp decline in commodity prices in the world market
had a signiﬁcant adverse impact on the Malaysian economy. By 1985, the Malaysian
economy was in recession. Under these circumstances, monetary policy during 1984-86
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was eased in stages. In addition, to complement the monetary easing, the ringgit was
allowed to depreciate in small steps. Compared to the level in 1980 (US$1=RM2.17)
the value of ringgit against the US dollar in 1986 had depreciated by almost 20%
(US$1=RM2.62). Undoubtedly, weakening of the domestic currency provided impetus
to the export market.
1.2.3.2 1987-1996: Managing Economic Success
Monetary management during the 1987-1996 period was confronted with challenges
posed by prolonged and rapid domestic economic growth. Rapid expansion of the
domestic economy over the nine years (averaging 9.3% per year) exerted substantial
pressures on the existing resources. The economy was operating at full employment.
This led to a steady increase in domestic inﬂation from around 0.3% in 1987 to reach its
peak of 5% in 1992. To contain inﬂationary pressures, BNM adopted a tight monetary
policy stance.
The task to manage inﬂationary pressures was made more diﬃcult with the general
decline in global interest rates. In the face of rising domestic interest rates, it caused
interest rate diﬀerentials favouring Malaysia. This attracted substantial inﬂow of short-
term foreign funds into the country. During the 1993-94 period, this large capital inﬂow
led to a bull-run in the local stock market. It also caused excess liquidity in the banking
system. Thus, monetary policy had to strike a delicate balance in terms of managing
excess liquidity and reducing inﬂationary pressure, while at the same time avoiding
undesirable speculative short-term capital inﬂows from destabilizing the economy.
Beside the interest diﬀerential favouring Malaysia, another factor that encouraged the
inﬂow of short-term capital into the country was the general perception among the
market players during that period that the Malaysian currency was undervalued. Given
the booming export sector and the capacity constraint faced by the economy at that
time, most market players expected BNM would allow the ringgit to appreciate to
complement the tight monetary policy stance that it had adopted. However, this
turned out not to be the case. Except for a small appreciation in 1992 (from around
US$1=RM2.70 in 1991 to US$1=RM2.50 in 1992), between 1992-1996 BNM kept the
exchange rate relatively stable (see Figure 1.1). Perhaps, BNM was reluctant to allow
the ringgit to appreciate as such action would have hurt the export sector. To smooth
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the upward pressure on the domestic currency, like other central banks, BNM conducted
sterilized intervention operations.3 With the beneﬁt of hindsight, BNM's strategy was
not successful fending oﬀ the inﬂow of short-term capital. Given the severity of the
problem, BNM opted to introduce several exchange control measures in January and
February 1994 to deal with the highly destabilizing capital movement and to reassert
control over monetary policy (page 289, Chapter 8: The Money and Foreign Exchange
Markets, Bank Negara Malaysia (1999)). The controls were speciﬁc and intended to
be short-term in nature to contain the speculative inﬂows. By August 1994, all these
measures were lifted.
1.2.3.3 1997-2005: Managing Financial and Economic Crisis
The most challenging period for monetary policy came towards the end of the decade,
following the outbreak of the regional ﬁnancial crisis in mid-1997. The period saw
extreme volatility in the ﬁnancial markets. The crisis had severe and wide-ranging
eﬀects on ﬁnancial and economic activities. Although the banking system was in a
strong position at the beginning of the crisis, structural weaknesses in the system
emerged as the crisis worsened. As such, BNM was faced with a diﬃcult balancing
act in fulﬁlling the objectives of its various roles. Besides the need to address the sharp
contraction in GDP and rising inﬂation, BNM also needed to ensure the Malaysian
banking system and ﬁnancial markets remained intact and continued to operate eﬀec-
tively to weather this unprecedented ﬁnancial crisis.
Following the speculative attacks and large capital outﬂow, the ringgit depreciated
by 40% against the US dollar in the period July 1997 - August 1998. The market
perception of emerging risks in the Malaysian ﬁnancial system and economic outlook
resulted in the contagion eﬀects on Malaysia being more severe, leading to a large
liquidation of portfolio investment by the foreign investors. This led to signiﬁcant down-
ward pressure on the ringgit. The ringgit breached a historical low of US$1=RM4.88
on 7 January 1998. In addition to the continued uncertainty in the region, new risks
emerged following the build-up of ringgit balances in the regional oﬀshore centres.
This can fuel further speculative activities and exert further downward pressure on the
3In Chapter 4, we will discuss in more detail the mechanics of sterilized intervention in the foreign
exchange market. In there, we will also discuss the role of exchange rate smoothing in BNM's policy
framework.
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ringgit. These developments led BNM to impose capital control on 1 September 1998
and the ﬁxing of the ringgit at US$1=RM3.80 on 2 September 1998.
The full eﬀect of the regional ﬁnancial crisis was felt in 1998. By end-August 1998,
the index for the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange fell by almost 80% from the level at
end-March 1997. GDP contracted by 7.5%. Large depreciation in domestic currency
caused upward pressure on imported goods. As a result, inﬂation rose and reached a
peak of 6.2% in June 1998. Following this, the Government put together a series of
policy actions to bring the economy back into recovery.
The sharp easing of monetary policy following the introduction of the exchange
control measures provided an environment of low interest rates to support the
economic recovery. Together with other macroeconomic measures, the nation has been
able to weather the crisis. By end-1999, most key economic indicators were showing
signiﬁcant improvements. Inﬂation had been reduced to 2.1% and GDP grew by almost
6%. Apart from a brief slowdown in GDP growth experienced during the end-2001 and
early-2002 following the September 11, 2001 events, the Malaysian economy recorded a
commendable expansion during the 2003-2005 period.
1.3 Outline of the Thesis
This thesis is divided into eight chapters.
Chapter 2 reviews the analytical framework that will be used to model BNM's behaviour
in formulating monetary policy. It begins by reviewing the role of policy rules in a
central bank's decision-making process, with particular attention to the importance of
the interest rate rule. The chapter then presents the formal speciﬁcation of the central
bank's policy problem as a solution to an optimal control problem.
Chapter 3 presents empirical results of BNM's reaction function. Results of this
exercise form a foundation to investigate in detail, BNM's behaviour in formulating
monetary policy in Malaysia. The subsequent analysis of BNM's behaviour in formu-
lating monetary policy depends crucially on the premise that BNM's reaction function
could be reasonably established and estimated. Based on this reaction function, the
systematic component of BNM's policy making could then be identiﬁed and analyzed.
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Thus, in this chapter, we explore the usefulness of the Henderson and McKibbin (1993)
and Taylor (1993) (HMT) interest rate rule as a benchmark for analyzing monetary
policy in Malaysia. We estimate the HMT rule as a single equation.
While estimated reaction functions are useful for describing how the target interest
rate changes in relation to macroeconomic factors, it must be acknowledged that this
policy rule is formulated on an ad-hoc basis and is estimated, analyzed and interpreted
in the absence of a fully speciﬁed economic model. As a result, important insights
into monetary policy formulation cannot be inferred from the estimated decision rule.
To gain further understanding and evaluate central bank behaviour in conducting
monetary policy, information on the policy objectives and policymakers' relative
preferences between these diﬀerent objectives, is essential to be known. Thus, in
Chapter 4, we try to unveil these aspects of BNM's policy behaviour. We model BNM's
formulating monetary policy as a solution to the optimal control problem. We represent
the Malaysian economy using a simple small open economy model. Then, by assuming
BNM's set interest rates according to the optimal interest rate rule, we identify BNM's
policy objectives and estimate its relative preferences. We also discuss what is the role
of the exchange rate in the overall conduct of monetary policy in Malaysia.
After gaining a general understanding about the way BNM behaves in formulating
monetary policy in Malaysia, we use this knowledge to ask another important
question regarding BNM's policy behaviour. What would happen to the outcomes of the
Malaysian economy if BNM was to behave diﬀerently than what we have
understood so far? To answer this, we conduct counter-factual policy simulations.
To do so, a good representation of the Malaysian economy is ﬁrstly needed. For this
purpose, we use dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. The main
attractiveness of DSGE models is that they are derived from ﬁrst principles and they
provide structural equations that form the structural features of the economy. The
"deep" parameters of these structural equations are assumed to be invariant to
policy actions - an important feature for the policy simulations exercise that we want to
conduct in order to analyze the impact to the Malaysia's economic outcomes if BNM
was to change its policy behaviour.
Based on this premise, Chapter 5 and 6 discuss the derivation and estimation of the
DSGE model for Malaysia. The key structural parameters of the Malaysian economy are
estimated using the Bayesian methodology. In this DSGE model, we use the same HMT
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interest rate rule speciﬁcations as in Chapter 3 to represent BNM's reaction function.
However, in this two chapters, the same interest rate rule is estimated under a diﬀerent
estimation approach. As part of the equations in the DSGE model, parameters of HMT
interest rate rule in Chapter 5 and 6 are estimated simultaneously with other parameters
of the DSGE model in the system of equations. Then, we compare these estimated
parameters to the results generated by the single equation estimation in Chapter 3.
Importantly, we ﬁnd the use of a diﬀerent estimation approach produces a diﬀerent
estimation result for BNM's reaction function.
After establishing the general understanding about BNM's policy behaviour over the pe-
riod, Chapter 7 presents simulation results about the possible impact to the Malaysia's
economic outcomes during the 1975-2005 period if BNM behaves diﬀerently to what
we have understood. For this purpose, we use the estimated DSGE model presented in
Chapter 5, as the workhorse. There are two aspects of BNM's policy behaviour that we
look at in this simulation exercise. One, is about BNM's policy action. We investigate
the diﬀerence to the economic outcomes when BNM's reaction function is based on the
estimated (historical) speciﬁcation and if BNM was to set interest rates according
to the optimized HMT-rule. Two, we look at the impact when BNM has diﬀerent
policy preferences regarding its multiple objectives for monetary policy. All in all,
these simulation results have given us a good understanding about the possible impact
to the Malaysia's economic outcomes if BNM was to change its behaviour in formulating
monetary policy in Malaysia during the 1975-2005 period.
Lastly, Chapter 8 provides conclusion of this thesis and our few suggestions for further
research.
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Chapter 2
Theoretical and Empirical Framework
to Analyze a Central Bank's
Behaviour in Formulating Monetary
Policy
Similar to the analysis of consumer behaviour, which begins with outlining consumers'
problems and assumptions, this chapter discusses the framework commonly used in
the literature to examine a central bank's behaviour in formulating monetary policy.
This framework will put in perspective, the rationale and theoretical reasoning behind
the observed policy action taken by a central bank. Based on this framework, the
empirical exercise to analyze Bank Negara Malaysia's (BNM) behaviour in formulating
and conducting monetary policy in Malaysia will be implemented in the subsequent
chapters.
This chapter is divided into three sections. First, there is a brief discussion on the
role of monetary policy rule as a tool to represent a central bank's behaviour in setting
monetary policy. Using this approach, it is assumed policymakers use the monetary
policy rule as a rule of thumb to guide them in making policy decisions. Obviously,
if this type of rule has guided a central bank's action, it should be possible to track
the systematic pattern of such action from the empirical exercise. This will provide
some insights in describing policymakers' behaviour in coming out with interest rate
decisions. The second section discusses the approach to modelling a central bank's
optimization problem explicitly. It assumes a central bank treats the process of
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formulating monetary policy as a solution to the optimal control problem. It involves
specifying the objective function and setting the policy constraint. Also, from specifying
a central bank's optimization problem explicitly, the central bank is assumed to execute
its policy action according to an optimal rule. The last section provides the empirical
methods that have been used in the literature to bring this theoretical framework to
data.
2.1 Monetary Policy Rules
In the theoretical and empirical work, a central bank's behaviour in formulating
monetary policy is represented by some type of monetary policy rule, which summa-
rizes the complex decision process of how a central bank adjusts its policy instruments
in response to changes in the macroeconomic environment. There are diﬀerent kinds
of monetary policy rules that have been developed. Among others are the Friedman
(1969) money rule, the McCallum and Nelson (1999) nominal income rule, the Svensson
(1999) inﬂation targeting rule and the Henderson and McKibbin (1993)/Taylor (1993)
(HMT) interest rate rule.
What is the attraction of rule based policy formulation? Economists have debated this
issue for a few decades and important results from Kydland and Prescott (1977) and
Barro and Gordon (1983) have contributed to the general consensus among economists
on the advantages of commitment to the policy rule. Discretionary policy-making
leads to the famous result of inﬂation bias as economic agents revise their inﬂation
expectation upwards following concern that policymakers will renege from their earlier
policy announcement. This ﬁnding highlights the importance of a course of action that
is time-consistent. In addition, studies among others by Ehrmann and Smets (2003),
Dennis and Soderstrom (2006) and Lees (2007) quantify the beneﬁts from optimal policy
under discretion to optimal policy with pre-commitment. They show that welfare gain
to the society from pre-commitment policy is quite large.
While there is general agreement that there is a distinct advantage to rule based vis-
à-vis pure discretion, there is no clear evidence that central bankers have actually
practiced it. Up to now, no central bank in the world has oﬃcially committed to basing
their policy decisions on any speciﬁc monetary rule. On this point, William Poole, the
President of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, states:
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We apply our best judgment to the task and do not rely on a formal
rule, because we do not have a formal rule we trust. (page 8, Poole (1999)).
Poole's comment may represent a general skepticism among central bankers around the
world on the limitation of applying the monetary policy rule to their actual
decision making process. The major reasons cited by central bankers in avoiding
commitment to a particular policy rule are that the policy rule is too mechanical and
inﬂexible, and so cannot fully accommodate all possible shocks and unanticipated
events. On this point, McCallum (2003) argues that when central bankers object
to the use of a policy rule, the conception that they have in mind is it must be
applied rigidly and mechanically - a regime which policymakers do not put any form of
judgment on the policy making process. They interpret the term rule as representing
a constant, non-responsive instrument setting, or what is also known as the non-
activist rule. This interpretation stems from Milton Friedman's famous money rule
(Friedman (1969)), which promoted a constant growth rate for some speciﬁed monetary
aggregate. In contrast, McCallum advocated the activist type of a rule - like the HMT
interest rate rule - which represents a contingency plan that guides central banks' policy
action. The activist rule provides a general, but systematic guideline to the policy-
makers on how to set interest rates in response to their assessment of the current and
future economic conditions.
Thus, while Poole's comment about the inﬂexibility of rule based could be a valid
concern, it does not mean the general framework behind the use of the policy rule
is totally impractical. Instead, central bankers can capitalize on certain principles
of rule-based decision-making and should put them into practice (McCallum (2000)).
On this point, Woodford (2003) stresses the importance of a central bank committing
to a framework of decision-making. While policymakers are not expected to follow a
speciﬁc policy rule mechanically, it is important that they should adopt a consistent
state-contingent plan in formulating monetary policy. In doing so, Woodford argues
policymakers should follow a time-invariant policy framework, that is optimal from a
timeless perspective. Rule-based policy-making in this sense avoids the sort of rigidity
often associated with a commitment to mechanically follow a policy rule.
Besides reducing inﬂation bias, Woodford (2003) also outlines two further advantages as
to why a central bank should commit to a systematic or rule based approach to policy
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making. Firstly, commitment to a systematic approach of policy-making enhances
the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy through anchoring economic agents' expectations.
He argues that the ability to successfully steer private-sector expectations is favoured
by a decision procedure based on a rule, since in this case the systematic character
of the central bank's action can be most easily made apparent to the public. Hence,
the rule-based approach of policy-making facilitates better public understanding of
the policy action that consequently contributes to better expectation formation among
economic agents. Secondly, Woodford highlighted that discretionary optimization (or in
other words changing the decision framework from time to time) will generally result in
a central bank choosing a suboptimal response to shocks. Under purely discretionary
policy formulation, the setting of policy instruments is determined period-by-period,
with no attempt to follow a well-deﬁned contingency plan for the future. Following the
shock, policy action based on discretionary optimization will only focus on one-oﬀ
action aimed at neutralizing such a shock. The failure of discretionary policy action to
take into account the dynamic behaviour of economic agents in responding to the initial
shocks, cause the chosen policy responses to be sub-optimal. Rather, Woodford shows
policy must be made history dependent, that is, dependent upon past conditions even
when they are no longer relevant to the determination of the current policy decisions.
Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) and Bernanke (2003) support Woodford's view by
highlighting the advantage of policy decision making based on constrained discretion.
The constrained discretion approach is the middle ground between the inﬂexibility of the
strict policy rules and the instability of purely discretion decision making. While it does
not completely eliminate the time inconsistency problems, the constrained discretion
approach will be able to mitigate them to some extent, by recommending policymakers
voluntarily commit their decision making process based on a particular framework.
Under constrained discretion, a central bank is free to do its best to stabilize output
and employment in the face of short-run disturbances. However, this is done with
the appropriate caution of the fact that policymakers have imperfect knowledge of the
economy. Due to this factor, in conducting the stabilization policy, a central bank must
also maintain a strong commitment to keep inﬂation ﬁrmly under control. In other
words, a constrained discretion approach acknowledges that policymakers need to be
given some latitude. Due to information imperfection and uncertainty in assessing the
true state of the economy, policymakers are allowed to use their judgment in deciding the
best course of action to minimize cyclical swings in the economy. However, such latitude
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must be used within the boundary that policymakers will not sacriﬁce its commitment
to achieve price stability. Hence, for a constrained discretion approach to work, the
policymakers' commitment to achieve price stability is crucial to ensuring the public's
inﬂation expectations are kept under control. If this commitment is compromised, the
disadvantage of a purely discretion approach in the form of an inﬂation bias problem
suggested by Kydland-Prescott and Barro-Gordon will come into full eﬀect and lead to
a suboptimal economic outcome.
Svensson (1999) argues that the inﬂation-targeting framework is the example of how
the principle of constrained discretion decision-making is formally put into practice.
On the same point, Bernanke (2003) claims that to some extent, the principle of
constrained discretion has been practiced by many central banks around the world.
This is evident from the stronger commitment among central bankers towards price
stability, as evident from the lower inﬂation rate in many countries from the 1980's
onwards. This was achieved without central banks mechanically following any pre-
announced policy rule.
2.1.1 Ad-hoc Interest Rate Rule
Out of many monetary policy rules proposed by economists, the interest rate rule is
the most widely used in recent theoretical and empirical literature to represent central
bank behaviour in formulating monetary policy. The outcome of inﬂuential studies by
Henderson and McKibbin (1993) and Taylor (1993), which suggest the past behaviour of
the US Federal Reserve in setting interest rates can be summarized with a simple interest
rate rule, have become a standard starting point in modelling central bank reaction
functions in various theoretical and empirical studies. The Henderson-McKibbin-Taylor
(HMT) type interest rate `rules' have a strong intuitive appeal to researchers in this
area, since they provide a simple organizing principle for assessing monetary policy and
avoid outsiders second-guessing how central banks set their instruments. Besides its
simplicity, HMT type interest rate rule is generally found to describe central bank's
policy action fairly well. The same rule is also regarded
There are three grounds for the preference of modelling the central bank reaction func-
tion by the interest rate type rule  practical, empirical and theoretical.
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On practical grounds, modelling central bank behaviour using the interest rate rule
is the closest to reality for the actual execution and formulation of monetary policy
by a central bank. Goodfriend (1991) and Goodhart (1989, 1995) argue that regard-
less of what monetary regime a central bank claims it follows, the implementation of
monetary policy was actually executed by a central bank setting the short-term
interest rate (price) rather than by controlling base money (quantity). The main fac-
tor supporting this argument is that in its actual money market operation, a central
bank has limited ability to accurately forecast the exact quantity of base money it
requires to supply to the money market. For example, the eﬀect of ﬁnancial deregula-
tion and product innovation cause the demand for base money to be more unstable and
unpredictable (Laidler (1993)). The problem of controlling base money with a high
degree of precision is compounded with the fact that demand for base money on a daily
basis is inelastic (Borio (1997)). Borio shows that demand for base money is inelastic
due to market participants' obligation to settle all their trading commitments at the
end of each business day. The combination of these two factors mean the use of base
money as a policy instrument could in practice lead to large ﬂuctuations in short-term
interest rates. For example, any errors on the side of a central bank in determining
the correct quantity required by market participants leaves the price (i.e. short-term
interest rates) to adjust freely in order to ensure market clearing. As in other markets,
large price ﬂuctuations increase market uncertainties and deter smooth trading from
taking place. Similarly, large ﬂuctuations in short-term interest rates make control-
ling base money as a monetary instrument less practical, thereby making interest rates
more popular instruments among central banks. The empirical studies by Bernanke
and Blinder (1992) and Bernanke and Mihov (1998) support these arguments and show
that movement of the Fed Fund rate is the best indicator to measure the US Federal
Reserve's monetary policy stance.
Following the above arguments, on the empirical ground, the estimated reaction
function modelled by the interest rate rule is found to track real data well. Among
others, studies by Judd and Rudebusch (1998), Taylor (1999a), Kozicki (1999) and
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) in the case of the US Federal Reserve; Nelson (2000)
for the UK; Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998) for country comparison of G8 economies;
Taylor (1999b), Gerlach and Schnabel (2000) for the European Union; de Brouwer and
Gilbert (2005) for Australia; Umezaki (2007) for Malaysia and Ramayandi (2008) for
the ASEAN countries have all found that the simple interest rate rule they estimated
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as a single equation, provided a reasonably good descriptions of the way major central
banks around the world behaved over a speciﬁed period of time.
On theoretical grounds, the interest rate rule also emerges as a valid principle that is
eﬀective in achieving price stability. Woodford (2003) analyzes the idea put forward
by Knut Wicksell about the relationship between price stability and the interest rates
level set by the central bank. In Wicksell's view, price stability can be achieved when
a central bank sets its nominal interest rate to be in line with the natural rate of
interest. The logic behind Wicksell's view is simple. As the natural rate of interest
is determined by real factors which are not aﬀected by monetary policy actions (such
as the marginal product of capital), deviation of the interest rate set by the central
bank from the natural rate of interest will cause disequilibrium in the goods market.
Hence, prices need to adjust to bring the goods market to its new equilibrium level.
In subsequent chapters of his book, Woodford formalizes Wicksell's idea into what he
terms Neo-Wicksellian Monetary Theory and argues that the HMT interest rate rules
are in spirit, consistent with Wicksell's idea. Woodford further proves that when the
Taylor Principle is fulﬁlled (i.e. when the feedback coeﬃcient on inﬂation in the
interest rate rule is greater than 1), such an interest rate rule is consistent with the
optimal equilibrium and ensures price determinacy and stability in the model.
Taylor (1999a) and Orphanides (2003) examine the usefulness of the HMT interest rate
rule framework as an organizing device for describing the evolution of monetary policy
in the United States. In their respective studies, Taylor and Orphanides examine the
consistency of the US Federal Reserve's historical interest rate movement with the inte-
rest rate level suggested by the HMT-rule framework. They then compare them with the
narrative descriptions of events and information available to policy practitioners when
policy was made. The theme emerging from Taylor's and Orphanides' examination is
that Federal Reserve policies over many periods can be broadly interpreted in terms of
the HMT-rule framework with surprising consistency. This historical analysis suggests
the HMT-rule appears to serve as a useful organizing device for interpreting past policy
decisions and mistakes.
In conclusion, while central banks do not mechanically follow the monetary policy rule,
the advantages of formulating monetary policy in a systematic manner is acknowledged
and perhaps has been practiced by many central bankers. The use of the rule-based or
systematic approach in the actual formulation of monetary policy is also consistent with
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the evidence observed in the empirical exercises. As mentioned earlier, empirical studies
in estimating a central banks' reaction function modelled by simple HMT type interest
rate rules are found to track well the actual movement of policy rates in many countries.
As no central bank in the world has ever announced that it oﬃcially follows any type
of interest rate rule, these empirical results suggest central banks actually formulate
monetary policy by adhering to the rule-based approach  i.e. they set interest rates
by responding to certain variables like inﬂation and output gap in a systematic manner.
2.2 Modelling a Central Bank's Problems
The HMT interest rate rule suggests the Fed's behaviour in formulating monetary policy
can be represented by a systematic pattern of reacting to inﬂation and the output gap.
But, what exactly is the objective the Fed wants to achieve? Does the Fed have a
dual objective of stabilizing prices and output? Or does it have a single objective of
maintaining price stability, and only treats the output gap as a leading indicator? (i.e.
reacting systematically to output gap as high output gap will lead to high inﬂation).
In order to overcome this ambiguity, another approach to understanding central bank
behaviour is to formally model a central bank's problem. This approach starts with
explicitly specifying the policymakers' loss function and deriving the optimal policy rule
that should be followed in order to minimize the speciﬁed loss function.
The central banks behaviour in formulating monetary policy is commonly modelled as
the solution to the optimal control problem. In their famous paper, which outlines
and summarizes recent research in monetary policy, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999)
indicate that modelling a central bank's problem in this way has become a standard
approach for the literature in this area. This approach is favoured due to its sim-
ple, but realistic representation of the real world problems facing policymakers. More
importantly, it treats a central bank like any other agent in the economy, which intends
to maximize some objective function subject to certain constraints. Similar to the
analysis of consumer behaviour, which assumes the observed action is the outcome of
the constrained optimization problem of trying to maximize utility subject to a budget
constraint, a central bank's problem in conducting monetary policy can also be put
in the same perspective. The policymaker's problem can be characterized as using an
instrument such as the interest rate, together with knowledge of the evolution of the
26
economy and the transmission mechanism process, seeking to minimize its loss function
by stabilizing the objective variables (such as inﬂation and output).
In this regard, Cecchetti (2000) characterizes a central banks' problem as the solution
to a complex control problem similar in structure to the one faced by an aircraft pilot.
Given knowledge of the weather and wind, a pilot's objective is to use the aircraft's
controls, to ﬂy from one place and land safely at the destination point. Similarly, a
central bank's objective is to move interest rates, given its knowledge on how the
economy evolves, to achieve certain objectives like maintaining steady income growth
and stable prices. Hence, the optimal control problem facing central bankers involves
minimizing a loss function (consisting of weighted sum of price variability, output
variability, ﬁnancial variability, etc), subject to the evolution of the state variables
(the economic structure describing the paths of output and inﬂation) which act as a
policy constraint, using a control rule (the optimal policy rule describing the optimal
reaction of a central bank in solving the problem).
In order to understand the framework of a central bank's problem, the rest of this
section reviews the general set-up about the application of optimal control problem as
a tool to formulate monetary policy. It covers a short description about speciﬁcation
of the loss function, state variables and how to model their movement and the use of
optimal rule. However, to minimize repetition, we will not provide in this section any
illustration about the mechanics and workings of the optimal control theory framework
in modelling a central bank's policy behaviour. We leave that to Chapter 4, where
we will illustrate how the optimal control theory is used to represent BNM's policy
behaviour.
2.2.1 Speciﬁcation of a Central Bank's Loss Function
To determine a central bank's policy choice, speciﬁcation of its preferences is needed.
The speciﬁed objective function becomes the point of reference for policymakers to
evaluate and discriminate all possible policy options at their disposal. As each policy
option will generate a diﬀerent policy outcome, the objective function is used as a tool
to summarize how consistent each policy outcome is with the policymakers' ultimate
aim. This is done by comparing the quantitative result of the objective function for
each policy option.
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In general, a central bank's objective function can be written in diﬀerent forms, depen-
ding on its underlying policy objectives and preferences. Cukierman (1992) provides
a detailed discussion of several motivations behind diﬀerent central bank's preferences
and objectives. Besides the common objective for monetary policy of achieving price
and output stability, Cukierman, argues a central bank's objective in formulating
monetary policy could also be motivated by political pressure to ensure a govern-
ment being re-elected. A central bank may also have a balance-of-payment motive, an
objective to maximize seignorage revenue, or the objective of stabilizing the ﬁnancial
system. Hence, diﬀerent objectives pursued by central banks will inﬂuence the way the
loss function is formulated in the theoretical model.
Walsh (2003) claims it is standard practice in the literature to assume a central bank's
preference is represented by an objective function that consists of target variables like
inﬂation, output and stabilizing (smoothing) interest rates. The beneﬁt of low and
stable inﬂation to an economy is well known and documented. Among others, the
cost of inﬂation to an economy is high and entails signiﬁcant social losses. Hence,
the primary objective of the monetary policy adopted by many central banks around
the world is to stabilize inﬂation at a level low enough that it becomes irrelevant to
household and ﬁrm decision-making.
The role of output stabilization in the loss function is to ensure the economy always
operates at or near its full potential. The beneﬁt of an economy operating at its full
potential is straightforward. For example, operating below potential means resources
are redundant. Social welfare, as a whole, can be improved by utilizing these idle
resources. Similarly, the notion that inﬂation is created by excess demand (demand
pull inﬂation) is related to the fact that an economy is operating beyond its potential
level. The capacity constraint to produce this additional demand will be translated
into upward price pressure. In addition, a central bank also wants to minimize output
volatility in order to promote further economic growth. Ramey and Ramey (1995)
present evidence that in a broad group of 95 countries, there is a strong negative
correlation between output volatility and growth.
Many empirical studies have shown that the interest rate movement is highly correlated
with its past value. This observation has caused many to include interest rate smoothing
in a central bank's loss function. While the reason for including price and output
stability is intuitive, the rationale for including an interest rate smoothing objective
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in a central bank's loss function is more controversial and has been discussed in many
papers. See among others Lowe and Ellis (1997) and Sack and Wieland (2000) for
detailed discussion and a literature review on this area. For example, central banks
smooth interest rates to maintain ﬁnancial stability (Cukierman (1992)), to enhance
credibility by minimizing policy reversal (Goodhart (1999)) or just a reﬂection of a
central bank's cautious attitude to information and model uncertainty (Clarida, Gali,
and Gertler (1999)).
The loss function central banks try to minimize is commonly written in a quadratic
form. There are three main reasons for this. The ﬁrst is to incorporate a cen-
tral bank's preference to stabilize its objective variable around a certain target. For
example, Walsh (2003) argues that most central banks have a desire to minimize
output and inﬂation ﬂuctuations. In conducting monetary policy, central banks always
prefer output to be near its natural level. This will ensure an economy operates at near
full employment, as operating below full capacity is ineﬃcient, while operating above
capacity puts upward pressure on price levels. Likewise, central banks always try to
keep inﬂation close to its target level. Hence, specifying the loss function in a quadratic
form will generate a role for a stabilization policy that is absent when the loss function is
speciﬁed in a quasi-linear form . The second reason for the popular use of a quadratic
loss function is theoretical. Woodford (2003) (Chapter 6) shows that, under certain
conditions, the quadratic central bank's loss function can be shown to originate from
the second order approximation to the expected utility of the economy's representative
household. Hence, it can be argued that a central bank's objective function in formu-
lating monetary policy is not done on an ad-hoc basis, but is instead chosen based on
a public welfare consideration. The last reason for the preference of using quadratic
form is its mathematical convenience. A quadratic loss function, together with a linear
speciﬁcation for the economic structure, results in an optimal decision rule that is also
linear. This simpliﬁes the computation and estimation burden of the theoretical and
empirical exercise.
2.2.2 State Variables and Modelling of the Economy
As the name suggests, state variables describe the state or existing condition of the
system. In the context of monetary policy formulation, they are macroeconomic
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variables that provide information on the condition of the economic system at a point
in time. The three most common state variables central banks monitor very closely are
inﬂation, output and the level of interest rates. These variables are closely monitored
not only for their importance for central banks' policy objectives, but also due to their
information content in summarizing the overall condition of an economic system. For
example, an economic system that produces a large output gap or has an inﬂation
rate above its targeted level, give signals that it is currently overheating or operating
beyond its optimal level. Similarly, interest rates that are persistently high indicate a
tight money market condition; or that agents' inﬂation expectations are on the upward
trend. After doing an assessment on the overall state of the system, policymakers will
consider the appropriate policy action to reﬁne the current condition of the economic
system. In the example given here, the central bank's reaction would be to raise its
policy instrument (short-term interest rate) to slow down aggregate demand with the
objective of steering the system towards its optimal path.
The dynamics of the state variables are assumed to follow a certain form of structure,
which essentially describes the mechanical operation of the economic system. This will
form the constraint to the central bank's optimization problem. There are two general
approaches to construct these constraints. The ﬁrst approach constructs the simple
structural equations like the IS and Phillips Curve functions on an ad-hoc basis to ﬁt
the data. This method was popularized by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and was
used in other subsequent work, among others by Favero and Rovelli (2003), Ozlale
(2003), Soderstrom, Soderlind, and Vredin (2005) and Dennis (2004, 2006). Another
approach to represent the operation of the economy is to develop a dynamic stochas-
tic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. The main attractiveness of DSGE models is
that they are derived from ﬁrst principles. This approach overcomes the limitation
of structural modelling in treating parameters to be time invariant, or as popularly
known in the literature as the Lucas critique (Lucas (1976)). Obviously, for this reason,
DSGE models are seen as powerful tools that provide a coherent framework for policy
discussion and analysis. Among examples of work that apply this approach and use
it to analyze central banks' policy behaviour are Devereux, Lane, and Xu (2006),
Justiniano and Preston (2006) and Kam, Lees, and Liu (Forthcoming). In this
thesis, we adopt both approaches to model the Malaysian economy and later use them
to analyze BNM's policy behaviour.
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2.2.3 The Control Variable and Optimal Instrument Rule
The control variable in this optimal control problem is the instrument a central bank
uses to execute its monetary policy. It operates to steer the economic system by aﬀecting
the movement of the state variables (output and inﬂation). After knowing the overall
set-up and operation of the system, how should a central bank use its control instrument
to steer the economic system towards achieving its speciﬁed objectives? The solution
to a central bank's optimal control problem is to set its control variable according to
the optimal rule. It is mathematically derived to minimize the speciﬁed loss function,
given the knowledge of the economic structure. The optimal rule serves as the `decision
rule' or `optimal reaction function' to policymakers in determining the correct value of
ﬁne-tuning the economic system needs in order to ensure the objective variables are
moving on the desired path.
In this regard, most of the recent literature derives the optimal decision rule for the
control variable in the form of an interest rate rule. Depending on the way the optimal
control problem is constructed, the corresponding optimal interest rate rule derived from
this optimization problem may have a diﬀerent form than the HMT interest rate rule.
To diﬀerentiate between these two classes of interest rate rule, the HMT-type interest
rate rule is sometimes known as the `simple interest rate rule' while the optimal interest
rate rule is known as the `complex interest rate rule'.
This distinction leads to another strand of research in the literature  which class of
interest rate rules perform better and hence should be favoured by central bankers?
This strand of research compares the performance of the optimal interest rate rule
vis-à-vis the simple HMT-type interest rate rule across diﬀerent economic models.
See among others Taylor (1999b), Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999, 2003),
Batini, Harrison, and Millard (2001) and Orphanides and Williams (2007) for
examples and results of these comparisons. The general conclusion of the research
in comparing the performance of simple and complex rules is that the simple interest
rate rule performs better on average than the complex rule when each of them is used
across diﬀerent economic models. This result is not surprising. As mentioned earlier,
the optimal interest rate rule is mathematically derived from a speciﬁc model that
forms a central bank's optimization problem, hence making it model-speciﬁc. The
optimal interest rate rule only works best in a model where it is originally assumed.
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In contrast, the simple HMT-type interest rate rule is more robust to model misspeci-
ﬁcation. Since the HMT interest rate rule is not derived from any economic model,
but instead originates from the attempt to describe the systematic behaviour of central
bankers in formulating monetary policy, the HMT rule has implicitly incorporated the
best practice principle that central bankers around the world should follow in setting
policy instruments. Perhaps, besides its simplicity, the robustness of the HMT rule is
the main property that has contributed to its popularity. Even though it is not expli-
citly derived to solve the optimization problem by formally considering the economic
structure and a central bank's loss function, the notion of setting interest rates by
reacting systematically to inﬂation and output gap; and adhering to Taylor's Principle,
are the general code-of-conduct that lead to a favourable economic outcome.
2.3 Empirical Methods to Analyze a Central Bank's
Behaviour
There are two general approaches to analyzing central bank behaviour in formulating
monetary policy. One is to carefully examine the central bank's legislative act and
public statements such as reports, publications, policy statements, public speeches and
interviews to analyze what central bankers say they are trying to accomplish. Known as
`narrative measures of monetary policy', examples of this approach include the classic
analysis by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and the work by Romer and Romer (1989),
Boschen and Mills (1991) and Judd and Rudebusch (1999). While this approach can
uncover some useful information regarding central bank's behaviour, it falls short of
formally modelling the policy formulation process. See Leeper (1993) for a critical
review of this approach. In addition, Walsh (2003) states that the narrative approach
captures both exogenous shifts in policy and the endogenous response of monetary
policy to economic development. Hence, analytical study of central bank's behaviour
to isolate these two factors is diﬃcult.
The second approach, and the one that will be used in this thesis, is to apply statistical
methods to detect the systematic relationships between the actual movement of the
central bank's instrument and other macroeconomic variables. If policymakers behave
purposefully, with well-deﬁned preferences for achieving diﬀerent goals, it may be pos-
sible to uncover these preferences and goals from the empirical response of the interest
32
rates to other macroeconomic variables. With that, this section outlines two empirical
approaches that have been used in the literature to analyze a central bank's behaviour
in formulating monetary policy.
2.3.1 Estimating a Central Bank's Reaction Function
As we mentioned in Section 2.1, there are a large number of empirical studies which
estimate the systematic components of monetary policy using HMT type interest rate
rule. In these studies, a central bank's reaction function is estimated as a single equa-
tion. The estimation method used to estimate the reaction function is dependent on the
model speciﬁcation of the interest rate rule. Ordinary least squares (OLS) is applied for
the case when the HMT interest rate rule uses contemporaneous and backward looking
set-up, while the Instrumental Variables (IV) and the Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM) is favoured when the HMT rule uses the forward looking speciﬁcation.
Dennis (2004) states that one of the reasons why using estimated interest rate rules
to describe monetary policy behaviour is attractive and widely used in the literature
is that they are able to capture the systematic relationship between interest rates and
macroeconomic variables. He argues that the estimated rules from this exercise can
be viewed as approximations to the decision rules used by the central banks. These
estimates are then commonly used in the literature to analyze and evaluate central
bank behaviour in setting monetary policy. The outcome of this approach provides a
few important contributions to understanding central bank behaviour in formulating
monetary policy. It indicates the suitability of modelling the central bank reaction
function by the HMT type interest rate rule. The ability of the interest rate rule
to track the historical movement of central bank instruments provides information on
its systematic behaviour in making monetary policy decisions. In addition, the result
of this approach is also used to provide the answer to the question regarding policy
evaluation. Analysis on the policy evaluation is done by looking at whether a central
bank's past behaviour in setting the interest rate fulﬁlls the Taylor's principle.
The main feature of this approach is that the policy reaction function is estimated as a
single equation. The reaction function is constructed on an ad hoc basis, without a need
to specify or estimate the underlying central bank loss function or the structure of the
economy. The essential point is that estimated policy rules are reduced-form equations,
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which are uninformative of policy issues that involve structural parameters or that
require a structural interpretation because they are formulated, estimated, analyzed,
and interpreted in the absence of a fully speciﬁed economic model (Lucas (1976)).
While it is relatively simple, the main limitation of this approach is that it is only able
to provide a descriptive analysis of a central bank's systematic behaviour in setting past
interest rates. To reveal what central banks aim to achieve through their policy actions,
it is necessary to recognize central banks behave purposefully when setting policy to
achieve a speciﬁc goal. Due to this fact, important information regarding central banks'
behaviour in formulating monetary policy cannot be obtained from the reduced form
approach. Hence, this approach could not provide answers to the questions related
to what are the policy objectives that a central bank wants to pursue and its relative
preferences between these policy objectives. Lastly, since the estimated policy rules are
reduced-form equations, analysis on the possible evolution of policymakers' behaviour
cannot be conducted.
2.3.2 Estimating Central Bank's Policy Preference
To address the limitations of the narrative approach, the empirical approach goes one
step further. It looks at the central bank's optimal control problem as a whole and tries
to estimate simultaneously parameters for the central bank's loss function, reaction
function and model equations representing the economy. Identifying and estimating
parameters of the model equations representing the economy is much more straightfor-
ward and has been widely done in the empirical literature involving the New Keynesian
model. In contrast, estimating parameters in a central bank's loss function from the
real data is far more complicated, mainly because a central bank's loss function itself
is not observable. What is observed from the central bank's action over time is the
actual movement of its monetary instrument (interest rates) and the evolution of the
state variables. In this regard, the estimation exercise needs to infer the parameters in
the loss function by extracting the information from the observed policy action taken
by the central bank as well as the evolution of economic variables over time. As such,
this approach involves an estimation procedure that searches over the parameters of
the model representing the economic structure, for values that reconcile a policy rule
that ﬁts the data and compares it with one that minimizes the expected loss function.
There are several examples in the literature that apply this approach to the case of
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central banks in developed economies. Using the closed economy set-up, Salemi (1995),
Favero and Rovelli (2003), Ozlale (2003), and Dennis (2004, 2006), investigated the case
of the US Federal Reserve, while Assenmacher-Wesche (2006) did a country comparison
involving the US, Germany and Japan. Kam, Lees, and Liu (Forthcoming) took the
approach one step further and used the open economy model to estimate the central
banks' preferences in several developed, inﬂation targeting countries.
There are three estimation methods that have been used to estimate the system of
simultaneous equations for this approach. The ﬁrst two are the maximum likelihood
method as used in Ozlale (2003) and Dennis (2004, 2006) and the GMM method as
applied in Favero and Rovelli (2003). Lastly, Kam, Lees, and Liu (Forthcoming) employ
the Bayesian method.
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter reviews the analytical framework and empirical approaches to analyze
a central bank's systematic behaviour in formulating monetary policy. Based on the
framework and empirical approaches that we outline in this chapter, empirical
exercises to analyze BNM's behaviour in formulating and conducting monetary
policy in Malaysia will be implemented. This will be presented and discussed in the
next ﬁve chapters.
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Chapter 3
Estimating Bank Negara Malaysia's
Reaction Function with a
Simple Interest Rate Rule
The main aim of this chapter is to explore the validity of modelling Bank Negara
Malaysia's (BNM) reaction function by a simple interest rate rule. The results of the
empirical exercise in this chapter will form a foundation to investigate in detail, BNM's
behaviour in formulating monetary policy in Malaysia. The subsequent analysis of
BNM's behaviour in formulating monetary policy depends crucially on the premise
that BNM's reaction function could be reasonably established and estimated. Based on
this reaction function, the systematic component of BNM's policy making could then
be identiﬁed and analyzed.
The empirical exercise in this chapter aims to fulﬁll four main objectives. The ﬁrst, is
to examine the ability of a simple, Henderson-McKibbin-Taylor (HMT) type interest
rate rule, to model the reaction function of BNM. The second, is to investigate the
role of exchange rates in inﬂuencing BNM's decision rule. Acknowledging the fact that
Malaysia is a small, open economy, the exchange rate could play an important role
in the overall monetary transmission mechanism. Hence, this exercise will compare
the outcome of the closed-economy interest rate rule, with an open-economy interest
rate rule in tracking interest rate determination in Malaysia. The third objective is to
analyze BNM's overall behaviour in setting interest rates. In particular, the empirical
results will indicate whether BNM's behaviour is consistent with Taylor's principle
and whether BNM practices interest rate smoothing. It will also provide the implicit
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estimates of the inﬂation target that BNM tries to achieve in conducting monetary
policy. The ﬁnal objective is to assess whether BNM's reaction function has been
consistent over time. In doing so, three sub-periods are considered. These include the
period prior to and during the capital controls and ﬁxed exchange rate regime was
in place.
To our knowledge, there are only two published empirical studies that have attempted
to estimate BNM's reaction function. First, is by Umezaki (2007). Similar to the
methodological approach we use in this chapter, Umezaki estimates BNM's reaction
function using monthly data, covering the period of January 1988 to August 1998.
He investigates how BNM's behaviour is aﬀected by external factors, like the change
in the exchange rate regime (ﬂoat and managed ﬂoat) and by the degree and size
of capital mobility. Likewise, Ramayandi (2008) applies the same approach and uses
the estimated reaction function based on the HMT interest rate rule to compare the
formulation of monetary policy in 5 ASEAN countries - Malaysia, Indonesia, Sin-
gapore, Thailand and The Philippines. Like the one we used in this chapter, Ra-
mayandi also uses quarterly data in his empirical exercise but he covers a shorter sam-
ple period of 1989Q1 to 2004Q4. While to some extent, the estimation of BNM's
reaction function that we do in this chapter is largely similar to those reported in
Umezaki (2007) and Ramayandi (2008), there are also new areas about BNM's pol-
icy behaviour that this chapter will explore and that have not been previously cov-
ered. For example, in our estimation exercise, we will cover a longer sample period,
1975Q1 to 2005Q2. This longer period covers diﬀerent phases and stages of eco-
nomic development experienced by the Malaysian economy, thus it provides a good
avenue to analyze how BNM may behave under diﬀerent economic circumstances.
In addition, with the use of estimation results for the sub-sample periods, we will
also investigate the possible evolution of BNM's reaction function over time.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 discusses diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the
simple interest rate rule that has been used in the literature to represent a central bank's
reaction function. Based on this discussion, Section 3.2 presents the speciﬁcations of the
simple interest rate rule that is used to represent BNM's reaction function. Section 3.3
presents the estimation results. The last section concludes.
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3.1 Speciﬁcation of Simple Interest Rate Rule
The original form of the simple interest rate rule suggested by the seminal contribution
by Henderson and McKibbin (1993) and Taylor (1993), is as follows:
rt = α + βpipit + Θyyt
where rt is the central bank's policy rate, pit the inﬂation rate, yt the output gap
(deﬁned as deviation of current GDP from its full potential level). βpi and Θy are
the feedback parameters for inﬂation and the output gap respectively. The intercept
parameter, α , is deﬁned as
α = r∗ + (1− βpi) pi∗
where pi∗ is the central bank's implicit inﬂation target and r∗ is the real interest rate
in the steady state.
The HMT rule given above represents the standard starting point for the family of
simple interest rate rules that has been used in the theoretical and empirical literature.
One common extension to this set-up is to introduce the desire of the central banks to
smooth interest rate changes. This is done by including a lagged interest rate term to
the reaction function, as shown below:
rt = (1− ρ) [α + βpipit + Θyyt] + ρrt−1 (3.1)
where coeﬃcient ρ measures the degree of the smoothing behaviour. The economic
rationale behind such smoothing behaviour has been well documented in the litera-
ture.1 Among others, central banks smooth interest rates to maintain ﬁnancial stability
(Cukierman (1992)), to enhance credibility by minimizing policy reversal (Goodhart
(1999)) or just a reﬂection of a central bank's cautious attitude to information and
model uncertainty (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999)).
1See Lowe and Ellis (1997) and Sack and Wieland (2000) for the literature review on this area.
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Another extension is to introduce variables other than inﬂation and the output gap
into the reaction function. For example, Ball (1999) proposes the inclusion of an
exchange rate target in the simple interest rate rule in the analysis of the open economy.
The main justiﬁcation for the inclusion of an exchange rate is to acknowledge the
importance of the exchange rate as one of the monetary transmission channels.
Svensson (2000) outlines three mechanisms on how exchange rates act as an addi-
tional channel of the monetary transmission mechanism. Firstly, the real exchange rate
aﬀects the relative price between domestic and foreign goods, and thus contributes to
the aggregate demand channel through expenditure switching. Secondly, the exchange
rate aﬀects consumer prices directly via the domestic currency price of imported ﬁnal
goods. Finally, Svensson argues that the exchange rate will aﬀect inﬂation indirectly
through imported intermediate goods, which will eventually aﬀect the cost of domesti-
cally produced goods.
The open-economy interest rate rule suggested by Ball (1999) is:
rt = (1− ρ) [α + βpipit + Θyyt + Ω1rert + Ω2rert−1] + ρrt−1 (3.2)
with rer representing the real exchange rate. In the above model, the apprecia-
tion of the exchange rate ( ↓ rer ) has a contractionary impact on aggregate demand.
Appreciation makes imported goods cheaper and domestic goods more expensive, hence
reducing net exports. The same eﬀect will also reduce domestic inﬂation. Thus, the
appreciating exchange rate puts downward pressure on the inﬂation rate and output
gap, which could induce the central bank to reduce interest rates (Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
(1995)). Following this, parameter Ω in the interest rate rule is expected to be positive.
Nevertheless, in reality, measuring the equilibrium level of the real exchange rate on
a real time basis is not an easy task for policymakers. This implies that the interest
rate rule that reacts to the level of the real exchange rate as suggested by Ball may
not be very useful in practice. Following this, Batini, Harrison, and Millard (2001) and
Leitemo and Soderstrom (2005) modify Ball's original model by suggesting that the in-
terest rate rule should react to the change in and not to the level of the exchange rate.
Their suggestion imposes the restriction that Ω2 = −Ω1 in equation 3.2, suggesting
that the central bank should react to the speed of depreciation/appreciation of the
exchange rate rather than to the ﬂuctuations in its exact level. Imposing this restriction
reduces the open-economy interest rate rule suggested by Ball to:
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rt = (1− ρ) [α + βpipit + Θyyt + Ω4rert] + ρrt−1 (3.3)
The estimation of the interest rate rule also diﬀers on the speciﬁcation about the time
dimension used for the explanatory variables. The original HMT-rule uses a contem-
poraneous set-up, with current inﬂation and the output gap included in the simple
interest rate rule. However, McCallum (1993) argues that this set-up is not realistic
in the real world, as data on current inﬂation and output gap is not available at the
time the interest rate decision is made. Hence, McCallum suggests inclusion of lags of
inﬂation and the output gap in the simple interest rate rule. With this set-up, the
central bank is assumed to adopt backward-looking behaviour in setting monetary
policy. Given the fact that monetary policy works with lags, the assumption of policy-
makers to be backward looking may not be sensible in the real world. Hence, Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler (1998) propose the use of a forward looking interest rate rule, which
is a function of the central bank's expectations of inﬂation and the output gap.
3.2 Speciﬁcation of BNM's Reaction Function
To explore the correct speciﬁcation of BNM's reaction function, this estimation
exercise considers separately the closed economy and open economy versions of the
simple interest rate rule. In addition, three speciﬁcations about the time dimension used
for the explanatory variables - inﬂation, output gap and exchange rates - are explored.
Diﬀerent time speciﬁcations used for BNM's reaction function are the backward-looking,
contemporaneous and forward-looking set-up.
From equation 3.1, the closed economy version of the simple interest rate rule to
represent BNM's reaction function is,
rt = (1− ρ) [α + βpipit+n + Θyyt+n] + ρrt−1 + εt (3.4)
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while the open-economy version of the simple interest rate rule is taken from
equation 3.3,
rt = (1− ρ) [α + βpipit+n + Θyyt+n + Ω4rert+n] + ρrt−1 + εt (3.5)
with α = r + (1− βpi) pi.
For the purpose of estimation, the deﬁnitions of variables are as follows:
rt is the average 3-month interbank rate for the quarter, the operational target of BNM;
pit is the annual inﬂation rate for the quarter;
yt is the output gap for the quarter, deﬁned as yt = GDPt − GDP ∗t , where GDPt is
the real GDP for the quarter and GDP ∗t is the potential output, estimated by
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter;
4rert is the changes in Real Exchange Rate (↑ 4rert denotes depreciation), deﬁned
as 4rert = rert − rert−1;
rt−1 is the lag interest rate to capture BNM's smoothing behaviour;
εt is the the error term;
r is the long run equilibrium (neutral) interest rate;2
pi is BNM's inﬂation target, derived by using the estimated value for α and the proxy
value of r.
Deﬁnitions and source of data is given at the end of this thesis. Variables rt , pit , yt
and 4rert are all found to be stationary. See Table 3.4 (placed in the Appendix) for
the result of unit root test.
To explore the most appropriate time speciﬁcations for BNM's reaction function, dif-
ferent values for n are used in the above model of the simple interest rate rule:
2This is not estimated by the model. Following the suggestion of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998),
the average real interest rate from 1973 to 1998 is used as the proxy for r.
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• n = -1 for a backward-looking set-up, as suggested by McCallum (1993, 1999);
• n = 0 for a contemporaneous set-up, in accordance to the original speciﬁcation
suggested by Henderson and McKibbin (1993) and Taylor (1993); and
• n = 1 for a forward-looking set-up, in line with the speciﬁcation suggested by
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998).
On the estimation procedure, the simple interest rate rule with the contemporaneous
and the backward-looking speciﬁcations employ the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
method. Due to the possible existence of correlation between the explanatory variables
and the disturbance term in the forward-looking interest rate rules, the Instrumental
Variables (IV) estimation method is chosen to estimate the forward-looking reaction
function. For this purpose, the instruments used for the IV estimation are four lags
of 3-month interbank rate (rt), inﬂation (pit), output gap (yt), log M3, and 4RERt.3
For both estimation methods, the Newey-West heteroscedasticity and serial correlation
consistent standard error is used.
Estimation Period
The estimation of BNM's reaction function covers the period of 1975Q1 to 2005Q2.
To investigate the consistency of BNM's behaviour during this 30 years period, three
diﬀerent sub-periods are considered. Two sub-periods prior to capital control and the
ﬁxed exchange rate regime are 1975Q1 to 1986Q4 and 1987Q1 to 1998Q2. The third
sub-period is 1998Q3 to 2005Q2, during which capital controls and the ﬁxed exchange
rate regime, were in place.
There are several reasons for choosing 1987Q1 and 1998Q3 as the breaking point to the
estimation period. First, is to take into account the changes in Malaysia's economic
development. After recovering from a severe recession in 1984-1985, the Malaysian
economy went through several structural changes and grew signiﬁcantly from 1987
3One of the criticisms of the IV estimation technique is the use of weak instruments, i.e. the
instruments used are poor predictors of the variable being instrumented for. However, this is not the
case for the set of instruments that we used in this exercise. Correlations between the instruments
used and the variables being instrumented for are quite high. See summary of correlation coeﬃcients
of variables in Table 3.5, placed in Appendix.
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onwards. This sudden change in the economic structure could have induced diﬀerent
policy responses from BNM in formulating its monetary policy. Second, is the struc-
tural break in the monetary policy framework adopted by BNM. During the 1970's and
a large part of the 1980's, BNM adopted a monetary targeting framework. During this
period, M1 and later, M3, was used as the nominal anchor to BNM's policy (Bank Ne-
gara Malaysia (1999)). Also, as a result of ﬁnancial and payment system innovations 
such as the introduction of Automated Teller Machine (ATM) facilities in mid-1980's 
demand for money in Malaysia was unstable.4 The unstable money demand
function makes the operation of monetary targeting framework less viable. Follow-
ing this, from 1987 onwards, BNM gradually reduced its policy emphasis on targeting
particular monetary aggregates before oﬃcially adopting the interest rate targeting
framework in 1994. Hence, the change in the BNM's monetary framework could aﬀect
the stability of the estimated reaction function. Finally, results of the Chow-test on
the estimated reaction function for 1975Q1 to 2005Q2 period reconﬁrm 1987Q1 and
1998Q3 as a valid breaking point.5
During the period of September 1998 to July 2005, BNM adopted the capital
controls and ﬁxed exchange rate regime. The adoption of this controversial policy in the
aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis may have resulted in signiﬁcant changes in the
behaviour of the policymakers. For example, the introduction of this regime provided
BNM with monetary independence (Bank Negara Malaysia (1999)) and the breathing-
space needed to adopt pro-growth policies to reﬂate the Malaysian economy (Athukorala
(2001)).
The best approach to investigate the possible changes in the BNM's behaviour
during the imposition of this regime is to estimate the model separately. This way, the
estimated reaction function will exclusively represent policymakers' underlying objec-
tives and allow consideration for the possible change in the decision making process
during the period. Nevertheless, with the short data point which covers the period of
this regime - 26 quarterly data points  the use of separate regression does not produce
a good ﬁt. To overcome this problem, dummy variable Ft is introduced to equation 3.4
and equation 3.5. Dummy variable Ft takes a value of 1 for period 1998Q3 to 2005Q2
and zero otherwise. The amended model for the estimation period 1987Q1 to 2005Q2
is as follows:
4See among others Ibrahim (2001), Sriram (2002) and Mohamed-Zulkhibri (2005).
5See results in Table 3.3, placed in Appendix
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Closed economy version:
rt = (1− ρ) [α + βpipit+n + Θyyt+n] + ρrt−1
+ (1− dρ) [∂αFt + ∂βpiFtpit+n + ∂ΘyFtyt+n] + ∂ρFtrt−1 + εt
Open economy version:
rt = (1− ρ) [α + βpipit+n + Θyyt+n + Ω4rert+n] + ρrt−1
+ (1− dρ) [∂αFt + ∂βpiFtpit+n + ∂ΘyFtyt+n + ∂ΩFt4rert+n] + ∂ρFtrt−1 + εt
with ∂ρ, ∂α, ∂βpi, ∂Θy, ∂Ω representing changes in estimated parameters when the
capital controls and ﬁxed exchange rate regime was in operation.
3.3 Estimation Results
To answer the question whether the interest rule speciﬁed in equation 3.4 and 3.5
is a good representation of BNM's behaviour, it must be tested against the data.
The outcome from this exercise highlights several main features about BNM's behaviour
in formulating monetary policy. Each of these features is discussed below.
Establishing BNM's Reaction Function
From the result in Table 3.1, it is found that the simple HMT-type interest rate rule
that has been widely used in the analysis of monetary policy in various developed and
developing economies, is also equally applicable in summarizing the historical behaviour
of the policymakers in Malaysia. This is shown from the very high adjusted R2 for each
of the estimated equations.6 Moreover, in all of the estimated equations involving the
closed economy version, the estimated coeﬃcients are correctly signed with a plausible
6In almost all cases, the estimated equations pass the standard diagnostic test for autocorrelation
and ARCH. In the case where the existence of heterocedasticity cannot be rejected, the Newey-West
consistent standard error is used.
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Table 3.1: BNM's Estimated Reaction Function with Diﬀerent
Speciﬁcations: 1975Q1-2005Q2
Backward-Looking Speciﬁcation
Closed Economy Version
βpi Θy ρ α pi
∗ Adj. R2 SEE
0.683 0.864 0.857 3.777 2.451 0.874 0.890
(0.243) (0.199) (0.049) (0.956) std. err.
(0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) p-value
Open Economy Version
βpi Θy ρ α Ω pi
∗ Adj. R2 SEE
0.822 0.789 0.840 3.089 -0.352 0.501 0.874 0.890
(0.222) (0.163) (0.051) (0.847) (0.180) std. err.
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.053) p-value
Contemporaneous Speciﬁcation
Closed Economy Version
βpi Θy ρ α pi
∗ Adj. R2 SEE
0.937 1.101 0.871 3.080 1.254 0.886 0.847
(0.256) (0.295) (0.044) (1.082) std. err.
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) p-value
Open Economy Version
βpi Θy ρ α Ω pi
∗ Adj. R2 SEE
1.053 1.032 0.863 2.434 -0.274 10.727 0.889 0.836
(0.240) (0.202) (0.040) (0.960) (0.242) std. err.
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.260) p-value
Forward-Looking Speciﬁcation
Closed Economy Version
βpi Θy ρ α pi
∗ Adj. R2 SEE
1.089 1.196 0.879 2.546 5.095 0.886 0.847
(0.318) (0.356) (0.038) (1.184) std. err.
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.034) p-value
Open Economy Version
βpi Θy ρ α Ω pi
∗ Adj. R2 SEE
1.444 0.918 0.870 1.234 -0.143 3.981 0.885 0.851
(0.424) (0.297) (0.040) (1.447) (0.269) std. err.
(0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.395) (0.598) p-value
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size. Estimated coeﬃcients for the model are also statistically signiﬁcant. Hence, the
results indicate the existence of a systematic relationship between the movement of
BNM's operational target with inﬂation and output gap, as well as the tendency of
BNM to smooth interest rates. Most importantly, the results suggest that the simple
interest rate rule tracks BNM's reaction function reasonably well. This result will be
an important platform to analyze BNM's behaviour in formulating monetary policy in
Malaysia.
In general, our estimation results are largely consistent with the results reported in
two other empirical studies that look at the conduct of monetary policy in Malaysia.
Studies by Umezaki (2007) and Ramayandi (2008) model BNM's reaction function
using a forward looking HMT rule and they ﬁnd that it tracks the historical interest
rate movement fairly well. The same outcomes are also found here.
BNM's Smoothing Behaviour
The results also indicate the tendency of BNM to smooth the interest rate movement
over the period. Using diﬀerent speciﬁcation, the estimated smoothing coeﬃcient of
its reaction function is within the range of 0.8. The size of the estimated smoothing
parameter for BNM is comparable to the estimates found in similar studies involving
central banks in the developed countries. See among others the study by Judd and
Rudebusch (1998), Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998) and Nelson (2003). This suggests
that in setting its policy rate, BNM's smoothing behaviour is not very diﬀerent from
its fellow counterparts in developed economies.
Choice of Time Dimension for the Reaction Function  Backward, Contem-
poraneous and Forward Looking Speciﬁcations
From Table 3.1, results using the backward looking speciﬁcation in both versions of the
HMT rule raised some questionable doubts about BNM's actual behaviour in managing
its interest rate policy. Even though the backward looking speciﬁcation is able to track
the data well, the estimates on the feedback coeﬃcient on inﬂation (βpi) are found to be
well below one. This result suggests that BNM's general behaviour in setting interest
rates during the estimation period, was not consistent with the Taylor's principle. If
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Taylor's principle is violated over an extended period, it will lead to a self-fulﬁlling
inﬂation spiral (Woodford (2001)). Given that the history of inﬂation in Malaysia
was fairly low and stable during the estimation period, the ﬁnding that the estimated
coeﬃcient for βpi to be well below 1 for the backward looking speciﬁcation is not really
consistent with the actual economic development experience in Malaysia.7 For this
reason, modeling BNM's reaction function using the backward-looking speciﬁcation
may not represent the actual behaviour of BNM in setting its policy rate during the
estimation period.
In contrast, speciﬁcations using the contemporaneous and forward-looking set-up,
produce more sensible results in tracking the formulation of monetary policy in Malaysia.
The size of the estimated coeﬃcient on βpi is more reasonable and consistent with
Taylor's principle. In addition, results of both speciﬁcations also produce a better
overall ﬁt, with higher adjusted-R2 and lower standard error than the backward look-
ing model. Hence, the results suggest that BNM has not adopted a backward-looking
behaviour in setting its interest rate policy. Instead, the policymakers are more likely to
give large consideration to current (contemporaneous) or future (forward-looking) infor-
mation in arriving at their policy decision. This result is not surprising. In several of its
past reports and publications, BNM always provided its view and evaluation about the
current and future economic outlook  suggesting their importance to BNM's monetary
policy formulation. The results of this exercise further supports this proposition. Hence,
a simple HMT rule with the contemporaneous or forward-looking speciﬁcation seems
to better represent BNM's reaction function than the backward-looking speciﬁcation.
Having said that, the estimation results using the contemporaneous and the forward
looking speciﬁcations are found to be very similar to each other. The strong
similarities between the two estimation results, give no clear cut indication to single
out which speciﬁcation is the best choice to represent BNM's actual reaction function.
Due to this reason, both, the contemporaneous and the forward-looking speciﬁcations
will be considered interchangeably in the subsequent analysis about the formulation of
monetary policy in Malaysia.
7The average inﬂation during the estimation period is 3.51%, which is very low for a developing
economy like Malaysia. See Figure 3.2 below to see the overall trend.
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Closed vs. Open Economy Version of the Simple Interest Rate Rule
Contrary to Ball's suggestion on the importance of the exchange rate to the interest
rate rule, the estimated result of the closed and open economy versions of the inter-
est rate rule for Malaysia is almost identical to each other (see results in Table 3.1).
More notably, the estimated results suggest that the exchange rate variable is not
really important in inﬂuencing BNM's interest rate decision. In all cases, the estimated
coeﬃcient for the change in exchange rate is wrongly signed and is not statistically
signiﬁcant.8 Similar outcomes were also reported in Umezaki (2007) and Ramayandi
(2008).
The insigniﬁcance of the exchange rate in inﬂuencing the determination of the interest
rate in Malaysia is not really surprising, given the fact that Malaysia adopted a managed
ﬂoat exchange rate regime during most of the estimation period. Like other central
banks in developing countries with a similar exchange rate regime, BNM smoothed the
ﬂuctuation of the ringgit by intervening directly in the exchange rate market (Page 15,
Bank Negara Malaysia (1994b) and page 270, Bank Negara Malaysia (1999)). As the
objective to smooth exchange rate ﬂuctuations is conducted separately using the direct
intervention method, it is very likely that BNM's decision to set interest rates purposely
exclude this factor.9 This could be the main explanation to the ﬁndings that the
exchange rate parameters in the estimated BNM's reaction function are insigniﬁcant.
Similar results on the unimportance of exchange rate movement to the interest rate
determination are also found in the empirical studies for developed economies. For
example, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998) concluded that the quantitative impact
of exchange rate movements to the estimated interest rate rule for the industrialized
countries is very small. Similarly, Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) ﬁnd little evidence of
exchange rate eﬀects on the interest rate movement in Australia, New Zealand and UK.
On this point, Taylor (2001) argues that even though the closed economy version of a
simple interest rate rule does not include the exchange rate variable directly, the impact
of exchange rate movement is already reﬂected on the outcome of inﬂation and output
8Estimation results using backward looking speciﬁcation indicate weak evidence on the signiﬁ-
cance of the exchange rate movement in BNM's reaction function. However, the estimate is still
wrongly signed. As stated earlier, backward looking speciﬁcation may not truly represent BNM's
actual behaviour in formulating monetary policy. Thus, we still view exchange rate movement is not
an important component in BNM's decision rule.
9We will discuss this issue in more detail in Chapter 4.
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gap that is considered in making interest rate decisions. Hence, adding the exchange
rate as an additional variable to the interest rate rule only gives marginal improvement
to the closed economy version of the interest rate rule. Results of studies by Batini,
Harrison, and Millard (2001) and Leitemo and Soderstrom (2005) supported Taylor's
argument. In their respective studies they ﬁnd that including exchange rates directly
into the interest rate rule does not yield much improvement in the performance of the
optimal interest rate rule of their model. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001) take Taylor's
point even further. Using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model as
a workhorse, they show how the monetary policy problem in an open economy set-up
of their model, is isomorphic to its closed economy counterpart. They conclude that
central banks' policy objectives of smoothing output and inﬂation variations remain the
same in the case of an open economy; what changes, however, is the structure of the
reduced form of the optimal interest rate rule. Hence, following this argument and the
fact that estimated parameters for the real exchange rates are found to be statistically
insigniﬁcant in the estimated model for Malaysia, the estimation result of the closed
economy version of the simple interest rate rule will be used in the subsequent analysis
of this chapter.
3.4 Evolution of BNM's Reaction Function
BNM's estimated reaction function is found to be considerably diﬀerent for the three
sub-periods that are considered. The results are presented in Table 3.2 below.
3.4.1 Pre-capital controls and ﬁxed exchange rate regime
period: 1975Q1 to 1986Q4 and 1987Q1 to 1998Q2
There are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the size of the estimated coeﬃcients for βpi , Θy and
ρ during the two sub-periods. It is found that the feedback coeﬃcient for the interest
rate smoothing ( ρ ) and the feedback coeﬃcient on the output gap (Θy ) for the 1987-
1998 period decrease notably compared with the estimates for the 1975-1986 period. In
contrast, the feedback coeﬃcient for inﬂation ( βpi ) increases considerably during the
later period, suggesting the increase in importance of inﬂation outlook in inﬂuencing
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Table 3.2: BNM's Estimated Reaction Function: Sub-sample Periods
Closed Economy Version of HMT Rule
Contemporaneous Speciﬁcation
1975Q1-1986Q4
βpi Θy ρ α pi
∗ Adj. R2 SEE
0.470 0.845 0.858 5.549 4.805 0.824 1.050
(0.405) (0.252) (0.062) (2.352) std. err.
(0.253) (0.002) (0.000) (0.023) p-value
1987Q1-1998Q2
βpi Θy ρ α pi
∗ Adj. R2 SEE
1.491 0.656 0.740 1.692 2.667 0.896 0.635
(0.304) (0.339) (0.109) (0.983) std. err.
(0.000) (0.057) (0.000) (0.089) p-value
1987Q1-2005Q2
βpi Θy ρ α ∂βpi ∂Θy ∂ρ ∂α pi
∗ Adj. R2 SEE
1.491 0.656 0.740 1.692 -0.005 -0.149 -0.445 0.721 1.211 0.936 0.569
(0.304) (0.339) (0.109) (0.983) (0.203) (0.042) (0.214) (0.217) std. err.
(0.000) (0.057) (0.000) (0.089) (0.980) (0.001) (0.041) (0.002) p-value
Forward-Looking Speciﬁcation
1975Q1-1986Q4
βpi Θy ρ α pi
∗ Adj. R2 SEE
0.351 1.125 0.852 6.171 4.883 0.819 1.063
(0.380) (0.463) (0.062) (2.044) std. err.
(0.361) (0.019) (0.000) (0.004) p-value
1987Q1-1998Q2
βpi Θy ρ α pi
∗ Adj. R2 SEE
1.880 0.568 0.674 1.028 3.440 0.913 0.583
(0.391) (0.160) (0.067) (1.411) std. err.
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.984) p-value
1987Q1-2005Q2
βpi Θy ρ α ∂βpi ∂Θy ∂ρ ∂α pi
∗ Adj. R2 SEE
1.888 0.546 0.679 1.070 -0.057 -0.279 -0.210 1.084 1.732 0.941 0.547
(0.380) (0.177) (0.075) (1.432) (0.210) (0.075) (0.064) (0.484) std. err.
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.978) (0.393) (0.000) (0.015) (0.040) p-value
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the movement of interest rates during the 1987-1998 period. The diﬀerence is also seen
on the policymakers' implicit inﬂation target. During the later period, monetary policy
aimed to achieve a lower inﬂation target.
Lower interest rate smoothing behaviour
The lower estimate for the smoothing coeﬃcient ( ρ ) for the 1987-1998 period suggests
that monetary policy had been used more aggressively as the demand management tool
during this period. The main reason to explain this outcome is the improvement in the
domestic ﬁnancial landscape and infrastructure. This condition provided BNM with
greater ﬂexibility to maneuver monetary policy, with less concern about the negative
impact of such action on the overall stability of the ﬁnancial system. For example, the
successful deregulation of the interest rate regime for the banking institutions in the late
1970s, provided the Malaysian banking system with greater ﬂexibility and resilience.
Together with the progression and advancement of the Malaysian ﬁnancial system that
permits a more eﬃcient working of the money and capital markets to allocate ﬁnancial
resources, the importance of monetary policy has also become more important and
dominant over time. This translated into a lower interest rate smoothing behaviour.
Lower feedback coeﬃcient on the output gap
While there is evidence of more aggressive use of monetary policy during the later
period, the estimated reaction function also indicates that BNM was less responsive to
the development in the output gap (Θy). This indicates that, as Malaysia's economy
became more developed, BNM was more cautious in its action responding to the output
gap.
BNM's cautious behaviour could be attributed to the increasing diﬃculty for the
policymaker to assess the true state of the Malaysian economy. With the rapid and
sustained expansion of GDP experienced during the post-1987 period, together with the
continuing evolution in the economic and ﬁnancial condition of the Malaysian economy,
the policymakers' task to get the clear picture on the economic conditions
becomes more challenging. To give a snapshot on the dynamic changes of the Malaysian
economy, Malaysia experienced a large increase in foreign direct investment (FDI).
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The total amount of FDI inﬂow during the 1975-1986 period was USD9.048 billion and
in 1987-1998, this amount increased signiﬁcantly to USD47.072 billion.10 The large
inﬂow of FDI during this short period of time contributed to the rapid expansion of the
Malaysian economy. During this period, Malaysian GDP grew at the average rate of 9%
annually. Hence, the dynamic economic progress during this short span of time gave
the central bank a great challenge to evaluate the true state of the economy before
making monetary policy decisions.
The result of the estimated reaction function suggests that BNM has reacted to this
increasing uncertainty by putting smaller weight on the output gap. Given that the
structure of the Malaysian economy changed considerably and experienced rapid growth
during this period, BNM's cautious behaviour as inferred from this result is sensible
and consistent with the famous proposition made by Brainard (1967). Faced with
multiplicative uncertainty, in deciding policy actions, the central bank should be on the
cautious side. As Alan Blinder, former member of Federal Reserve Board, put it on
this issue:
. . . .estimate how much you need to tighten or loosen monetary policy
to `get it right'. Then do less. Blinder (1998)
The results of the estimated reaction function suggests BNM did just that from 1987
onwards.
The observation that in the face of increasing diﬃculty to asses the true economic
condition, BNM reacted less forcefully to the output gap ( ↓ Θy ) but showed less
tendency to smooth interest rates ( ↓ ρ ), is quite interesting. Normally, we would
expect, faced with increase policy uncertainty, BNM to become more cautious in its
overall policy action and this would translate into a higher interest rate smoothing.
This turns out not to be the case. During the 1987-1998 period, BNM demonstrates
its precautionary policy stance by responding less to the output gap but not to the
willingness to change interest rate. There could be two reasons for this policy beha-
viour. One, as we mentioned before, from 1987 onwards BNM operated in a more
resilient banking system that allows it to use monetary policy more eﬀectively as one
of the tools in the macroeconomic demand management. Second, this could reﬂect the
10Source: UNCTAD FDI database (http://stats.unctad.org/FDI/TableViewer/tableView.aspx)
53
outcome from policymakers' strategy at that time to address the inﬂationary pressure
in Malaysia. During that period, inﬂationary pressure was dominantly emanated from
the supply constraint to keep up with the increase demand. The continuous expansion
of the economy from 1987 onwards resulted the Malaysian economy to operate at the
full employment level by 1992 (Bank Negara Malaysia (1994b)). Instead of focusing
its policy action to slowdown the demand side, Malaysia's policymakers (BNM and
other Government agencies like the Treasury and the Economic Planning Unit) took a
diﬀerent approach to tackle this issue. They tried to address the supply constraint by
encouraging more capacity building. Thus, to encourage investment, particularly from
the private sector, monetary policy (and interest rate) was made more accommodative
when responding to the development in the output gap. As we will see in Chapter 4,
this policy action is consistent with BNM's policy preferences. Compared to the 1975-
1986 period, BNM increases its policy preference to stabilize the output gap during the
later period.
Higher feedback coeﬃcient on the inﬂation outlook
The estimation results reveal that the coeﬃcient for βpi , (the feedback coeﬃcient for
inﬂation) during the period of 1975-1986 is small and is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Interestingly, BNM's estimated reaction function for this period was not really consis-
tent with the behaviour predicted by the HMT-type interest rate rule in the way the
central bank articulates its interest rate decision. Even though the simple HMT rule
ﬁts the data fairly well (with the adjusted R2 for 1975-1986 period is around 0.8), the
estimation results indicate that the inﬂation factor was not statistically signiﬁcant in
inﬂuencing the movement of interest rates during this period. Stabilizing the output
gap was the dominant factor that contributed to BNM's action to change the interest
rate.
Does this result imply that the simple HMT-rule fails to represent BNM's reaction
function for this period? While this is one of the possibilities, the fact that the simple
HMT rule is able to track the actual data well suggests the high possibility for this
rule to be a valid representation of BNM's reaction functions for the 1975-1986 period.
Hence, the result could indicate possible inconsistencies on the part of BNM's behaviour
at that time, in particular its failure in setting the interest rates to be in line with the
Taylor's principle (i.e. to set βpi > 1 ). On this note, the simple HMT-rule ﬁts the data
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Figure 3.1: Malaysia's GDP Growth 1975Q1-2005Q2
(quarterly, seasonally adjusted, %)
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much better during the later periods, with the estimated coeﬃcients for βpi well above
1 and statistically signiﬁcant.
This result highlights two important observations on BNM's behaviour in formulating
monetary policy in Malaysia. Firstly, it indicates that the formulation of monetary
policy during the 1975-1986 period was geared towards achieving output stability, with
little consideration to the inﬂation outlook. During this period, the growth of Malaysia's
GDP was more volatile (see Figure 3.1 for details). GDP growth was badly aﬀected
by the oil price shocks (early and end-1970's) and the collapse of commodity prices in
the international market (mid-1980s). Perhaps, these factors prompted BNM to tempo-
rarily sacriﬁce its price stability objective and focus more towards stabilizing the output
ﬂuctuations. Secondly, BNM's failure to comply with the Taylor's principle during this
period caused a temporary increase in the level and volatility of the inﬂation rate in
Malaysia. During 1975-1986, it is found that the inﬂation rate was much higher and
volatile than what was experienced during the later period. While higher domestic inﬂa-
tion during the period could be attributed to the eﬀects of supply shock experienced
by the Malaysian economy following the ﬁrst (1973) and the second (1979) oil price
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Figure 3.2: Malaysia's Inﬂation Rate 1975Q1-2005Q2
(quarterly, seasonally adjusted, %)
-1
1
3
5
7
9
11
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
% 1975Q1 to 1986Q4 1987Q1 to 1998Q2 1998Q3 to 2005Q2
Aftermath of First 
Oil Price Shock
 1973-74
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1975Q1-1986Q4 1987Q1-1998Q2 1998Q3-2005Q2 1975Q1-2005Q2
Mean 4.28 3.23 2.02 3.37
Std. Dev. 2.62 1.23 1.19 2.08
Minimum -0.29 0 0.87 -0.29
Maximum 10.54 5.73 5.67 10.54
shocks, failure of BNM to set interest rates by responding to the inﬂation outlook could
be the amplifying factor contributing to this high inﬂation experience. In particular,
BNM's failure to set interest rates by reacting more than one-to-one to inﬂation could
have exacerbated the impact of the oil price shocks on the domestic price. See table
and graph in Figure 3.2 for details. This outcome is in-line with the theoretical ﬁndings
advocated by Taylor (1999b) and Woodford (2001) about the importance of an interest
rate rule to fulﬁll Taylor's principle in order to ensure price stability. Failure to do
so, leads to the self-fulﬁlling inﬂationary process to take eﬀect. In the Malaysian case
during this episode, the supply shocks from the higher oil price triggered the upward
adjustment on the price of general goods, as well as the inﬂationary expectation among
economic agents. These factors contributed to the higher domestic inﬂation. When
nominal interest rates failed to adjust more than one-to-one to changes in the inﬂation
rate, the reduction in the real interest rates pushed up the aggregate demand through
the interest rate channel. The higher aggregate demand put further upward pressure
on the general price level. Hence, the price level continued to be adjusted upwards.
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As a result, inﬂation during 1975-1986 remained high for an extended period and peaked
at 10.5% in Q2 1984.
In contrast, inﬂation rate during the 1987-1998 period was much lower and relatively
stable. During the estimation period, the estimated coeﬃcient for βpi of BNM's reaction
function is well above 1 and is statistically signiﬁcant. Despite the Malaysian economy
growing at a rapid rate during this period  with GDP expanding at an average annual
rate of 9% - the inﬂation rate remained low and stable. Again, the stable inﬂation
outcome during this period was attributed to BNM's sound conduct of monetary policy
by setting interest rates according to Taylor's principle.
The beneﬁt of this sound policy to Malaysia's economy was considerable. Inﬂation
during the later period was much lower and more stable. The volatility of the inﬂation
rate declined substantially, with its standard deviation reduced to just 1.232 (2.624
for 1975-1986). In addition, the beneﬁt from stable inﬂation is prosperous economic
growth. During the period, Malaysia experienced the longest economic boom in its
history. GDP grew at an average rate of 9% with a much lower volatility. This outcome
is consistent with the argument put forward by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) -
aggressive monetary policy to ﬁght inﬂation works to reduce aggregate output volatility
by eliminating sunspot equilibria.
Lower inﬂation target
The estimated reaction function across the two time periods also reveals that there is
a signiﬁcant decline in the BNM's implicit inﬂation target, pi. Using the respective
estimates for Θy and βpi of the two sub-samples, the inﬂation target during the later
period is derived to be between 2.7-3.4% (about 4.8% for the 1975-1986 period). This
decline may indicate the change in BNM's policy objective. In-line with the overall
improvement in Malaysia's real-sector economy during the 1987-1998 period, monetary
policy was indeed implemented to achieve a lower inﬂation target.
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3.4.2 Post-capital controls and ﬁxed exchange rate regime
period: 1998Q3 to 2005Q2
From the results in Table 3.2, there is strong evidence to suggest that BNM's reaction
function changes considerably during the engagement of this regime. The estimated
coeﬃcient on the interactive dummy for output gap (∂Θy) and interest rate smoothing
(∂ρ) are found to be statistically signiﬁcant, indicating changes in BNM's responses to
stabilize output and the tendency to change its policy stance. The estimated coeﬃcient
on the interactive dummy for inﬂation (∂βpi) is not signiﬁcant; suggesting that the
policymakers' concern on the inﬂation outlook in formulating monetary policy remained
unchanged when the regime was in place. Nevertheless, there is evidence that BNM
reduced its inﬂation target to around 1.2-1.7% (from around 2.7-3.4% previously).
The estimated coeﬃcient for ∂Θy is negative, suggesting that BNM's feedback reaction
to stabilize the output gap decreases during the period. At ﬁrst glance, this result may
seem to be counter-intuitive, given the fact that the main aim of the introduction of this
regime was to revive the Malaysian economy. With the Malaysian economy at that time
operating well below its potential level, it is expected that BNM's concern to stabilize
output would have increased. Nevertheless, this result is indeed consistent with the
downward trend observed earlier regarding BNM's feedback coeﬃcient on output. As
found earlier, the estimated coeﬃcient for Θy declines in the 1987-1998 period and this
trend continues when the capital control and ﬁxed exchange rate regime was introduced.
Again, a possible reason to explain the decline in BNM's feedback coeﬃcient to stabilize
output is the increasing uncertainty on the Malaysian economic structure following the
1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the subsequent introduction of capital controls and
ﬁxed exchange rate regime. The impact of these unprecedented and short-lived events
to the Malaysian economy must have been considerable and perhaps unknown to BNM
at that point of time. With the increased uncertainty of the impact of such events to
the real sector, the result suggests that BNM acted cautiously by reacting less forcefully
to the output gap.
In contrast, the estimated coeﬃcient for ∂ρ is also negative, suggesting BNM's reduced
tendency to smooth the interest rates. The lower interest rate smoothing coeﬃcient
on its estimated reaction function indicated the changing behaviour of BNM's during
the period to change its policy rate more forcefully than the manner showed before
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the regime was introduced. This also suggests that monetary policy was used more
aggressively during the period as part of the key strategies to revive the Malaysian
economy on the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis. This result is not surprising,
given the fact that one of the main objectives of capital control that was introduced
at this time was to provide BNM with autonomy to conduct independent monetary
policy. Despite imposing a ﬁxed exchange rate regime by pegging the ringgit to the
US dollar, the imposition of capital control allowed BNM to pursue an independent
monetary policy without being dictated by the US's monetary policy. The result of
BNM's reaction function for this period indicated that BNM took full advantage of the
`window opportunity' provided by the capital control, by actually changing its policy
rate more aggressively. From 1998Q3 onwards, BNM drastically loosened its monetary
stance. Between 1998Q3 to 1999Q4, BNM reduced its policy rate 7 times. Within that
13-months period, interest rates declined from 11% in June 1998 to 5% at end-1999.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter established a few important features about the way Bank Negara Malaysia
(BNM) formulates monetary policy in Malaysia.
First, modeling BNM's reaction function by using a simple HMT-type interest rate rule
is able to track the interest rate movement generally well. As it is being commonly used
to model the reaction function of central banks in various developed and developing
countries, this exercise indicates that a similar approach also works equally well in
summarizing the central bank's behaviour in Malaysia.
Second, the estimated reaction function with the backward looking speciﬁcation
performs poorly in tracking BNM's past behaviour. This provides empirical evidence
that interest rate movements in Malaysia have been largely inﬂuenced by current and
future economic development. Hence, it is very likely that BNM has always adopted a
forward-looking approach in its policy making.
Third, the exchange rate factor is not statistically signiﬁcant in explaining the
movement of BNM's reaction function. Despite the fact that BNM does smooth
exchange rate movement, this exercise failed to capture any empirical evidence to esta-
blish a relationship between BNM's interest rate policy and the movement of exchange
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rates. This indicates BNM does not directly use its interest rate policy to stabilize
exchange rates. Instead, this outcome is achieved mainly through BNM inﬂuencing the
movement of the nominal exchange rate by adopting a managed ﬂoat exchange rate
regime. In doing so, BNM intervenes directly in the foreign exchange market and does
not directly use interest rates as the instrument.
Fourth, BNM's behaviour in setting interest rates changed considerably over time. The
change in behaviour was triggered by the continuous development and progression of
the Malaysian economy, as well as the change in the policy landscape following the
introduction of the capital control and ﬁxed exchange rate regime in September 1998.
Fifth, like other central banks in the developed countries, the results indicate that BNM
also smoothed interest rates. Interestingly, this smoothing behaviour tends to decline
over time. It suggests that monetary policy in the later period has been used more
aggressively and forcefully. Even though the other results suggest that BNM did react
more cautiously when responding to the development in the output gap during the later
period - possibly due to the increasing diﬃculty to gauge the true state of the economy
 but this does not make BNM more risk averse in taking policy action. When it comes
to combating inﬂation, interest rates have been used forcefully. Hence, it is most likely
that the lower smoothing coeﬃcient as found in this exercise reﬂects the outcome from
the increased importance of monetary policy as part of the demand management tool
to achieve price stability in the later period. This can be seen from the bigger estimated
coeﬃcient for βpi, with its magnitude surpassing the value of Θy after the 1987 period.
Lastly, the results also reconﬁrm the importance of interest rate setting to fulﬁll Taylor's
principle in order to achieve price stability. Similar to the result by Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler (2000) from analyzing the US Federal Reserve's interest rate setting behaviour
before and during the Volker-Greeenspan period (that found the administration before
the Volker-Greeenspan era failed to comply with Taylor's principle), the same conclusion
also holds in the case of developing countries like Malaysia. Hence, in general, the sound
conduct of monetary policy requires that central banks always be aggressive in ﬁghting
inﬂation. Not only will such action put inﬂation at bay, but also it beneﬁts the aggregate
stability of the economy in the form of lower output variability.
Even though the estimation of BNM's reaction function as a single equation as
conducted in this chapter is able to shed a few important insights about the systematic
components of BNM's policy-making, it must be acknowledged that this approach also
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has its own limitations. As is generally known from the econometrics ﬁeld, the simpli-
city of a single equation estimation as used in this chapter, requires a strict assumption
that the explanatory variables in the HMT interest rate rule are exogenous. If this
assumption is invalid, estimated parameters from the single equation estimation could
be biased. Obviously, this would aﬀect the representation of the estimated BNM's
decision rule. We will look at this possibility in Chapter 5 and 6. As part of the
equations in the DSGE model, parameters of HMT interest rate rule in these two
chapters are estimated simultaneously with other parameters of the DSGE model in
the system of equations. We then compare the estimation results of BNM's reaction
function from this alternative estimation approach, to what is reported in this chapter.
Interestingly, we ﬁnd the use of a diﬀerent estimation approach produces a diﬀerent
estimation result for BNM's reaction function.
Apart from the estimation issues, Dennis (2002) argues that while estimated policy
rules can usefully summarize past movement of interest rates, their main drawback
is that they are unable to address questions about the actual policy formulation pro-
cess. This drawback is evident in the fact that the feedback coeﬃcients of the reaction
function is constructed on an ad-hoc basis, without specifying the loss function and
structure of the economy. Indeed, as Svensson (1997a) shows, given an appropriate
form of the objective function, the HMT-type reaction function is the solution to a
central bank's inter-temporal optimization problem. In this framework, the coeﬃcients
of the policy rule will not only depend on parameters deﬁning the preferences of the
policymaker but also on those describing the structure of the economy. As will be seen in
Chapter 4, this relationship is complicated and identiﬁcation of the policy parameters
might be non-trivial since changes in the estimated parameters of the policy rules could
be induced not only by a shift in the central bank's preferences but also by variations
in the structure of the economy. Hence, the next chapter will try to address this
issue by estimating simultaneously BNM's reaction function and equations representing
Malaysia's economic structure as a whole system.
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3.6 Appendix
Table 3.3: Results of Chow Test for Structural Break
(based on estimation results for full sample period 1975Q1 to 2005Q2)
Backward-Looking Speciﬁcation
Closed Economy Version Open Economy Version
Break-point F-statistic p-value F-statistic p-value
1986Q4 2.778 0.030 1.966 0.089
1998Q2 2.823 0.028 2.609 0.028
Contemporaneous Speciﬁcation
Closed Economy Version Open Economy Version
Break-point F-statistic p-value F-statistic p-value
1986Q4 2.952 0.023 2.134 0.066
1998Q2 2.209 0.072 2.072 0.074
Forward-Looking Speciﬁcation
Closed Economy Version Open Economy Version
Break point F-statistic p-value F-statistic p-value
1986Q4 6.628 0.000 7.692 0.000
1998Q2 7.731 0.000 7.212 0.000
Table 3.4: Results of Unit Root Test
KPSS Phillip-Perron
H0: Series are stationary H0: Series are not stationary
Test Stats Bandwidth Test Stats Bandwidth
rt 0.292 9 -2.252 3
pit 0.396 8 -4.761 4
yt 0.054 7 -4.696 7
4rert 0.057 3 -7.489 1
Critical Value (with intercept) Critical Value (with intercept)
5% level 1% level 5% level 1% level
0.463 0.739 -2.885 -3.485
KPSS - Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin Method.
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Table 3.5: Correlation Between Dependent Variables and Instruments in IV Estimation
Variables pit pit+1 yt yt+1 4rert 4rert+1
pit 1.000 0.756 yt 1.000 0.690 4rert 1.000 0.377
pit−1 0.920 0.756 yt−1 0.661 0.352 4rert−1 0.376 -0.015
Instruments pit−2 0.797 0.593 yt−2 0.328 0.223 4rert−2 -0.018 0.006
pit−3 0.665 0.447 yt−3 0.189 0.152 4rert−3 0.003 0.017
pit−4 0.520 0.337 yt−4 0.152 -0.097 4rert−4 0.015 -0.042
Variables pit pit+1 yt yt+1 4rert 4rert+1
logM3t−1 -0.419 -0.385 0.113 0.088 -0.010 -0.007
Instruments logM3t−2 -0.422 -0.388 0.109 0.083 -0.013 -0.009
logM3t−3 -0.424 -0.393 0.105 0.079 -0.015 -0.006
logM3t−4 -0.428 -0.398 0.101 0.075 -0.013 -0.006
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Chapter 4
Identifying Bank Negara Malaysia's
Policy Preferences: Estimating
Parameters of its Loss Function
As seen in Chapter 3, the Henderson-McKibbin-Taylor (HMT) type interest rate rule is
able to represent Bank Negara Malaysia's (BNM) reaction function fairly well. While
the estimation of its reaction function sheds some light on the way BNM conducts
monetary policy in Malaysia, several key questions regarding its policy actions remain
unanswered. What really were the factors that led to the evolution of BNM's reaction
function over time? Does it mean BNM changed its policy objectives and preferences
over the period? Or was the change in its reaction function the outcome of the changing
structure of the Malaysian economy?
While estimated reaction functions are useful for describing how the target interest
rate changes in relation to macroeconomic factors, it must be acknowledged that the
policy rule itself is a reduced form equation. Due to this factor, important insights
to monetary policy formulation cannot be inferred from the estimated decision rule.
To gain further understanding and to evaluate the central bank's behaviour in conduc-
ting monetary policy, information on the policymakers' policy objectives and relative
preferences between diﬀerent objectives, is essential. There are several beneﬁts that can
be gained from inferring policymakers' policy objectives and preferences. By analyzing
central bank behaviour at the level of policy objectives, rather than at the level of
reaction function coeﬃcients, allows for direct estimation of policymakers' implicit
policy targets and preferences. Therefore, this approach is more appropriate when
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an investigation of policy evolution over time is a researcher's primary objective. For a
central bank, like BNM, that does not oﬃcially adopt the inﬂation-targeting framework,
the estimated policy objectives would provide valuable information about the implicit
policy goals that it wants to achieve. Hence, this chapter will try to address this issue by
estimating simultaneously BNM's reaction function and Malaysia's economic structure
as a system.
This chapter aims to fulﬁll two main objectives. First, it attempts to reveal the under-
lying objectives and preferences of the policymakers in formulating monetary policy in
Malaysia. While the previous chapter highlighted the possible economic variables that
BNM responded to in setting interest rates, the approach used in this chapter goes one
step further by trying to infer the actual objective variables that inﬂuence the policy
making. To do so, it models BNM's policy behaviour as the solution to the optimal
control problem. For this purpose, four objective variables will be considered - inﬂation,
output, exchange rates and smoothing interest rates. Based on this consideration, the
second objective of this chapter is to estimate the relative importance of these diﬀerent
objective variables to the policymakers. It will also investigate how BNM's relative
preferences evolve over time.
This chapter is divided as follows. Section 4.1 lays out the speciﬁcation of BNM's
loss function and the economic model that will be used in this exercise. Section 4.2
explains the mechanics of the estimation procedure. It will also discuss the choice of
estimation period and give a description of the data used for this empirical exercise.
Section 4.3 presents the estimation results. Section 4.4 discusses the main outcome
of this exercise and highlights the key points towards understanding BNM's policy
behaviour. Conclusion follows.
4.1 Model Set-up
One of the main objectives of this chapter is to estimate the parameters of BNM's
loss function. To do so, it assumes BNM's policy behaviour can be represented by
an optimal control problem. A similar approach has been used in the literature to
investigate the behaviour of central banks in developed economies. Using the closed
economy set-up, Favero and Rovelli (2003), Ozlale (2003), and Dennis (2004, 2006),
investigated the case of the US Federal Reserve, while Assenmacher-Wesche (2006)
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did a country comparison involving the US, Germany and Japan. Collins and Siklos
(2004) and Kam, Lees, and Liu (Forthcoming) took the approach one step further and
used the open economy model to estimate the central banks' preferences in several
developed, inﬂation targeting countries. This chapter broadens the research in this
area by extending the same approach to the case of a developing country like Malaysia.
Below is the outline of the model used to analyze BNM's policy behaviour.
4.1.1 Speciﬁcation of BNM's loss function
As stated in Chapter 1, BNM's policy objectives are deﬁned in the Central Bank of
Malaysia Act 1958 (Revised 1994), as:
"i. To issue currency and keep the reserves safeguarding the value of the
currency;
ii. To act as a banker and adviser to the Government;
iii. To promote monetary stability and a sound ﬁnancial structure; and
iv. To inﬂuence the credit situation to the advantage of Malaysia."
Clearly from the above, the Act is silent on the explicit objective of the monetary
policy that needs to be pursued by BNM. On this regard, Tang (2006) states that
BNM's monetary policy objective has often been interpreted to mean the attainment
of sustainable economic growth with price stability. In doing so, BNM's policy action
always weighs more heavily on the side of output growth than price stability (page 43,
Tang (2006)). As BNM's monetary policy objective is unclear to the non-policymakers,
one of the main motivations of this empirical exercise is to explicitly identify the
objective(s) of monetary policy in Malaysia. In doing so, it will also authenticate
Tang's propositions that BNM's policy preferences is biased towards output growth
rather than to stabilizing inﬂation.
By taking into account the above considerations, BNM's policy objective function is
represented by the quadratic loss function;
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Loss = Et
∞∑
j=0
βj
[
(pia
t+j
− p¯i)2 + λ1(yt+j)2 + λ2(rert+j)2 + λ3(rt+j − rt+j−1)2
]
(4.1)
where Et denotes expectation conditional on information available at time t ;
0 < β < 1 is the discount factor; yt is the output gap; pi
a
t is the average inﬂation
(deﬁned as piat =
1
4
3∑
j=0
pit−j , with pit is the annual inﬂation for the quarter); rt is
the short-term interest rate and rert is the real exchange rate. pi is the inﬂation tar-
get, and parameter λ1 , λ2 ,λ3 > 0 , is the relative weights (relative to the inﬂation
stabilization objective, whose weight is set to 1) given to the policy objective for the
output gap, exchange rate stabilization and interest rate smoothing respectively. While
the inclusion of inﬂation, output stabilization and interest rate smoothing in the loss
function is a standard practice in expressing a central bank's loss function, the model
set-up for this chapter explores the suitability of including real exchange rate stabiliza-
tion as an additional policy objective of BNM. The main motivation of this exploration
is to ﬁnd the exact role of the exchange rate stabilization in the overall conduct of
monetary policy in Malaysia.
There are two reasons to believe that exchange rate stabilization is an important element
in inﬂuencing BNM's policy behaviour. First, is from BNM's own admission on the
importance of exchange rate stability to the Malaysian economy. As a small open
economy that relies heavily on international trade, constant ﬂuctuation in the exchange
rate will aﬀect the Malaysian economy negatively. On this account, there is a need for
BNM to smooth excessive ﬂuctuation of the ringgit in the foreign exchange market
(page 114, Bank Negara Malaysia (1999)). Second, is the general observation that
such objective is common among central banks in the developing countries (Moreno
(2004)). For example, a survey conducted by Fry, Goodhart, and Almeida (1996)
on the objectives and activities of central banks in developing countries, ﬁnds that
there is a general tendency among central banks in this group to smooth the exchange
rate movement.1 To achieve this, the common practice among the central banks is to
intervene directly in the foreign exchange market (Jurgensen (1983)).2 Due to these two
1Chapter 4, Fry, Goodhart, and Almeida (1996). BNM is one of the respondents to this survey.
2This topic on central banks direct intervention in the foreign exchange market is well docu-
mented and widely researched in the literature. See among others, Taylor (1982), Macfarlane (1993),
Lewis (1995); Baillie and Osterberg (1997); Sarno and Taylor (2001) and Kim and Sheen (2002) for
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reasons, this chapter will explore how the exchange rate stability factor was translated
into BNM's actual policy action. Most importantly, the approach used in this chapter
will indicate whether empirical exercise can capture this proposition.
Note that the inclusion of the exchange rate smoothing objective in BNM's loss function
involves the use of real rather than nominal exchange rates. In practice, as the real
exchange rate cannot be inﬂuenced directly by the policymakers, central bank's foreign
exchange intervention is conducted in the nominal exchange rate market. This raises the
question that the use of the nominal rather than the real exchange rate could be more
appropriate to be included in BNM's loss function. To address this question, note that
BNM's action to intervene in the (nominal) exchange rate market cannot be viewed as
its ﬁnal policy objective. Unlike the central bank that adopts the currency board or the
ﬁxed exchange rate regime - that demands the central bank to intervene in the foreign
exchange market to maintain the stipulated exchange rate peg - nothing in BNM's Legal
Act obligates it to maintain the stability of the ringgit against any particular currency.3
Instead, BNM's action to intervene in the foreign exchange market is conducted on a
voluntary basis, most likely to complement interest rates as its policy instrument.4
On this account, it is more sensible to include the real exchange rate smoothing as a
possible policy objective and take its intervention operation in the nominal exchange
rate market as a means towards achieving other objectives.
4.1.2 Modelling the Malaysian Economy
The structure of Malaysia's economy is represented by a simple small open economy
model (SOEM). The main characteristic of this model is similar to the one used in
Ball (1999); Lees (2007); Svensson (2000) and Collins and Siklos (2004). The open
economy version of the IS and Phillips curve see the introduction of the exchange rate
discussion on the motivation and eﬀectiveness of the direct intervention in practice. Bank of Inter-
national Settlement (BIS) organized a conference on this topic in 2004, with particular attention on
the experience of the central banks in the developing countries. See Bank for International Settlement
(2004) for details.
3In BNM's case, this is true except for the period 1998Q3-2005Q2 when it adopts the ﬁxed exchange
rate regime as part of temporary policy packages introduced by the Malaysian Government to recover
from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. See Athukorala (2001), Dornbusch (2001) and Kaplan and
Rodrik (2001) for discussion of this controversial policy action.
4A more detailed discussion about the possible objectives of BNM's intervention operations in the
foreign exchange market is presented in Subsection 4.4.2.
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as the additional variable. This is to capture the exchange rate channel as one of
the important conduits to the monetary transmission mechanism. In addition, other
variables like foreign output and commodity prices are also included in the model.
For a small open economy like Malaysia, these foreign inﬂuences will aﬀect the move-
ment of domestic inﬂation and output. The set-up of the model is as follows:
Open economy Aggregate Demand (IS equation):
yt = γ0 + γ1yt−1 + γ2yt−2 + γ3
[
ra
t−1 − piat−1
]
+ γ4rer
a
t−1 + γ5y
∗
t−1 + yt (4.2)
Open economy Aggregate Supply (Phillips Curve)
pit = κ0 + κ1pit−1 + κ2pit−2 + κ3pit−3 + κ4pit−4 + κ5yt−1 + κ6rer
a
t−1 + κ7comt−1 + pit (4.3)
where, yt is the output gap; pit is quarterly inﬂation; r
a
t is the average short-term
interest rates; rerat is the average real exchange rate ( rer ↑ denotes depreciation);
y∗t is the output gap of the foreign country; comt is the oil price index.
The movement of the real exchange rate, rert , is governed by the real uncovered interest
parity (UIP) condition;
rert = rert−1 − ϕ
[
(rt−1 − pit−1)− (r∗t−1 − pi∗t−1)
]
+ qt (4.4)
where r∗t and pi
∗
t is foreign interest rates and inﬂation rate respectively. With the
way rert is deﬁned here ( rer ↑ denotes depreciation), parameter ϕ is expected to be
negative.
Variables yt , pit and qt are the random shocks that aﬀect aggregate demand, Phillips
curve and real UIP condition respectively.
Movement of aggregate demand is inﬂuenced by its own lags, real interest rates, real
exchange rate and foreign output. The diﬀerence between average short-term interest
rate rat =
1
4
3∑
j=0
rt−j and piat =
1
4
3∑
j=0
pit−j average inﬂation, is the real interest rate
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that aﬀects the IS curve in equation 4.2. As an increase in the real interest rate
aﬀects spending negatively, parameter γ3 is expected to be less than zero. In addition,
domestic output is also aﬀected by the performance of the export sector. An average of
the real exchange rate, rerat =
1
4
3∑
j=0
rert−j and the lag of foreign output would capture
this eﬀect. The real exchange rate determines the country's export competitiveness in
the world market, hence a depreciation is expected to increase demand for Malaysia's
export (γ4 > 0). Similarly, higher foreign output is expected to increase Malaysia's
export demand and contribute positively to aggregate output (γ5 > 0).
For the Phillips curve, inﬂation is determined by its own lags, lag of output gap, average
real exchange rate and lag of oil price. Increase in the output gap leads to demand-pull
inﬂation (κ5 > 0). Exchange rate depreciation makes imported goods more expensive
for the domestic residents. The substitution eﬀect among consumers favouring domestic
goods, contributes to higher inﬂation (κ6 > 0). Lastly, the Phillips curve equation also
takes into account the possible cost-push inﬂation factor. This is done by including
the movement of the oil price index into the inﬂation equation (κ7 > 0).
Variables for the rest of the world are taken as exogenous and are represented by a
stationary, univariate AR(1) process. This speciﬁcation is chosen for its simplicity. As
the main focus of this exercise is to estimate the parameters of the Malaysian economy,
the model simpliﬁcation for the exogenous variables is instrumental for the statistical
ﬂexibility and the parsimony of the model parametrization (Kam, Lees, and Liu (Forth-
coming)). Nevertheless, despite its simplicity, the use of AR(1) process in our model
speciﬁcation does not lead to a loss of information from the perspective of inferring
the inﬂuence of the foreign variables on the Malaysian economy. Perhaps, due to this
reason, the same approach is also used in Ball (1999); Svensson (2000); Collins and
Siklos (2004); Lees (2007) and Kam, Lees, and Liu (Forthcoming) in representing the
external sector in their respective model's speciﬁcations. The model for the exogenous
variables is;
y∗
t
= µ1y
∗
t−1 + y∗,t (4.5)
r∗
t
= µ2r
∗
t−1 + r∗,t (4.6)
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pi∗
t
= µ3pi
∗
t−1 + pi∗,t (4.7)
comt = µ4comt−1 + c,t (4.8)
where the coeﬃcients µ1 to µ4 are non negative and less than unity.
5
From the above, the small open economy model that will be used to ﬁt Malaysia's data
is clearly backward looking in nature. There are two main reasons why the backward
looking model is chosen for this exercise. Firstly, the performance of the forward-looking
model in tracking the actual data is not very good. From the results using data of the
developed economies, forward looking models tend not to ﬁt the data as well as the
Rudebusch-Svensson model (Estrella and Fuhrer (2002)). However, similar comparison
cannot be made on the performance of these models to ﬁt the Malaysian data due
to lack of known studies. Hence, to start, a backward looking model will be used
to represent the Malaysian economy. Secondly, the use of a backward-looking model
precludes the issue of time consistency in BNM's policy decisions. The estimation
problem becomes signiﬁcantly more complicated when time-inconsistency issues are
taken into account. With a backward looking model, there is no need to take into
account possible diﬀerences in the law of motion of the state variables when central
bank action is taken either with commitment or discretion. Admittedly, these two
areas are among the limitations of this exercise. Perhaps, these limitations would be a
suitable extension for future research involving data of the Malaysian economy.
5Note that in this chapter, parameters for the exogenous variables µ1 to µ4 are estimated separately.
They are not estimated jointly with the other parameters of interest of equation 4.5 to 4.8, in order
to reduce the computation burden of the FIML procedure. This is not expected to aﬀect the overall
results. As a small economy, it is unlikely that the movement of the Malaysian economy will directly
aﬀect the performance for the rest of the world.
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4.2 Estimation Set-up
4.2.1 Deriving the Optimal Interest Rate Rule
It is assumed that BNM's objective is to minimize its inter-temporal loss function
(equation 4.1), by choosing its policy instrument rt , subject to the economic structure
given as equations 4.2 to 4.8. Equations 4.2 to 4.8 are written in the state-space form;
zt+1 = C + Azt + Bxt + ut+1 (4.9)
where xt = [rt ] is the policy instrument or control variable, zt is the state vector.
ut+1 is the shock vector, with variance-covariance matrix Σ. A , B , C are matrices of
coeﬃcients that describe the economic structure.
A =

κ1 κ2 κ3 κ4 κ5 0
κ6
4
κ6
4
κ6
4
κ6
4
0 0 0 0 0 0 κ7
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−γ3
4
−γ3
4
−γ3
4
−γ3
4
γ1 γ2
γ4
4
γ4
4
γ4
4
γ4
4
γ3
4
γ3
4
γ3
4
γ5 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ϕ 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ϕ ϕ 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 µ1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 µ2 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 µ3 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 µ4

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zt =

pit
pit−1
pit−2
pit−3
yt
yt−1
rert
rert−1
rert−2
rert−3
rt−1
rt−2
rt−3
y∗t−1
r∗t
pi∗t
comt−1

ut =

εpi,t+1
0
0
0
εy,t+1
0
εq,t+1
0
0
0
rt−1
rt−2
rt−3
εy∗,t
εr∗,t
εpi∗,t
εc,t

B =

0
0
0
0
γ3
4
0
−ϕ
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0

C =

κ0
0
0
0
γ0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Now, writing the loss function in the state and control vectors
Loss = Et
∞∑
j=0
βj[(z
t+j
− z¯)/W(z
t+j
− z¯) + (x
t+j
− x¯)/Q(x
t+j
− x¯)
+2(z
t+j
− z¯)/H(x
t+j
− x¯) + 2(x
t+j
− x¯)/G(z
t+j
− z¯)] (4.10)
Where W, Q, H, G are matrices containing policy preference parameters (or weights),
deﬁned as;
Q = [λ3]
H
/
= G =
[
01x16 −λ32 01x10
]
W = P
/
RP with
74
P =

1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
 R =

1 0 0 0
0 λ1 0 0
0 0 λ2 0
0 0 0 λ3

β is the vector of the subjective discount factor, which is ﬁxed as 0.985.6
The target vectors for zt and xt are denoted zt and xt respectively. Particular interest
is on the estimate of pit , which is BNM's target inﬂation rate.
The estimation exercise seeks to identify and subsequently estimate the parameters in
the structural model, A, B and C jointly with the policy regime parameters W, Q, H
and G . As suggested by Dennis (2004), the strategy to achieve this is to extract
information from actual economic outcomes. In doing so, it is assumed that the central
bank has set the interest rate optimally and the observed economic outcome has evolved
according to a known law of motion. Hence, following Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000),
the solution to the stochastic linear optimal regulator problem, is given by the optimal
policy rule;
xt = f + Fzt (4.11)
where,
f = x + Fz (4.12)
F = −
[
Q + βB
/
MB
]−1 (
H
/
+ G + βB
/
MA
)
(4.13)
M = W + F
/
QF + 2HF + 2F
/
G + β (A + BF)
/
M (A + BF) (4.14)
Equations 4.9 and 4.10 can be solved by ﬁrst substituting equation 4.13 into equa-
tion 4.14. Then iterating over the resulting matrix Riccati equation until convergence,
6Which is a common approach used in the literature. Ireland (1997) states that parameter β is
invariably imposed ex ante in the literature involving business cycle models and the New Keynesian
model because it is diﬃcult to be estimated precisely.
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thereby obtaining a solution for M . Once a solution for M has been found, F can be
determined recursively.
When subject to control, the state variables evolve according to a certain law of motion.
This is done by substituting equation 4.11 into equation 4.9, resulting in:
zt+1 = C + Bf + (A + BF) zt + ut+1 (4.15)
This system of dynamic equations will be stable provided all eigenvalues of (A + BF)
are less than unity; otherwise the system will be explosive. This stability condition
depends on parameters A, B, and F, and is independent of parameter f . Following
this, estimated values of z and x will not inﬂuence the stability properties (Dennis
(2006)). Hence, the restriction that has been imposed by equation 4.12, will not aﬀect
the overall results.
4.2.2 Transforming Model into Estimable Format
After setting up the model in this way, the next step is to conduct the estimation
exercise. To do this, equations 4.9 and 4.11 are estimated simultaneously. To avoid a
stochastic singularity problem, a new disturbance term is introduced. This disturbance
term represents possible measurement errors that exist when policymakers assess the
true state of the economy. Hansen and Sargent (1980) argue that in model estimation,
econometricians have less information than policymakers do when actually formulating
monetary policy. Hence, adding a vector of disturbance term ε
it
to equation 4.11,
results in:
xt = f + Fzt+εit (4.16)
To transform the model into an estimable format, ﬁrst rewrite equations 4.9 and
4.16 in the structural form as follows:
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yt = γ0 + γ1yt−1 + γ2yt−2 + γ3
[
rat−1 − piat−1
]
+ γ4rer
a
t−1 + γ5y
∗
t−1 + yt
pit = κ0 + κ1pit−1 + κ2pit−2 + κ3pit−3 + κ4pit−4 + κ5yt−1 + κ6rerat−1 + κ7comt−1 + pit
rert = rert−1 − ϕ
[
(rt−1 − pit−1)− (r∗t−1 − pi∗t−1)
]
+ qt
rt = f +F1pit +F2pit−1 +F3pit−2 +F4pit−4 +F5yt +F6yt−1 +F7rert +F8rert−1 +F9rert−2 +
F10rert−3 + F11rt−1 + F12rt−2 + F13rt−3 + F14y
∗
t−1 + F15r
∗
t−1 + F16pi
∗
t−1 + F17comt−1 + rt
Now deﬁning Jt =
[
pit yt rert rt
]/
as a vector of endogenous variables,
Et =
[
y∗t−1 r
∗
t−1 pi
∗
t−1 comt−1
]/
as a vector of exogenous variables, and
ξt =
[
pi,t y,t q,t r,t
]/
as a vector of disturbance terms,
the above structural form model can be written in the VAR(4) system as;
A0Jt = A1Jt−1 + A2Jt−2 + A3Jt−3 + A4Jt−4 + A5Et + A6 + ξt (4.17)
With matrices A0 to A6 deﬁned as;
A0 =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
−F1 −F5 −F7 1
 , A1 =

κ1 κ1
κ6
4
0
−γ3
4
1
γ4
4
γ3
4
ϕ 0 1 −ϕ
F2 F6 F8 F11
 ,
A2 =

κ2 0
κ6
4
0
−γ3
4
γ2
γ4
4
γ3
4
0 0 0 0
F3 0 F9 F12
 , A3 =

κ3 0
κ6
4
0
−γ3
4
0
γ4
4
γ3
4
0 0 0 0
F4 0 F10 F13
 ,
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A4 =

κ4 0
κ6
4
0
−γ3
4
γ2
γ4
4
γ3
4
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
 , A5 =

0 0 0 κ7
γ5 0 0 0
0 ϕ −ϕ 0
F14 F15 F16 F17
 ,
A6 =

κ0
γ0
0
F

4.2.3 Estimation Procedure
As the parameters of the central bank's loss function are not directly observable, they
need to be inferred from the observed data. To do so, the estimation method based on
the maximum likelihood approach is chosen for this exercise. To estimate the parame-
ters of interest, the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) method is employed
to the above system of equations. The same method is also used in Ozlale (2003),
Dennis (2004, 2006) and Assenmacher-Wesche (2006). The set-up of the FIML
estimation procedure is as follows:
Let Ψ denote the variance-covariance matrix of disturbance vector ξt in equation
4.17 and let θ = {γ, κ, ϕ, λ1, λ2, λ3, pi} . Then by construction, A0, A1, A2, A3,
A4, A5, A6 are each a function of θ. Hence, the joint probability density function
(PDF) for the data is
P
(
{Jt}T1 ;θ,Ψ
)
= P
(
{Jt}T5 | {Jt}41 ;θ,Ψ
)
· P
(
{Jt}41 ;θ,Ψ
)
where T is the sample size.
Now assume ξt | {Js}t−11 ∼ N (0,Ψ) for all t. Then, the joint PDF for {Jt}T1 can be
written as
P
(
{Jt}T1 ;θ,Ψ
)
=
[
1
(2pi)
n(T−4)
2
| Φ0 |(T−4)| Ψ−1 |T−42 exp
∑T
t=5
(
−12ξ
/
tΨ
−1ξt
)]
·P
(
{Jt}41 ;θ,Ψ
)
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where n equals the number of stochastic endogenous variables, i.e. four. It is assumed
that the initial conditions {Jt}41 are ﬁxed and thus P
({Jt}41 ;θ,Ψ) is proportionally
constant. From this joint PDF, the following quasi-likelihood function is derived as
ln L
(
θ,Ψ; {Jt}T1
)
∞ −n(T−4)
2
ln (2pi)+(T − 4) ln | Φ0 | −T−42 ln | Ψ | −12
∑T
t=5
(
ξ
/
tΨ
−1ξt
)
The quasi maximum likelihood estimator (QMLE) of Ψ is
Ψˆ (θ) =
T∑
t=5
ξˆtξˆ
/
t
T − 4 (4.18)
which can be used to simplify the quasi-likelihood function above to
ln L
(
θ; {Jt}T1
)
∞ − n (T − 4)
2
(1 + ln (2pi)) + (T − 4) ln | Φ0 | −T − 42 ln | Ψˆ (θ) | (4.19)
The estimation of θ will be done by maximizing equation 4.19, and then using equation
4.18 to recover the estimate for Ψ.
To test the signiﬁcance of the estimated parameters, the QMLE for the variance-
covariance matrix of θ̂ is constructed using the method proposed by White (1982).
This robust sandwich estimator allows for the possibility that the errors are not
normally distributed.7 Hence, the variance-covariance matrix is given by
V ar
(
θˆ
)
= [H (θ) |θˆ]−1 [G (θ) |θˆ] [H (θ) |θˆ]−1
where H (θ) = −
[
∂2lnLc(θ;{Jt}T1 )
∂θ∂θ/
]
is the inverse of the Fisher-Information matrix; and
G (θ) =
[
1
T−4
∑T
t=5
(
∂ lnLtc(θ;{Jt}tt−4)
∂θ
∂ lnLtc(θ;{Jt}tt−4)
∂θ/
)]
is the outer-product variance
estimator.
7See Calzolari and Panattoni (1988) for discussion on the use of diﬀerent estimators for the variance-
covariance matrix in the FIML procedure.
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Both H (θ) and G (θ) are evaluated at θ̂ .
The estimation exercise for this chapter is conducted using the GAUSS program.
The FIML procedure is operated by employing the OPTMUM library tools in GAUSS,
with the Broyden, Fletcher, Goldfarb and Shanno (BFGS) algorithm is used to run the
iteration for maximizing the likelihood function.8
4.2.4 Estimation Period
The estimation exercise covers the period of 1975Q1 to 2005Q2. To investigate the
consistency of BNM's behaviour during this 30 year period, four sub-sample periods
are considered. Three sub-sample periods prior to capital control and the ﬁxed exchange
rate regime are 1975Q1 to 1998Q2, 1975Q1 to 1986Q4 and 1987Q1 to 1998Q2. The
fourth sub-sample period is 1998Q3 to 2005Q2, during which capital control and the
ﬁxed exchange rate regime, was in place.
4.2.5 Data description
The description of the data used for this estimation exercise is given below.
rt is the average 3-month interbank rate for the quarter, the operational target of BNM;
pit is the annual inﬂation rate for the quarter;
yt is the output gap for the quarter, deﬁned as yt = GDPt − GDP ∗t , where GDPt is
the real GDP for the quarter and GDP ∗t is the potential output, estimated by
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter;
rert is the real exchange rate for the quarter, expressed as the deviation from its equi-
librium level.
8Algorithm developed by Davidson, Fletcher and Powell (DFP) is another common method that
can be used for this purpose. These two methods are complementary (Luenberger (1984), page 268).
The BFGS method is chosen here due to its faster speed to achieve convergence.
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y∗t is the foreign output gap for the quarter, represented by the deviation of the US's
real GDP from the potential output. The US's potential output is estimated using
the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter;
pi∗t is the foreign annual inﬂation rate for the quarter, calculated using the US's Con-
sumer Price Index;
r∗t is the foreign short-term interest rate, represented by the US's 3-month interbank
rate; and
comt is the commodity price expressed in log, represented by the index of World Oil
Price.
All the Malaysian data are sourced from the Monthly Statistical Bulletin, published by
Bank Negara Malaysia. Data for real exchange rate and foreign variables are sourced
from the International Financial Statistics (IFS).
4.3 Estimation Results
Estimation results for the simple small open economy model (SOEM) of the Malaysian
economy are given in Tables 4.1, 4.4 and 4.5. Properties of residuals for the esti-
mated equations (test for normality and autocorrelation) are summarized in Table 4.2.
Comparison of the statistical moments (mean, standard deviation and persistence) of
the actual data and ﬁtted values are given in Table 4.3. Results of policy preference
parameters are presented in Table 4.6.9 Discussion on the estimation results follows.
4.3.1 Performance of the SOEM in representing the Malaysian
Economy
The results indicate that the simple SOEM ﬁts Malaysian data reasonably well. Most
of the estimated parameters of the IS and PC equations have a plausible size, correctly
9Note: Estimation results for the 1998Q3-2005Q2 cannot be generated. See Sub-section 4.3.2 for
the explanation. Hence, no result for this period is reported in the respective tables.
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Table 4.1: Estimation Results of SOEM: 1975Q1 to 2005Q2
(standard error and p-value in parenthesis)
Phillips Curve IS Equation UIP Equation
κ0 -3.337 γ0 0.153 ϕ -0.116
(3.334) (0.156) (0.213) (0.236) (0.580) (0.421)
κ1 0.127 γ1 0.750
(0.088) (0.076) (0.086) (0.000)
κ2 0.144 γ2 -0.202
(0.093) (0.062) (0.055) (0.000)
κ3 -0.157 γ3 -0.099
(0.089) (0.040) (0.041) (0.009)
κ4 -0.348 γ4 0.025
(0.075) (0.000) (0.013) (0.028)
κ5 0.214 γ5 0.043
(0.108) (0.025) (0.044) (0.161)
κ6 0.214
(0.098) (0.016)
κ7 1.143
(0.766) (0.069)
R2 0.278 R2 0.496 R2 0.528
signed and are statistically signiﬁcant. As indicated in Table 4.2, except for the UIP
equation, in most cases residuals of the estimated model pass the standard diagnostic
test for normality and autocorrelation.10 The ability of the estimated model in matching
the characteristic of the actual data is also fairly good. As shown in Table 4.3, except for
the real exchange rate, the mean and persistence of the actual data and the ﬁtted values
for each variable are generally very close to each other. However, this simple model
fails to track the short-run volatility of the quarterly data very well, which explains a
low R2 of the estimated model. This limitation also causes the standard deviation of
the ﬁtted value to be much lower than those of the actual data (see Table 4.3). Having
10Figure 4.2 (placed in the Appendix) provides the graphical representation of the residuals for the
estimated equations across diﬀerent sample periods. Except for the residuals for the UIP equation,
movement of residuals for other equations seems to be random and well behaved. In contrast, residuals
for the UIP equation exhibits some stickiness in its movement, which is consistent with the results of
the diagnostic test that suggest existence of a serial correlation.
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Table 4.2: Diagnostics for Residuals of Estimated SOEM Equations Across Diﬀerent
Sample Periods
1975Q1-2005Q2 1975Q1-1986Q4 1987Q1-1998Q2 1975Q1-1998Q2
Phillips Curve
Normality Jacque-Berra 7.314 0.202 1.181 1.351
p-value (0.025) (0.989) (0.554) (0.509)
Autocorrelation Q-stats. AR(1) 1.9491 1.745 1.919 1.931
p-value (0.163) (0.187) (0.166) (0.238)
IS Equation
Normality Jacque-Berra 0.131 0.567 0.635 0.125
p-value (0.936) (0.753) (0.727) (0.939)
Autocorrelation Q-stats. AR(1) 0.4493 0.191 5.209 1.498
p-value (0.503) (0.662) (0.022) (0.221)
UIP Equation
Normality Jacque-Berra 36.537 18.558 49.550 34.487
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Autocorrelation Q-stats. AR(1) 59.750 22.266 13.069 37.093
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Interest Rates Equation
Normality Jacque-Berra 20.375 14.257 0.005 72.293
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.997) (0.000)
Autocorrelation Q-stats. AR(1) 0.5275 0.519 0.716 3.004
p-value (0.468) (0.471) (0.397) (0.083)
said that, given the dynamic of the developing economy like Malaysia, the ability of
this simple model to track this overall movement is quite astounding.
Nevertheless, the performance of a simple UIP model in explaining the movement of
Malaysian real exchange rates is less encouraging. For each estimation periods, its
residuals fail the diagnostic test of normality and serial correlation. In addition, the
mean and standard deviation of the ﬁtted value are very diﬀerent than those of the
actual data (see Table 4.3). Even though the estimated coeﬃcient for ϕ is correctly
signed, it is not statistically signiﬁcant. This result suggests that the eﬀect of the
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Table 4.3: Comparison of Statistical Moments Across Diﬀerent
Sample Periods
Actual Data vs. Fitted Value
1975Q1-2005Q2 1975Q1-1986Q4 1987Q1-1998Q2 1975Q1-1998Q2
Inﬂation
Mean (actual) 3.226 3.929 3.369 3.655
(ﬁtted) 3.281 3.693 3.427 3.544
Std. Dev. (actual) 3.097 4.036 2.385 3.327
(ﬁtted) 1.821 3.392 1.419 2.075
Persistence (actual) 0.838 0.814 0.880 0.818
(ﬁtted) 0.829 0.754 0.918 0.812
Output Gap
Mean (actual) -0.240 -0.126 0.115 -0.008
(ﬁtted) -0.214 -0.147 0.173 -0.104
Std. Dev. (actual) 2.899 2.851 2.969 2.896
(ﬁtted) 1.920 1.881 1.348 1.616
Persistence (actual) 0.686 0.679 0.636 0.656
(ﬁtted) 0.558 0.524 0.687 0.535
Real Exchange Rates
Mean (actual) -0.427 0.067 -0.407 0.998
(ﬁtted) -1.197 1.254 1.169 -0.165
Std. Dev. (actual) 5.301 5.373 7.336 9.910
(ﬁtted) 10.081 10.031 9.543 5.483
Persistence (actual) 0.829 0.827 0.800 0.813
(ﬁtted) 0.881 0.891 0.845 0.869
Interest rates
Mean (actual) 5.990 7.098 6.432 6.729
(ﬁtted) 5.987 7.062 6.421 6.772
Std. Dev. (actual) 2.510 2.502 1.972 2.147
(ﬁtted) 2.491 2.393 1.899 2.271
Persistence (actual) 0.987 0.895 0.938 0.912
(ﬁtted) 0.984 0.920 0.935 0.912
Note: Persistence is the estimated coeﬃcient of the AR(1) regression.
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Table 4.4: Estimation Results of SOEM: Sub-sample Periods
(standard error and p-value in parenthesis)
IS Equation
UIP Equation
1975Q1-1998Q2 1975Q1-1986Q4 1987Q1-1998Q2
γ0 -0.139 -0.170 1.214
(2.546) (0.478) (0.454) (0.354) (0.593) (0.021)
γ1 0.629 0.756 0.350
(0.179) (0.000) (0.155) (0.000) (0.153) (0.012)
γ2 -0.100 -0.176 0.059
(0.135) (0.234) (0.105) (0.048) (0.072) (0.208)
γ3 -0.123 0.030 -0.435
(0.074) (0.050) (0.124) (0.403) (0.139) (0.001)
γ4 0.027 0.004 0.061
(0.015) (0.041) (0.133) (0.489) (0.030) (0.023)
γ5 0.953 -0.110 1.224
(0.130) (0.000) (0.132) (0.203) (0.149) (0.000)
R2 0.437 0.482 0.734
ϕ -0.091 -0.049 -0.252
(0.105) (0.193) (0.077) (0.263) (0.103) (0.008)
R2 0.460 0.514 0.541
interest rate diﬀerential to the Malaysian real exchange rate is negligible. If the interest
rate diﬀerential factor is excluded, the results suggest that the random walk model
could represent the movement of Malaysian real exchange rates quite closely.
Results using the sub-period sample are broadly consistent with the way the Malaysian
economy has evolved over time. Through analyzing the estimated parameters in the
IS and PC equations, it is evident that the Malaysian economy in the later period is
becoming more mature and responding more forcefully to the movement of interest
rates and exchange rates. The estimation results also suggest how inﬂation dynamics
in Malaysia changes after 1986, with price pressures mainly emanating from the robust
economic growth experienced during this period.
On the output side, the results of the IS equation suggest that the Malaysian
economy during the later period, was more responsive to ﬁnancial price (interest rate
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Table 4.5: Estimation Results of SOEM: Sub-sample Periods (continue)
(standard error and p-value in parenthesis)
Phillips Curve
Equation
1975Q1-1998Q2 1975Q1-1986Q4 1987Q1-1998Q2
κ0 -7.449 -13.465 -9.818
(4.310) (0.043) (0.824) (0.000) (6.516) (0.067)
κ1 0.089 -0.021 0.048
(0.097) (0.180) (0.114) (0.428) (0.118) (0.342)
κ2 0.151 0.154 0.022
(0.117) (0.099) (0.127) (0.113) (0.112) (0.421)
κ3 -0.233 -0.312 -0.028
(0.126) (0.034) (0.106) (0.002) (0.124) (0.411)
κ4 0.280 0.200 0.302
(0.079) (0.000) (0.107) (0.033) (0.134) (0.013)
κ5 0.246 -0.026 0.361
(0.141) (0.042) (0.185) (0.444) (0.152) (0.009)
κ6 0.335 0.681 0.088
(0.137) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000)
κ7 2.344 4.020 2.926
(1.087) (0.017) (1.738) (0.011) (1.552) (0.031)
R2 0.301 0.362 0.453
and exchange rate) factors and to foreign output. For example, for the 1975-1986
period, the estimated parameter for γ3 - which measures the responsiveness of
output to the interest rate - is initially found to be wrongly signed (positive) and is not
statistically signiﬁcant. This result could reﬂect the eﬀect of the restrictive interest rate
structure for this period. The result however, changes in the later period. The esti-
mated parameter for γ3 , turns negative and statistically signiﬁcant for the 1987-
1998 period, reﬂecting the beneﬁt of liberalizing the banking system's interest rate
structure undertaken in late-1978. As expected, the liberalization of the interest rate
structure allows a more eﬃcient price determination process through market based
mechanisms. In the case of Malaysia, it also improves the overall monetary trans-
mission process. Consequently, output is more responsive to monetary policy action
taken by the central bank. Similarly, the impact of the exchange rate and foreign
income to output is also much bigger in the later period. In line with the expansion
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of the export sector as the main engine of growth, the estimated parameter for γ4
and γ5 - which measure the responsiveness of output to the exchange rate and foreign
output respectively - increases considerably during the post-1986 period. Both para-
meters also become statistically signiﬁcant, reﬂecting the importance of these factors
to the Malaysian GDP during the later period.
On the same note, factors that contribute to the development of inﬂation in Malaysia
also change notably over the period. From the estimation result of the PC equation,
inﬂation in the later period was largely attributed to the 'demand-pull' factor and
less from the 'cost-push' factor. For example, the estimated coeﬃcient for κ5 - which
measures the contribution of the output gap to inﬂation - turns positive and statis-
tically signiﬁcant during the 1987-1998 period. This suggests, as the Malaysian economy
experienced rapid expansion during this period, the capacity constraint starts to kick
in and cause rising price pressure. Looking from another angle, this development
also indicates improvement in the process of transmitting monetary policy action to
inﬂation. From the way the Malaysian economy is modelled here, the impact of
interest rate changes is transmitted to inﬂation through its initial impact on the IS equa-
tion. As shown in the results, this channel was not in operation during the earlier
period. Perhaps, this factor could partly explain the high inﬂation rate experienced
during this period. Besides that, inﬂation movements during the 1975-1986 period
are also attributed to the 1973 and 1980 oil price shocks. Following these events, the
estimated coeﬃcient for κ7 - which measures the contribution of oil price to inﬂation
- is much higher during the 1975-1986 period, but declines noticeably during the later
period. Surprisingly, the estimation results also indicate that the contribution of the
exchange rate factor to inﬂation is weakening as the Malaysian economy increases its
trade openness over time. Even though correctly signed, the estimated parameter for
κ6 is much smaller during the 1987-1998 period, suggesting that inﬂation dynamics in
Malaysia could largely be attributed to the domestic factor.
4.3.2 Uncovering Parameters of BNM's Loss Function
While the small open economy model used in this exercise is able to ﬁt Malaysian data
reasonably well, the approach produces mixed outcomes in trying to estimate BNM's
preference parameters. Attempts to uncover BNM's preference parameters are only
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Table 4.6: Estimated Parameters of BNM's Loss Function
(standard error and p-value in parenthesis)
λ1 λ2 λ3 pi
Full sample
1975Q1-2005Q2 7.816 0.008 1.056 0.110
LogL = -1102.426 (13.875) (0.287) (0.014) (0.269) (2.193) (0.315) (0.441) (0.402)
Sub-sample
1975Q1-1998Q2 1.639 0.099 2.609 3.721
LogL = -872.899 (0.755) (0.016) (1.033) (0.462) (1.521) (0.044) (2.203) (0.047)
1975Q1-1986Q4 1.403 0.108 2.963 4.590
LogL = -452.932 (0.631) (0.014) (0.456) (0.407) (1.245) (0.009) (2.338) (0.026)
1987Q1-1998Q2 1.916 0.013 0.317 3.871
LogL = -376.63 (0.466) (0.000) (0.025) (0.307) (0.175) (0.037) (2.108) (0.035)
successful for the period prior to the introduction of the capital controls and ﬁxed
exchange rate regime. Parameter estimates for the loss function when using the data
for the whole sample period (that includes the 1998Q3-2005Q2) are found to be not
statistically signiﬁcant. Estimates for BNM's implicit inﬂation target for this period is
also found to be unrealistically low. Unsurprisingly, attempts to estimate the preference
parameters using the 1998Q3-2005Q2 sample period alone, could not produce any result
at all. Despite several attempts using diﬀerent starting values, the iteration procedure
using this short sample period fails to reach convergence. Hence, no result can be
reported for this last sub-period.
There are a few possible reasons for the failure to satisfactorily estimate BNM's
preferences parameters using the sample that includes the 1998Q3-2005Q2 period.
Firstly, is the possibility that the standard, linear quadratic loss function (like equa-
tion 4.1) cannot adequately represent BNM's loss function when the capital controls
and ﬁxed exchange rate regime was in place. While the use of this model produces
reasonable results when applied to the other sample periods, its failure to produce a
similar performance for the period when this regime was in eﬀect suggests that the
same model could be inadequate or perhaps, inappropriate to represent BNM's loss
function. The introduction of this regime as the stop-gap policy action to recover
from the Asian Financial Crisis could induce BNM to deviate from its normal/usual
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Figure 4.1: Residuals of Interest Rates Equation: 1975Q1-2005Q2
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behaviour of policy-making. This unusual change in the central bank's behaviour
cannot be easily approximated by the standard loss function used here and could not
be taken as the usual BNM's behaviour in conducting monetary policy. The possible
change in the BNM's behaviour in formulating monetary policy during this period can
also be seen by analyzing closely the residuals of the estimated interest rate equation
during this period. As indicated in Figure 4.1, there are few large spikes in the interest
rate residuals during the post 1997 period, suggesting the possible deviations of the
interest rate movements during this period from the normal way BNM set its interest
rate policy.
Secondly, it is very likely that during this period, BNM was pursuing diﬀerent
policy objectives other than what is assumed here. Given the circumstances at the
time, BNM was probably pursuing other unconventional and temporary objectives like
managing capital outﬂow and stabilizing domestic liquidity; restructuring and rebuild-
ing the banking system; and restoring economic conditions. This can be inferred from
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BNM's publication below, explaining its policy action after the crisis.
"Beginning mid-1998, the policy focus shifted towards reviving the
economy.... ...The National Economic Recovery Plan (NERP) had six
objectives, which included the short-term focus of stabilizing the ringgit;
restoring market conﬁdences; and maintaining ﬁnancial market stability.
These were complemented with structural reform objectives of strength-
ening economic fundamentals, continuing the socio-economic agenda; and
restoring adversely aﬀected sectors."
Page 596, Chapter 14: Management of the Economy during the Asian Crisis,
Bank Negara Malaysia (1999)
Obviously, all this additional, unconventional and temporary policy objectives could not
be represented by a standard loss function as in equation 4.1. Hence, the outcome of
this empirical exercise suggests that the standard loss function is only able to represent
BNM's behaviour during the "normal" period, and not during the period when the
central bank is pursuing other uncommon and temporary agenda.
Thirdly, the operation of this regime may impose diﬀerent policy constraints to BNM's
optimal control set-up. Besides pegging the currency to the US dollar, the capital
control provided BNM with monetary independence. This allowed Malaysia's interest
rate policy to be set independently from the US monetary policy.11 The restriction
on capital movement put away the usual Mundell-Fleming eﬀect on the relationship of
deviation between domestic and international interest rates and the determination of
exchange rates. Consequently, the model set-up of exchange rate determination through
UIP as used in this exercise becomes redundant.
In order to reaﬃrm the hypothesis that the speciﬁcation of BNM's loss function after the
introduction of the capital control and ﬁxed exchange rate could be very diﬀerent than
the one assumed here, the estimation exercise using the sample period that speciﬁcally
excludes this regime is also examined. The results are given in Table 4.6. As expected,
11From the impossible trinity condition (free capital movement, monetary independence, ﬁxed ex-
change rate regime), a central bank can only choose 2 out of 3 conditions. During September 1998-July
2005, BNM chose the last two and must adopt the capital control for the arrangement to work. See
Bank Negara Malaysia (1999), Athukorala (2001), Dornbusch (2001) and Kaplan and Rodrik (2001)
for detailed discussion of this issue.
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the estimation exercise using the shorter sample period of 1975:Q1 to 1998:Q2 produces
much better results than the one using the whole sample period of 1975Q1-2005Q2.
As shown in Table 4.6, parameter estimate for λ1 is also much smaller (1.63, against
7.81 for 1975Q1-2005Q2 period) and is also more in-line with the estimation results
using the sub-sample period (1.40 and 1.91 for 1975Q1-1986Q4 and 1987Q1-1998Q2
respectively). Most importantly, with a lower standard error, the parameter estimates
for the loss function using the 1975Q1-1998Q2 period are found to be statistically
signiﬁcant. This supports the earlier proposition that BNM's loss function during
1998Q3-2005Q2 period could be very diﬀerent than the standard speciﬁcation assumed
in this exercise.
4.4 Discussions on Understanding BNM's Behaviour
in Formulating Monetary Policy in Malaysia
Modelling a central bank's behaviour is not an easy task for economists. Being one of
the key economic agents, modelling a central bank's behaviour is an integrated part in
the study of macroeconomic research. In the case of Malaysia, the above results indicate
that representing BNM's policy behaviour as a rational and optimizing economic agents
works reasonably well. By using Malaysia's economic outcomes for the 1975Q1-1998Q2
period, representing BNM's action using the optimal control theory provides valuable
information regarding its policy behaviour. In particular, the results identify BNM's
policy targets and relative preferences, as well as the inﬂation target that it wants to
achieve.
Most essentially, the results indicate that modelling BNM's policy behaviour does not
diﬀer very much to its counterparts in the developed countries. Despite having a
diﬀerent economic structure (and hence diﬀerent policy constraints), BNM's policy
behaviour can be reasonably represented by using the optimal control approach, which
is the standard modelling methodology used in the literature to represent a central
bank's behaviour in formulating monetary policy. Perhaps, the outcome of these
results would prompt the use of the same approach to model BNM's behaviour in future
research involving Malaysian data. The above results indicate that this approach works
well for the period that excludes September 1998 to July 2005, i.e. when the capital
controls and ﬁxed exchange rate regime was in eﬀect.
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The results presented in the previous section highlight a few important characteristics
regarding BNM's behaviour in formulating monetary policy in Malaysia. Each of these
characteristics are discussed below.
4.4.1 Objective of Monetary Policy in Malaysia
By assuming that BNM's preference can be represented by the standard loss func-
tion, the estimate for BNM's relative preferences are found to have a plausible size,
be correctly signed and are statistically signiﬁcant. This holds in all cases, except
for the 1998Q3-2005Q2 period, when BNM was pursuing several unconventional and
temporary agendas.
The results indicate that the objective of monetary policy in Malaysia is not very
much diﬀerent than those pursued by the central banks in the developed economies.
Based on its policy action, the results suggest that BNM formulates monetary policy to
achieve three common objectives - stabilizing inﬂation, stabilizing output and smooth-
ing interest rates.
In addition, the positive and statistically signiﬁcant estimated parameters for the
relative preferences on output stabilization and interest rates smoothing (λ1 and λ3 )
suggests that BNM is not a central bank which Svensson (1999) categorized as a strict
inﬂation targeter. In contrast, it can be inferred from these empirical results that
besides achieving price stability, BNM also takes into account the objective to stabilize
output and to smooth interest rates.
The results also reveal important information about the way BNM balances the trade-
oﬀ between achieving price stability and stabilizing output growth. The estimated
parameter on relative preferences to stabilize output (λ1 ) is found to be greater than 1,
suggesting BNM puts greater weight on attaining output stability ahead of stabilizing
inﬂation. Hence, with λ1 > 1 , the results reaﬃrm the proposition made by Tang
(2006) that the objective of monetary policy in Malaysia is the attainment of sustainable
economic growth with price stability. In doing so, BNM's policy preferences are biased
towards achieving output stability.
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4.4.2 Stabilizing Exchange Rate is not one of BNM's monetary
policy objectives
In all the sample periods, the estimated coeﬃcient for λ2 are not statistically signiﬁ-
cant. These results suggest that smoothing the real exchange rate is not one of BNM's
policy objectives. Given the knowledge that BNM does intervene regularly in the
foreign exchange market, the outcome of this result is rather unexpected. Nevertheless,
despite the strong reasons to believe that smoothing the real exchange rate is one of
the important objectives that BNM pursues in its policy formulation, results of this
exercise fail to capture any empirical evidence to support this proposition.
On this regard, Kam, Lees, and Liu (Forthcoming) also attempted the same exercise
in the case of central banks in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. By also modelling
central bank behaviour using the optimal control theory set-up, they too, do not ﬁnd
empirical evidence to support the proposition that smoothing real exchange rates is one
of the policy objectives for the central bank in these countries.
Perhaps, the main reason that contributes to the failure of the empirical exercise to ﬁnd
supportive evidence for this proposition is related to diﬀerences in the actual method
that central banks use to achieve exchange rate stability and the way that this is being
represented in the model. Instead of using interest rates as the instrument to inﬂuence
the real exchange rate - which is the key assumption in the model of representing central
bank behaviour using the optimal control theory - most central banks in practice,
prefer to intervene directly in the foreign exchange market (Jurgensen (1983); Bank for
International Settlement (2004)).
There are two possible reasons for central banks' favouring the direct intervention
method - speed and accuracy. The mechanism of the interest rate to inﬂuence exchange
rate movement in the short-run relies on the sensitivity of the short-term capital ﬂows
to the interest rate. Change in exchange rates is triggered by the actual demand for
domestic currency following the movement of the capital ﬂows. In reality, movement
of short-term capital across borders is bound by factors other than interest rates alone.
Factors like country risk premium, players' expectation on future returns, performance
of the stock markets, as well as political stability are also important. As a result, the
eﬀect of changing interest rates to inﬂuence exchange rate movement could be full of
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uncertainty, which makes the direct intervention to be a more favourable option to the
central banks.
The direct intervention method inﬂuences the exchange rate movement through three
main channels - monetary policy, portfolio and expectation channels.12 The monetary
policy channel - that requires the change in interest rate to trigger the adjustment in
the exchange rate through the standard Mundell-Fleming mechanism - works when the
intervention operation is unsterilized.13 Nevertheless, many central banks do not favour
the unsterilized intervention due to its negative impact on interest rate stability (Craig
and Humpage (2001)). On this regard, Fry (1995) ﬁnds that Asia-Paciﬁc countries have
attained autonomy in both monetary policy and exchange rate stabilization by means of
sterilized intervention in the foreign exchange markets. Also, Takagi and Esaka (2001)
argue that sterilized intervention was eﬀective in Asian countries, particularly during the
period before the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. With the sterilized intervention method,
exchange rate stability is achieved with interest rate levels left virtually unchanged.
Nevertheless, this condition is not consistent with the mechanics assumed under the
optimal control theory. The stability of the exchange rate - one of the state variables
in the optimal control system - is achieved without the use of the interest rate (control
variable). This factor could directly contribute to the failure of the empirical exercise
to ﬁnd evidence that smoothing the exchange rate is one of the central bank's policy
objectives. For the same reason, the knowledge that BNM conducts most of its foreign
exchange intervention through the sterilized intervention method (Lin See Yan (1991),
Bank Negara Malaysia (1994b, 1999)), could also explain the failure of this exercise to
generate positive evidence to support the proposition that smoothing the real exchange
rate is one of the BNM's policy objectives.
Having said that, the truth of the matter lies in the diﬃculty in identifying the exact role
of real exchange rate smoothing to the Malaysian policymakers. If the empirical result
using the optimal control theory is taken as the correct speciﬁcation representing BNM's
12See Sarno and Taylor (2001) for a detailed description of each channel.
13In short, the mechanics of sterilized intervention is as follows. Central banks operation of buying
(to smooth appreciation pressure) or selling (to smooth depreciation pressure) of foreign currency in
the foreign exchange market will see the injection or contraction of domestic currency (liquidity) into
the foreign exchange market. The injection or contraction of liquidity in the domestic money market
leads to constant ﬂuctuations of short-term interest rates. To avoid unwanted interest rate ﬂuctuations,
central banks conduct a contra operation in the domestic money market to neutralize the amount of
liquidity that it initially injected/contracted in the foreign exchange market. See among others, Taylor
(1982); Jurgensen (1983); Craig and Humpage (2001) for details.
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policy behaviour, then its regular intervention operation in the (nominal) exchange rate
market could have an alternative role to the policymakers. Putting together two sources
of information regarding BNM's policy and operational behaviour - the insigniﬁcant of
parameter λ2 as found in this empirical exercise; and the knowledge that BNM conducts
regular sterilized intervention operations in the foreign exchange rate market - suggests
a useful proposition regarding the role of the real exchange rate stability in the conduct
of monetary policy in Malaysia. Smoothing the real exchange rate may not be one of
BNM's policy objectives, but it has been used as the means to achieve its other policy
objectives that have been identiﬁed in this empirical exercise - stabilizing inﬂation,
stabilizing output and smoothing interest rates.
This proposition is also consistent with BNM's oﬃcial view in justifying its action
to minimize excessive exchange rate ﬂuctuation. The quotations below outline the
importance of stable exchange rates to the conduct of monetary policy for a small open
economy like Malaysia.
"As a matter of policy, the Central Bank's intervention in the foreign
exchange market is only to moderate day-to-day ﬂuctuation in the value
of ringgit and not to ﬁght the underlying trend dictated by the market."
page 270, Bank Negara Malaysia (1999)
"...Competitiveness needs to be achieved through eﬃciency and productivity
gains rather than relying on currency deprecation. As a matter of policy,
Malaysia does not rely on the exchange rate to gain competitive advantage."
Governor's Statement, Bank Negara Malaysia (2001) Annual Report
More importantly, the last quotation also reiterates BNM's stand for not using the
exchange rate to promote exports. This lends support to the proposition that stabilizing
real exchange rates is not one of BNM's policy objectives.
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4.4.3 Evolution of BNM's Relative Preferences and Inﬂation
Target
Estimation results using the sample period of 1975Q1-1986Q4 and 1987Q1-1998Q2
indicate considerable changes in BNM's relative preferences between diﬀerent objectives
and the inﬂation target. To non-policymakers, two possible reasons could contribute to
this outcome. First, changes in BNM's relative preferences and inﬂation targets could
be attributed to the changes in the key policymaker itself, i.e. the Governor.14 Second,
the change in policymakers' relative preferences could reﬂect a change in its policy
emphasis. For example, the strengthening of the banking sector and the liberalization
of the interest rate structure would cause the central bank to be less concerned about
the impact of policy changes on ﬁnancial stability. This could prompt the central bank
to reduce its preferences to smooth interest rate.
While the ideal way to investigate the ﬁrst reason is to divide the estimation period
according to tenure of the BNM's Governor itself, this option is not being pursued
in this exercise. The fact that BNM does not enjoy goal independence, highlights
the possibility that its policy directions are heavily inﬂuenced by the Government.15
Hence, the change in BNM's Governor is less likely to cause signiﬁcant changes in the
way BNM pursues its policy objectives. In contrast, the way that the estimation period
is divided in this empirical exercise, is more inclined to cater for the second reason.
The change in BNM's relative preferences over time could be more likely attributed to
the change in its policy emphasis, in line with the evolution of the Malaysian economy.
4.4.3.1 Evolution of BNM's policy preferences to stabilize output
The estimated value for parameter λ1 increases during the later period, suggesting
BNM's higher relative preferences to stabilize output to be close to its potential level.
A higher estimated value for λ1 could reﬂect BNM's continuous eﬀort in trying to
14In the case of the US Federal Reserve, this factor was investigated by Ozlale (2003), and Dennis
(2004, 2006), by dividing the estimation period under the chairmanship of Arthur Burns, Paul Volker
and Alan Greenspan.
15Page 109, Bank Negara Malaysia (1999) states: "...BNM is independent within the Government,
but not of the Government." This suggests that BNM has operational independence, but its policy
objective(s) is set by the Government. Having said that, the way BNM prioritizes its designated policy
objective(s) is unknown to the non-policymakers.
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moderate the accelerated economic growth experienced during this period. In the
aftermath of the mid-1980 recession, the Malaysian economy staged a strong recovery
and recorded a decade of uninterrupted growth until the outbreak of the 1997 Asian
Financial Crisis. During this period, its GDP grew constantly to over 8% every year.
This prolonged growth created a new challenge to the policymaker. The risk of rising
inﬂation became an important issue together with the need to ensure economic growth
remained sustainable. The three quotes from a series of BNM's Annual Reports below,
reﬂects its long-standing concerns about this issue during the course of this period.
"The primary thrust of macro-economic policy in 1991 was on the manage-
ment of rising price pressures to ensure that the rapid pace of economic
expansion in recent years would not precipitate an inﬂationary spiral in the
country. The maintenance of price stability was particularly important as
there were increasing signs of overheating in the domestic economy, charac-
terized by rising wage pressure amidst a general tightening of the labour
market, and the buoyant and sustained expansion in domestic demand."
Page 16, Bank Negara Malaysia (1991) Annual Report
"The challenge of economic management in 1994 continued to be sustaining
the growth momentum, while at the same time maintaining price
stability. It was recognized that the price pressures and the imbalance in the
current account of the balance of payments reﬂected not only excess demand
conditions, but also supply constraints."
Page 19, Bank Negara Malaysia (1994a) Annual Report
"During 1996, the monetary policy strategy was undertaken against the
background of continued resource constraints reﬂected in higher wages and
persistent inﬂationary pressures despite a moderation in exports and growth."
Page 68, Bank Negara Malaysia (1996) Annual Report
To reinforce this point, the estimation result of the PC indicates that the contribution of
the output gap to overall inﬂation in Malaysia becomes more important as the economy
progresses. From Table 4.5, the estimated parameter for κ5 of the PC equation turns
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positive and statistically signiﬁcant during the 1987-1998 period. Hence, the strategy to
achieve price stability could not only rely on an orthodox instrument like price control,
but also needs to focus on the source of the price pressure. In the Malaysian case,
price pressure during the 1987-1998 period mostly originated from the demand side
(demand-pull inﬂation). Due to this factor and as suggested by the estimation results
of its loss function, BNM's policy preferences during this period gave more attention to
stabilizing output. The strategy to make output operate close to its full potential level
minimizes the risk of an excess demand in the economy. Consequently, with a more
sustainable economic growth, it will directly reduce the risk of demand-pull inﬂation.
4.4.3.2 Evolution of BNM's relative preferences to smooth interest rates
In contrast, BNM's relative preferences to smooth interest rates declines markedly in the
later period. This outcome is consistent with the advancement of the Malaysian banking
system and ﬁnancial sector. For example, the success of the banking system reforms
in the late 1970s and the ﬁrst half of the 1980s made Malaysian banking institutions
stronger and more resilient to face competitive pressure (Bank Negara Malaysia (1994b,
1999)). As maintaining banking system stability is also one of BNM's main tasks, this
advancement reduced BNM's concern that its monetary policy action would generate
negative impact to the overall stability of the banking system.
In addition, the successful interest rate liberalization in late 1978 made the economy
more responsive to the interest rate changes. This can be seen from the parameter
estimate of γ3 in the IS equation. During the 1975-1986 period, the estimate for γ3
is wrongly signed and is not statistically signiﬁcant. The situation reversed in the
1987-1998 period, signifying the positive impact of the interest rate liberalization to
the Malaysian economy. For the policymakers, this change indicates vast improve-
ment in its monetary transmission process. As central banks are generally reluctant to
reverse policy action in order to maintain reputation and credibility (Goodhart (1999)),
the knowledge that its policy action is now being transmitted more eﬀectively, could re-
duce BNM's concern of making policy mistakes. On top of that, BNM's progression to
move away from non-market based monetary policy instruments (like direct controls on
interest rates, credit controls and high Statutory Reserves/Liquid Assets Requirement)
in favour of market based instruments (like direct borrowing/lending and open market
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operation) has enabled the central bank to inﬂuence market interest rates more eﬀec-
tively (Bank Negara Malaysia (1999) and Bank for International Settlement (1999)).
Consequently, these factors made BNM less reluctant to change interest rates in the
later period.
4.4.3.3 Lower implicit inﬂation target
The change in BNM's behaviour over the period is also reﬂected in the evolution of its
implicit inﬂation target. The estimation results indicate that BNM's inﬂation target
during the 1987Q1-1998Q2 period was around 3.9%, which is lower than the 4.6%
estimated for the earlier period. The change in the implicit inﬂation target over these
two periods could be due to two factors - policy outcomes attributed to the economic
circumstances and a possible change in BNM's policy behaviour.
First, the higher estimated inﬂation target during 1975Q1-1986Q4 could reﬂect the
outcome of the policymakers' diﬃculty during the period to bring actual inﬂation near
to its targeted level. The impact of the ﬁrst and second oil price shocks experienced
in 1973 and 1979 caused inﬂation during the subsequent periods to be highly volatile.
In general, experiences indicate that inﬂation originating from the cost-push factor is
much more diﬃcult to contained compared with the demand-pull factor. Hence, the
"failure" of BNM to pin-down inﬂation during the aftermath of the ﬁrst and second oil
price shocks could 'inﬂate' the estimation of its implicit inﬂation target for the period.
The second possible reason to explain this outcome is related to the possible change in
BNM's policy behaviour itself. The higher inﬂation target for the 1975-1986
period could reﬂect BNM's stance during the period to accept a higher inﬂation rate.
Due to falling output following the oil price shocks as well as the severe economic reces-
sion experienced in the mid-1980s, perhaps the main focus of the policy was to stabilize
output. In contrast, the lower inﬂation target reﬂects that BNM was more stringent in
its policy-making to achieve price stability during the post-1986 period. In line with the
new challenge faced by the policymakers to ensure sustainable growth of the Malaysian
economy, BNM sets a lower inﬂation target for its policy. Unsurprisingly, against the
background of robust economic growth experienced during the later period, the lower
inﬂation target requires BNM to be more aggressive in taking policy action. This is
generally consistent with the earlier suggestion that BNM was more concerned about
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stabilizing output (higher λ1 ) and less concerned about smoothing interest rates (lower
λ3 ) during the post-1986 period.
4.5 Conclusion
In conclusion, the results of this chapter provide important insights towards under-
standing Bank Negara Malaysia's (BNM's) behaviour in formulating monetary policy
in Malaysia. By employing the standard approach used in the literature to model
central banks behaviour, this chapter models BNM's policy behaviour as the solution
to the optimal control problem. The results indicate that this standard approach repre-
sents BNM's policy behaviour reasonably well. However, this representation is limited
to the sample that excludes the September 1998-July 2005 period. During the period
when the capital control and the ﬁxed exchange rate regime was in place, this standard
approach fails to generate any results.
By assuming that BNM's preferences can be represented by the standard loss function,
the results suggest that the objective of monetary policy in Malaysia is not very diﬀerent
than those pursued by the central banks in developed economies. For the estimation
period prior to September 1998, BNM's policy objectives were identiﬁed as to stabilize
inﬂation, output and interest rates. The results also reveal important information
about the way BNM balances the trade-oﬀ between price stability and output growth.
Estimates of its relative preferences parameters suggest BNM puts greater weight on
attaining output stability ahead of stabilizing inﬂation. This ﬁnding also reaﬃrms the
proposition made by Tang (2006) that the objective of monetary policy in Malaysia is
the attainment of sustainable economic growth with price stability.
Despite prior beliefs that smoothing the real exchange rate could be one of BNM's key
policy objectives, this could not be substantiated empirically. Based on this result, this
chapter proposes another role for exchange rate smoothing in the conduct of monetary
policy in Malaysia. BNM uses the stable real exchange rate environment as a means to
achieve its other policy objectives.
Results using diﬀerent sample periods suggest the parameters of BNM's loss function
evolve over time. The change in BNM's relative preferences over the period could be
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attributed to the change in its policy emphasis, in line with the evolution of the
Malaysian economy. The results show that BNM's relative preference to smooth
output increases in the later period, suggesting BNM's desire to contain the economic
overheating problem experienced during the ﬁrst half of the 1990s. In addition, the
improvement in the overall monetary transmission mechanism as well as with the more
resilient banking system during the post-1986 period, explains the marked decline
in BNM's relative preference to smooth interest rates. Besides changing its relative
preferences over diﬀerent policy objectives, the results also suggest BNM has a lower
implicit inﬂation target during the later period.
After gaining a general understanding about the way BNM behaves in formulating
monetary policy in Malaysia, we use this knowledge to ask another important
question regarding BNM's policy behaviour. What would happen to the outcomes of
the Malaysian economy if BNM was to behave diﬀerently than what we have understood
so far? To answer this, we need to conduct counter-factual policy simulations. This is
done best using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model representing
the Malaysian economy. Developing one is the topic of the next chapter.
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4.6 Appendix
Figure 4.2: Residuals of Estimated SOEM Equations Across Diﬀerent Period
(a) 1975Q1 - 2005Q2 and 1975Q1-1986Q4
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Chapter 5
An Estimated DSGE Model of the
Malaysian Economy: Full Sample
Period 1975Q1 to 2005Q2
During recent years there has been a growing literature that uses dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) models for analyzing macroeconomic ﬂuctuations and for
quantitative policy analysis. The appeal of DSGE models has captured the interest of
many researchers, inside and outside academia. Among the academicians, economists
use DSGE models in many ways to answer various interesting research questions.
Similarly, a large number of central banks use DSGE models for their policy
analysis. Despite the large interest in this area, it is fair to say that the current litera-
ture on DSGE modelling is largely concentrated on the experience of the developed
economies. Among the rare examples of literature that cover the experience of develop-
ing economies are the studies involving Latin American countries by Medina and Soto
(2005, 2007) for Chile and Castillo, Montoro, and Tuesta (2006) for Peru. Ramayandi
(2008) estimates a DSGE model for four ASEAN economies (including Malaysia).
The main attractiveness of DSGE models is that they are derived from ﬁrst principles.
They describe the general equilibrium allocations and prices of the economy in which all
the agents dynamically maximize their objectives (utility, proﬁts, etc) subject to budget
or resource constraints. These equilibrium equations form the structural features of the
economy. Parameters of these structural equations are known as "deep" parameters
- they are assumed to be invariant to policy actions. For this reason, DSGE models
are seen as powerful tools that provide a coherent framework for policy discussion and
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analysis. In principle, they can help to identify sources of ﬂuctuations, answer questions
about structural changes, forecast and predict the eﬀect of policy changes, and perform
counter-factual experiments. They also establish a link between structural features of
the economy and reduced form parameters, something that was not always possible
with large-scale macroeconomic models.
The main objective of this chapter is to employ the DSGE modelling framework to
the case of the Malaysian economy. The key structural parameters of the Malaysian
economy are estimated using the Bayesian methodology. The estimated model is later
used to analyze Bank Negara Malaysia's (BNM) behavior in formulating monetary
policy. Naturally, in developing the DSGE model to analyze BNM's behaviour in formu-
lating monetary policy, empirical results from other studies involving the Malaysian
economy should be taken into account. Not only does the knowledge derived from
previous studies contribute to the model's richness, but it also helps to incorporate
the salient features about the Malaysian economy in the model's speciﬁcations. Hence,
we build the DSGE model in this chapter based on this philosophy. On the mone-
tary transmission channels, empirical studies using Malaysian data by Razi (1998)
and Tang (2006) concluded that interest rates, exchange rates and credit channels
are the three important channels that transmit BNM's monetary policy action to the
real sector. On areas related to the exchange rate pass through, empirical studies by
Webber (1999) and Ito and Sato (2006) found that the impact of exchange rate ﬂuctu-
ations on Malaysia's CPI was very low, suggesting the presence of incomplete exchange
rate pass through in the Malaysian import sector. On the formulation of monetary
policy, our results from Chapter 3 conclude that the simple Henderson-McKibbin-Taylor
(HMT) rule represents BNM's policy behaviour reasonably well. We incorporate all
these features in the DSGE model presented here.
We choose the DSGE model of a small and open economy developed by Gali and Mona-
celli (2005) as the starting block to develop a DSGE model of the Malaysian economy.
Gali-Monacelli's model is seen as the best candidate for this purpose as its general
design already incorporates most of the empirical knowledge about the Malaysian
economy listed in the previous paragraph. More importantly, the set-up used in Gali-
Monacelli's model gives rise to simple, intuitive and tractable log-linearized equilib-
rium equations. While the model used in this chapter shares many elements with
Gali-Monacelli's model, we introduce a small modiﬁcation. We put into the model's
speciﬁcations the eﬀect of the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism described in Bernanke,
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Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) (BGG hereafter). The motivation behind this modiﬁ-
cation is simple. We seek to improve the model's properties by specifying formally
the role of ﬁnancial friction as a propagation mechanism. There is ample evidence in
the literature to show that ﬁnancial frictions amplify the magnitude and persistence of
ﬂuctuations in economic activities.1 In the context of the Malaysian economy, evidence
about the importance of credit channels in propagating BNM's monetary policy action is
documented in the empirical study by Razi (1998) and Tang (2006).
Based on this evidence - both theoretical and empirical, we explore the eﬀects of speci-
fying explicitly the operation of ﬁnancial frictions to the empirical properties of our
DSGE model. For this purpose, we estimate two model speciﬁcations - with and
without a ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism. Estimating these two model speciﬁcations
allows us to statistically evaluate the importance of a ﬁnancial-accelerator mechanism
using the posterior odds ratio (or Bayes factor). To show the operation of a ﬁnancial
accelerator as a propagation mechanism, we also compare the impulse responses and
variance decompositions of key macroeconomic variables generated by the two model
speciﬁcations.
The model is estimated using the data set for the 1975Q1-2005Q2 period. The estima-
tion results provide useful information about the structural parameters of the Malaysian
economy. Estimates of structural parameters like consumer preferences, behaviour of
retailers in setting prices as well as the degree of the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism
for the Malaysian economy are revealed.
This chapter is organized as follows. It starts with the discussion on the model set-up.
This covers the deﬁnitions of key variables and derivation of equilibrium equations of
our model. Section 5.2 describes the Bayesian methodology utilized to estimate the
model. Then, Section 5.3 and 5.4 discuss the estimation results. The last section
concludes.
1See among others BGG, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Meier and
Muller (2006), Devereux, Lane, and Xu (2006), Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2007) and Chris-
tensen and Dib (2008) for theoretical discussions and empirical evidence of the ﬁnancial accelerator
mechanism.
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5.1 The Open Economy DSGE Model
Design of the DSGE model in this chapter builds extensively on the model devel-
oped by Gali and Monacelli (2005), but is modiﬁed to include the ﬁnancial accelerator
mechanism. With this modiﬁcation, this model shares many salient features to the open
economy DSGE model used in Devereux, Lane, and Xu (2006). The economy under
purview is small and open, with nominal price rigidities following a staggered pricing.
There are four major actors in this economy - households, entrepreneurs, retailers and
the central bank.
This section starts with deﬁnitions of consumption composites, prices indexes, terms of
trade and real exchange rate. These deﬁnitions act as the building block for the model
set-up. Before proceeding, some note on the notations. Throughout this chapter, a
variable in capital letter denotes the variable in its original form, while those in the small
caps denotes the corresponding variables written in log and as percentage deviations
from a corresponding non-stochastic steady state.
Deﬁnitions
5.1.1 Consumption Composites and Price Indexes
Consumption index, Ct , is a bundle comprising domestically produced goods and
imported goods,
Ct =
[
(1− γ) 1η (CH,t)
η−1
η + γ
1
η (CF,t)
η−1
η
] η
η−1
(5.1)
where CH,t denotes the composite consumption index for the domestic goods, CF,t
denotes the composite consumption index for the imported goods. Parameter γ ∈ [0, 1]
measures the preference bias to the foreign good (degree of openness) and η > 0
measures the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods.
The consumption index for each category of generic goods is aggregated using the
standard CES function,
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CH,t =
 1ˆ
0
CH,t (h)
ε−1
ε dh

ε
ε−1
CF,t =
 1ˆ
0
CF,t (f)
ε−1
ε df

ε
ε−1
with h ∈ [0, 1] and f ∈ [0, 1] denotes the good variety. Parameter ε > 0 is the
elasticity of substitution between generic goods within each category. To minimize
expenditure, the optimal allocation for CH,t and CF,t across generic goods within each
category is given by the standard isoelastic demand function;2
CH,t(h) =
(
PH,t(h)
PH,t
)−ε
CH,t C(f) =
(
PF,t(f)
PF,t
)−ε
CF,t
where PH,t and PF,t is the associated aggregate price index (expressed in domestic
currency) for each good category.3
Following the same steps, the optimal consumption demand for the domestic and foreign
produced goods can be derived respectively as,
CH,t = (1− γ)
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
Ct (5.2)
2Which is derived from consumers solving the following problem:
max
Ct(i)
Ct =
 1ˆ
0
Ct (i)
ε−1
ε di

ε
ε−1
subject to PtCt −
1ˆ
0
Pt (i)Ct (i) di = 0
with Ct(i) and Pt(i) is the respective good and its associated price. The FOC for good i is given by,
Ct(i)
−1
ε
 1ˆ
0
Ct (i)
ε−1
ε di

1
ε−1
− ζPt(i) = 0
with ζ is the Lagrange multiplier for the minimum expenditure constraint. By computing another
generic good i∗ and taking the ratio, get the expression(
Ct(i)
Ct(i∗)
)− 1ε
=
(
Pt(i)
Pt(i∗)
)
Then, substituting this into the CES consumption index for Ct(i), get the demand function for good
i, Ct(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ε
Ct .
3Both aggregate price index will be derived later in Section 5.1.5 (see equation (5.23) and (5.25)).
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CF,t = γ
(
PF,t
Pt
)−η
Ct (5.3)
and the implied consumer price index (CPI) for the domestic economy is given by the
expression,
Pt =
[
(1− γ)P 1−ηH,t + γP 1−ηF,t
] 1
1−η (5.4)
5.1.2 Inﬂation, Terms of Trade, Real Exchange Rate and
Incomplete Pass-through
There are three categories of inﬂation in this model. First, is the CPI inﬂation (pit).
It measures the price condition of the consumption goods, which is a mixture of domes-
tically produced and imported goods. Using the deﬁnition for the consumer price
index from equation 5.4, the expression for the CPI inﬂation is pit ≡ log
(
Pt
Pt−1
)
=
pt−pt−1 . Second, is the domestic inﬂation (piH,t), which measures the price condition of
domestically produced goods. It is measured by the expression piH,t ≡ log
(
PH,t
PH,t−1
)
=
pH,t − pH,t−1 , with PH,t the domestic price index. Third, is the foreign good inﬂation
(piF,t≡ log
(
PF,t
PF,t−1
)
= pF,t − pF,t−1), which measures the movement of foreign goods in
the domestic economy. By log-linearizing the deﬁnition of the consumer price index
given by equation (5.4), the relationship between the three categories of inﬂation is;
pit = (1− γ) piH,t + γpiF,t (5.5)
The terms of trade is deﬁned as TOTt ≡ PF,tPH,t . It measures the relative price of foreign
produced goods to domestic produced goods (expressed in domestic currency). The
expression pt = pH,t + γtott provides the link between the CPI, domestic price index
and term of trade. Write this in the growth form,
pit = piH,t + γ4tott (5.6)
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where tott = pF,t − pH,t . The above equation indicates the role of degree of openness
of the economy (γ) in inﬂuencing the country's CPI. As the economy becomes more
open, the bigger the inﬂuence of the change in the term of trade to the movement of
CPI inﬂation.
Let St be the nominal exchange rate (deﬁned as the price of foreign currency in terms
of the domestic currency. Hence, ↑ S denotes depreciation). The deﬁnition for the real
exchange rate is RERt ≡ St P
∗
t
Pt
(↑ RER denotes depreciation), with P ∗t the aggregate
price index in the foreign country.
Assuming the law of one price, the price of foreign goods (PF,t) in the domestic economy
(expressed in the domestic currency) will move on a one-to-one basis with the price level
of its country of origin (P ∗t ), i.e. PF,t = StP
∗
t . However, under the case of incomplete
exchange rate pass-through, the law of one price does not hold. For example, the
existence of monopolistic domestic importers that practice Local Currency Pricing,
could cause the price of the foreign goods in the domestic market to temporarily deviate
from the price level in the country of origin.4 The wedge between these two prices is
known as the law of one price gap (LOPG) and is given by the expression LOPGt ≡
StP ∗t
PF,t
, or in the log-linear form as lopgt = st+p
∗
t −pF,t. Obviously, in the case when the
law of one price holds, LOPGt = 1. For estimation purposes, the LOPG is assumed to
be exogenous and follows the AR(1) process,
lopgt = ρLOPGlopgt−1 + εLOPGt (5.7)
where ρLOPG ∈ [0, 1] is the AR(1) coeﬃcient and εLOPGt ∼ iid (0, σ2LOPG) is the LOPG
shocks.
Following Monacelli (2005), the expression that links the real exchange rate, terms of
trade and the eﬀect of deviation from the law of one price (in log-linear forms) is,
rert = (1− γ) tott + lopgt (5.8)
4Factors that contribute to the incomplete exchange rate pass-through are well documented in
the literature. Campa and Goldberg (2006) is the leading literature on this area. Monacelli (2005)
discusses the impact of the incomplete exchange rate pass-through on the formulation of monetary
policy.
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Equation 5.8 shows that the possible deviation from the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)
comes from two factors. First, from the heterogeneity of the consumption baskets
between the domestic and the foreign economy (captured by (1− γ) tott). From equa-
tion 5.1, parameter γ measures the degree of preference bias to the foreign goods.
Hence, as γ → 1, composite consumption between the domestic and the foreign
economy will coincide and the contribution of tot to the movement of rer is negligible.
Second, movement of the real exchange rate is inﬂuenced by the eﬀect of incomplete
exchange rate pass-through, which is captured by lopgt. As LOPG increases, the eﬀect
of the increase in the foreign price (P ∗t ) is transmitted less slowly to the price of foreign
goods in the domestic economy (PF,t). This contributes to the smaller rise in the CPI
inﬂation (Pt) compared to P
∗
t , and hence, leads to the depreciation of the domestic
economy's real exchange rate.
Note that for simplicity, in this model, the assumption of the law of one price holds
for the export goods. Hence, there is a complete exchange rate pass-through for the
domestic produced goods sold abroad, i.e. P ∗H,t =
PH,t
St
(where P ∗H,t is the price of
domestic produced goods sold in the foreign country). This simpliﬁcation is consistent
with the notion that the domestic economy is small in size compared to the rest of the
world. Hence, in marketing its product abroad, the country is a price taker in the world
market. In the case of Malaysia, this simplicity is also consistent with the ﬁnding by
Toh and Ho (2001) that exchange rate pass-through of Malaysian exports is very large
(about 80% for the sample period 1975-1996).
The Economic Actors
5.1.3 Households
Households maximize the following expected discounted sum of utilities over paths of
consumption and labour,
E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
βtU (Ct, Ct−1, LH,t)
}
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where Et is the mathematical expectation conditional on information available in
period t, β ∈ [0, 1] is the exogenous discount parameter. The utility function that
represents the preference of the representative household i is,
U (Ct, Ct−1, Lt) = log [(Ct −ΥCt−1)]−
L 1+ΨH,t
1 + Ψ
where Ct is the composite consumption index and LH,t is the labour supply chosen by
household i. ΥCt−1 is the external (exogenous) habit stock, with constant parameter
Υ ∈ [0, 1] capturing the degree of habit persistence in the economy. The introduction
of habit formation in the model helps in generating persistence in the consumption
dynamics following the monetary policy shocks. Parameter Ψ > 0 is the inverse
elasticity of labour supply.
Household's budget constraint is given by,
W˜H,tLH,t +Rt−1Dt−1 +R∗t−1Ψ
B
(
Zt−1, AUIPt−1
)
StBt−1 + Πt + Tt ≤ PtCt +Dt + StBt
Households derive income by supplying labour, LH,t at a nominal wage rate W˜H,t. They
receive transfers (Tt) from the left-over equity of entrepreneurs who die and leave the
economy (see section 5.1.4.4 below). Households also receive proﬁts (Πt) made by the
retail ﬁrms which operate in the monopolistically competitive market (see section 5.1.5
below). They can also hold two types of ﬁnancial assets: place depositsDt (denominated
in domestic currency) with a domestic ﬁnancial intermediary which pays a ﬁxed nominal
return Rt ; or buy a one-period non-contingent foreign bond Bt (denominated in foreign
currency) which gives a risk adjusted nominal return R∗tΨ
B
(
Zt, A
UIP
t
)
.
In holding the foreign bonds, households are subject to the country's risk premium.
Introduction of this friction is necessary to alleviate the problem of net foreign assets
in the steady-state being non-stationary (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003)).5 Following
Adolfson, Laséen, and Villani (2008), the expression for the debt-elastic risk premium
is given by
ΨB
(
Zt, A
UIP
t
)
= exp
[−ψB (Zt + AUIPt )]
5See Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) for detailed quantitative analysis on the diﬀerent approaches
to overcome this problem. One approach, like the one applied here, is to introduce imperfect ﬁnancial
markets. Besides the debt-elastic risk premium, another method to introduce the ﬁnancial market
friction is through introducing a portfolio adjustment cost to hold foreign bonds. Another approach is
to assume the existence of complete asset markets, like the one used in Gali and Monacelli (2005).
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where Zt =
StBt
Y¯ Pt
is the real outstanding net foreign assets position of the domestic
economy. ψB > 0 is the parameter that represents elasticity of the risk premium. The
term AUIPt is the debt-elastic risk premium shocks, which follows the AR(1) process,
AUIPt = ρUIPA
UIP
t−1 + ε
UIP
t (5.9)
where ρUIP ∈ [0, 1] is the AR(1) coeﬃcient and εUIPt ∼ iid
(
0, σ2uip
)
is the random
shocks.
Optimum Allocation
Households choose the paths of {Ct, LH,t, Dt, Bt}∞0 to maximize expected lifetime
utility subject to the budget constraint. Solving the household's optimization
problem, yields the following set of optimality conditions;
W˜H,t
Pt
≡ WH,t = Lψt (Ct −ΥCt−1)
Rt =
1
β
Et
[
(Ct −ΥCt−1)
(Ct+1 −ΥCt)
Pt
Pt+1
]
R∗tΨ
B
(
Zt, A
UIP
t
)
=
1
β
Et
[
(Ct −ΥCt−1)
(Ct+1 −ΥCt)
Pt
Pt+1
St
St+1
]
where WH,t is the real wages (relative to the CPI). The ﬁrst equation above refers to
the intra-temporal condition relating to the labour supply which equates real wages to
the household's marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between consumption and leisure.
The remaining two equations above correspond to the familiar Euler equations that
determine the optimal path of consumption, by equating the marginal beneﬁts of savings
to its corresponding marginal (opportunity) costs. With this optimal consumption
path, it will also determine the household's savings decision in the form of holding the
domestic deposits and foreign bonds respectively. Hence, combining these two equations
provides a version of the (risk-adjusted) uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition.
The UIP condition will place a restriction on the relative changes of the domestic and
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foreign interest rates and pin-down the movement of the nominal exchange rates for
the domestic economy.
In log-linear forms, equations that determine consumption, labour supply and the real
UIP condition are:
ct −Υct−1 = Et (ct+1 −Υct)− (1−Υ) (rt − Etpit+1) (5.10)
lH,t =
1
Ψ
[
wH,t − 1
1−Υ (ct −Υct−1)
]
(5.11)
rert+1 − rert = (rt − Etpit+1)−
(
r∗t − Etpi∗t+1
)
+ ψBzt + A
UIP
t (5.12)
5.1.4 Entrepreneurs
Introduction of the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism requires modiﬁcation to the original
set-up of Gali-Monacelli's model. It involves introducing capital as another factor input
in the production function, as well as introducing the entrepreneur as a new economic
agent. Capital plays two main roles in this modiﬁed model. Through investment
expenditure, accumulation of capital acts as another source of demand for goods in the
economy. Also, ﬂuctuations in the capital price plays a vital role in determining the
external ﬁnance premium, which plays a key role in the BGG's ﬁnancial accelerator
mechanism.
The set-up for the entrepreneur's behaviour closely follows the approach used in BGG.
Entrepreneurs are involved in two main economic activities. First, they manage ﬁrms
that produce wholesale (intermediate) goods. Second, entrepreneurs produce capital
goods. They also own all the capital. In producing and owning capital, entrepreneurs
are subject to a ﬁnancing constraint. This forms the ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect in
this model. To ensure the ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect always binds, entrepreneurs are
assumed to have a ﬁnite horizon. A fraction (1− ς) of entrepreneurs "die and exit
business in each period. Parameter ς ∈ [0, 1] represents the proportion of entrepreneurs
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that survive. Following BGG, this assumption is introduced to guarantee that entre-
preneurs always face a ﬁnancing constraint and will avoid the situation when they are
able to accumulate enough net worth to be self-ﬁnancing. In addition, it also captures
the realistic phenomenon of ongoing births and deaths of ﬁrms in the economy.
5.1.4.1 Production of Wholesale Goods
Entrepreneurs operate in a competitive market. They produce wholesale goods YH,t
and sell them to retailers at a market clearing wholesale price PWH,t . In producing
the wholesale goods, entrepreneurs combine two factors of production - capital (Kt)
and labour (Lt). The labour input is a composite of household labour (LH,t), and
entrepreneur labour (LE,t),
L = LΩH,tL
1−Ω
E,t
with parameter Ω measuring the proportion of household to entrepreneur labour in
the economy. Following BGG, and for simplicity, the supply of entrepreneur labour is
assumed to be constant and is normalized to 1.
The gross nominal rental rate for capital is R˜G,t . The nominal wage for the household
and entrepreneur labour input is W˜H,t and W˜E,t respectively. All ﬁrms are assumed
to have a common production technology to produce the wholesale goods, given by the
standard Cobb-Douglas production function,
YH,t = A
Y
t K
α
t L
(1−α)Ω
H,t
where parameter α ∈ [0, 1] is the proportion between the capital and labour input of
the given production technology. Variable AYt is a productivity factor common to all
ﬁrms in the economy. The productivity factor evolves as follows,
AYt = ρYA
Y
t−1 + ε
Y
t (5.13)
where ρY ∈ [0, 1] is the AR(1) coeﬃcient and Yt ∼ iid (0, σ2Y ) is the random shocks.
In log-linear form, the equation that represents the production function is;
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yH,t = αkt + (1− α) ΩlH,t + AYt (5.14)
In every period, entrepreneurs choose a combination of factors of production to minimize
costs subject to the technology constraint. More formally, each producer solves the
following cost minimization problem,
min
LH,tKt
R˜G,tKt + W˜H,tLH,t + W˜E,t
subject to the technology constraint given by the Cobb-Douglas production function
deﬁned previously. The solution to the above problem provides the implicit demand
function for capital and labour. The following equations are demand functions for the
respective factor inputs. They equate the factor cost to its value of marginal product;
R˜G,t = α
YH,t
Kt
PWH,t
W˜H,t = (1− α) ΩYH,t
LH,t
PWH,t
W˜E,t = (1− α) (1− Ω)YH,tPWH,t
To explicitly demonstrate the eﬀect of the LOPG and real exchange rate movements in
inﬂuencing the cost of the factor inputs (and hence the real marginal cost of domestic
produced goods), simple manipulations on the above expressions are necessary. First,
write the above demand functions in the real form, by dividing both sides by Pt (the
CPI) and introduce PH,t (the domestic price index) on the RHS. Next, by using the
fact that producers in the wholesale market are price takers and that proﬁt maximiza-
tion behaviour leads them to set production quantity YH,t at the level where the real
wholesale price equals the marginal cost of production, we can substitute
PWH,t
PH,t
= MCH,t .
Following these two steps the above factor demand equations can be written as,
R˜G,t
Pt
≡ RG,t = αYH,t
Kt
MCH,t
PH,t
Pt
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W˜H,t
Pt
≡ WH,t = (1− α) ΩYH,t
LH,t
MCH,t
PH,t
Pt
W˜E,t
Pt
≡ WE,t = (1− α) (1− Ω)YH,tMCH,tPH,t
Pt
where RG,t,WH,t,WE,t are the respective real price of factor inputs expressed in terms
of CPI and MCH,t =
PWH,t
PH,t
represents the real marginal costs in terms of domestic prices.
In log-linear form, equations for the corresponding demand function of factor inputs
are;
rG,t = yH,t +mcH,t − kt −
(
γ
1− γ (rert − lopgt)
)
(5.15)
wH,t = yH,t +mcH,t − lH,t −
(
γ
1− γ (rert − lopgt)
)
(5.16)
wE,t = yH,t +mcH,t −
(
γ
1− γ (rert − lopgt)
)
(5.17)
where, equations 5.15, 5.16 and 5.17 above are written by using the expression
pt = pH,t + γtott and rert = (1− γ) tott + lopgt (see Section 5.1.2) to PH,tPt . This is
done to explicitly demonstrate the eﬀect of RER and LOPG in aﬀecting the cost of pro-
ducing domestic goods. Then, to get the expression for the real marginal cost, simply
substitute equations 5.15 and 5.16 into equation 5.14 and rearrange,
mcH,t =
(1− α)(1 + Ω)
α + (1− α)Ω yH,t +
1
α + (1− α)Ω [αrG,t + (1− α)wH,t]
+
1
α + (1− α)Ω
[
γ
1− γ (rert − lopgt)
]
− 1
α + (1− α)ΩA
Y
t
From the above expression, notice the role of RER and LOPG in aﬀecting the movement
of the real marginal cost. Depreciation in the real exchange rate (↑RER) contributes
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positively to the cost of production, while an increase in the LOPG has the opposite
eﬀect. In the open economy set-up, the contribution of these two variables depend on
the degree of openness of the economy, measured by parameter γ . As γ → 1 , the
more open the economy and the bigger the impact of external factors on the domestic
marginal cost. Other standard results of the closed-economy set-up also hold. Marginal
cost is an increasing function to domestic output (yH,t) and is inversely related to the
productivity factor (AYt ).
5.1.4.2 Investment and Capital Production
Entrepreneurs produce capital and sell it in the competitive market at a nominal price
Q˜t . To produce new capital, entrepreneurs combine two factors of production; existing
capital (Kt) and investment (INVt). Variable INVt is a composite of home and foreign
consumption goods, both purchased from the retailers. For simplicity, entrepreneurs
are assumed to choose the investment input mix in exactly the same fashion as the
households choose their consumption basket. Thus, entrepreneurs' demand function
is the same as households'. Hence, with this assumption, the expression for INVt is
analogous to equation (5.1);
INVt =
[
(1− γ) 1η (CH,t)
η−1
η + γ
1
η (CF,t)
η−1
η
] η
η−1
Note also that with this assumption, the Investment Price Index is the same as the
Consumer Price Index. Hence, the cost for a unit of investment is Pt .
The expression for the capital accumulation equation is,
Kt+1 = Φ
(
INVt
Kt
)
Kt + (1− δ)Kt
where δ is the capital depreciation rate. Φ (.) is an increasing and concave production
function capturing the presence of adjustment costs in the production of capital, given
as follows,
Φ
(
INVt
Kt
)
=
INVt
Kt
− ψI
2
(
INVt
Kt
− δ
)2
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where ψI > 0 is the parameter measuring capital adjustment cost. The adjustment cost
is necessary to allow movement in the price of capital. As explained in BGG, asset price
variability contributes to volatility in the entrepreneurial net worth and contributes to
the ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect. Note that Φ (.) has the following properties in the
steady-state. First, Φ′
(
INV
K
)
= 1 , which will ensure the real price of capital (Qt, see
below) will be equal to unity in the steady-state (i.e. Q = 1). Second, Φ
(
INV
K
)
= δ ,
which implies that in the deterministic steady-state condition (i.e. no steady-state
growth), investment just replaces the depreciated capital.6 In log-linear forms, the
equation for capital accumulation is,
kt+1 = δinvt + (1− δ)kt (5.18)
In deciding how much new capital to produce, entrepreneurs choose investment level
INVt , to maximize proﬁts. To do so the entrepreneur solves the following problem,
max
INVt
Q˜tΦ
(
INVt
Kt
)
Kt − PtINVt
The optimality condition for the entrepreneur's investment decision is given by the
expression,
Q˜tΦ
′
(
INVt
Kt
)
− Pt = 0
Now, to express the price of capital in real term, deﬁne Qt =
Q˜t
Pt
. Then, transform the
above optimality condition as,
Qt =
1
Φ′
(
INVt
Kt
)
or in the log-linear approximation,
qt = ψI (invt − kt) (5.19)
6This is a standard assumption used in the literature for capital production with capital adjustment
cost. See among others, Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999); Smets and Wouters (2003); Gertler,
Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2007). This assumption leads to the condition INV
K
= δ holds in the steady-
state that is used to log-linearize the capital accumulation equation below.
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where ψI =
(−Φ′′
Φ′
) (
INV
K
)
is the elasticity of the price of capital to the capital adjust-
ment cost. The above expression is the familiar Tobin's-Q relation, which relates the
price of capital to the price of investment, adjusted for the capital adjustment cost.
Hence, the higher the capital adjustment cost, the more costly for entrepreneurs to
produce new capital, which translates into a higher capital price.
5.1.4.3 Return on Investment
Let RK,t denotes the gross real return to investment for entrepreneurs. The expression
for the gross return on investment received by entrepreneurs is,
RK,t =
{RG,t + (1− δ)Qt}Kt
Qt−1Kt
which implies, in log-linear approximation;
rK,t + qt−1 =
(
1− (1− δ)
RK
)
rG,t +
(1− δ)
RK
qt (5.20)
where RK is the return on investment in the steady-state.
The above equation shows that there are two determinants to the return on the entre-
preneur's investment. First, is the real rental revenue received from the production of
the intermediate (wholesale) goods (RG,t). Secondly, after taking into account capital
depreciation, the return on capital also depends on the current value of the existing
capital stock. Hence, movement in Qt produces capital gains or losses that directly
aﬀects total return on capital. Movement in Qt also inﬂuences the entrepreneur's net
worth position and their ability to borrow. This is discussed next.
5.1.4.4 Financial Friction and Net Worth
Entrepreneurs ﬁnance the production activities and owning of capital using the combi-
nation of their net worth (Nt+1) and by borrowing funds from the ﬁnancial intermediary
(Ft+1). Hence, the entrepreneur's budget constraint is,
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QtKt+1 = Nt+1 + Ft+1
With the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism, when borrowing funds from a ﬁnancial
intermediary, entrepreneurs need to pay gross real interest rate Rt
Pt
Pt+1
and the
external ﬁnance premium that depends on the borrower's leverage ratio. Following
the approach used by BGG, there is an agent-principal problem in the credit market
that makes external ﬁnance more expensive to entrepreneurs than the internal funds.
The external ﬁnance premium depends on the entrepreneur's ﬁnancial position. This
is given by the expression,
External Finance Premium =
(
Nt+1
QtKt+1
)−χ
where χ > 0 is the parameter measuring the elasticity of the external ﬁnance premium
to the leverage ratio Nt+1
QtKt+1
. See BGG for a comprehensive discussion and a detailed
derivation on the optimal contract that motivates the positive relationship between the
external ﬁnance premium and the borrower's leverage ratio. In short, as Nt+1
QtKt+1
falls
the higher is the leverage ratio of the borrowers. With a higher leverage ratio, the
lenders require a higher premium from borrowers to commensurate the higher risk of
default from the increase incentive to misreport the project outcome.
Entrepreneurs are risk neutral and choose the level of capital Kt+1 , as well as the associ-
ated level of fund borrowing, Ft+1 , to maximize proﬁt. At the optimum, entrepreneurs
equate the expected marginal return from capital investment to its expected marginal
ﬁnancing cost. Accordingly, the entrepreneur's optimality condition is,
Et (RK,t+1) = Et
[(
Nt+1
QtKt+1
)−χ
Rt
Pt
Pt+1
]
or in log-linear form,
EtrK,t+1 = rt − Etpit+1 − χ (nt+1 − qt − kt+1) (5.21)
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The next step is to derive the evolution of the entrepreneur's net worth. The entre-
preneurs net-worth, Nt+1 , consists of the entrepreneurial equity, Vt , held by the
proportion of entrepreneurs (ς) who are still in business during the period and the
share of the entrepreneur's real wage income WE,t from supplying labour for the
production of household goods, i.e.
Nt+1 = ςVt +WE,t
The remaining entrepreneurs who exit the economy, are assumed to transfer their
equity as a lump sum to households, with Tt = (1− ς)Vt .7 Note that, following
BGG, the model assumes that the share of entrepreneur's income from supplying labour
for production purposes is small. With this assumption, parameter 1 − Ω (share of
entrepreneurs labour input in the production process, see sub-section 5.1.4.1) is set
at 0.01. Hence, with the small share of entrepreneur wage income, the dynamics of the
entrepreneur's net worth is largely determined by the movement of its equity value.
In fact, the introduction of the entrepreneur wages in the BGG model is mainly due
to a technical reason - to pin-down the net-worth position in the steady state. Also,
with wage income, entrepreneurs always have a non-zero net-worth in the initial state
to start the business.
Entrepreneurial equity, in turn, is given by
Vt =
[
RK,tQt−1Kt −
(
Nt
Qt−1Kt
)−χ
Rt−1
Pt−1
Pt
Ft
]
where Ft = Qt−1Kt−Nt−1 is the amount borrowed. In words, entrepreneurial equity is
the realized return on capital less repayment of loans. There are two principle sources
for the movement of the entrepreneur's equity position. First, as mentioned earlier, is
from the changes in the capital return, RK,t , that aﬀects the entrepreneur's revenue
stream. The second source that aﬀects the entrepreneur's equity comes from the change
7Note that this is a small departure from the original approach used in BGG. In their model, BGG
assumes entrepreneurs who exit the economy spend their remaining equity in form of consumption
goods, that requires the introduction of additional variable in the model for entrepreneur consumption.
Here, instead of introducing a new notation for entrepreneur's consumption, it is lumped into household
consumption. This does not aﬀect the overall results.
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in the loan repayment burden. An increase in the interest rate, for example, reduces
the entrepreneur's net worth through higher debt burden. This raises the external
ﬁnance premium, that subsequently increases the amount of outstanding loan. With
higher liability due to higher external ﬁnance premium, the entrepreneur's net worth
is further reduced. These factors will aﬀect the entrepreneur's ability to borrow, which
subsequently aﬀect the demand and supply of capital in the economy.
The log-linear approximation for the equation governing the dynamics of the entrepreneur's
net-worth is,
nt+1 = ςRK {(Γ5 + 1) rK,t − Γ5 (rt−1 − pit)− χΓ5 (qt−1 + kt) + χ (Γ5 + 1)nt} (5.22)
+ (Γ5 + 1)
WE
K
wE,t
where Γ5 =
K
N
− 1 , and K
N
is the capital net-worth ratio in the steady-state. WE
K
is
the entrepreneur's wages-capital ratio in the steady-state.
5.1.5 Retailers, Price Determination and Inﬂation Dynamics
To introduce nominal price rigidities, the model assumes that all consumption goods
are distributed to the end-users by retailers who practice Calvo-type staggered price
setting. These retailers are monopolistically competitive. They earn non-zero proﬁt
that is distributed back to the households. There are two types of retailers in this
economy. Home good retailers, which distribute home produced goods to domestic
households and capital producers. They also export the home produced goods for
consumption abroad. The second type of retailers distribute foreign goods for domestic
users. The mechanics of how both types of retailers set their price is discussed below.
Based on their price setting behaviour, the price dynamic for the home and foreign
produced goods will also be derived accordingly.
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5.1.5.1 Home Good Retailers
Home good retailers redistribute goods produced by the home good producers. They
buy the good from producers at the wholesale price PWH,t . For simplicity, retailers do not
incur any cost to redistribute their products to the end users. Let PH,t (z) be the price
set by home good retailer z , for the period t . Retailer's re-optimized price is denoted
PNEWH,t . It is assumed that all retailers face the same decision problem, hence their
optimized price is common across the board, i.e. PH,t (z) = P
NEW
H,t . At each period,
the exogenous probability for home goods retailers to re-optimize their price level is
(1− θH) . Following Calvo (1983), this probability is assumed to be independent of
the price level chosen by the retailers in the previous periods and on the last time
the retailers changed their price. This time independent probability is necessary to
simplify the aggregation problem. Thus, at each period, a measure of (1− θH) home
goods retailers re-optimize their prices by setting PH,t (z) = P
NEW
H,t . Meanwhile, the
remaining retailers do not re optimize their price. This happens with a probability θH .
Following Gali and Gertler (1999), these retailers updated their price according to the
last period CPI inﬂation as follows;
PH,t (z) = PH,t−1 (z) (pit−1)
κ
where parameter κ ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of inﬂation indexation (or degree of
the backward-lookingness), and pit−1 ≡ log
(
Pt−1
Pt−2
)
is the CPI inﬂation.8 Accordingly,
the expected duration for a price to adjust to its optimum level is given by,
(1− θH) + 2θH (1− θH) + 3θ2H (1− θH) + ....+ tθt−1H (1− θH) =
1
1− θH
Thus, for example, if θH = 0.75 per quarter, retailers do not reset their optimum price
for an average duration of 1 year.
Under the assumed price-setting structure, the aggregate price level for the home good
is given by,
8The inﬂation indexation is introduced in order to generate the Phillips Curve that contains both
the forward-looking and backward-looking elements. This combination is necessary to better ﬁt the
data. See Gali and Gertler (1999) for a detailed discussion.
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PH,t =
(
(1− θH)
(
PNEWH,t
)1−ε
+ θH (PH,t−1 (pit−1)
κ)
1−ε
) 1
1−ε
(5.23)
Let YH,t (z) be the composite good sold by retailer z at period t. The aggregate goods
sold by all home goods retailers for consumption, investment and export purposes is
given by the CES function,
YH,t =
 1ˆ
0
YH,t (z)
ε−1
ε dz

ε
ε−1
and each ﬁrm faces a demand schedule of the form,
YH,t+s (z) ≤
(
PNEWH,t
PH,t+s
(pit+s−1)
κ
)−ε
YH,t+s
In setting the price level, ﬁrm z solves the problem of maximizing the present
discounted value of proﬁts;
max
PNEWH,t
∞∑
s=0
βsθsHEt
{
YH,t+s (z)
[
PNEWH,t (pit+s−1)
κ − PH,t+s
PWH,t+s
PH,t+s
]}
subject to the sequence of demand constraints. Note that
PWH,t+s
PH,t+s
= MCH,t+s is the
home retailer's real marginal cost. Since all retailers source their supply from the
competitive intermediate good producers and they do not incur any additional cost to
diﬀerentiate their products, each retailer has a common real marginal cost equal to the
real wholesale price.9 Parameter β is the exogenous discount factor.10 The FOC of the
above optimization problem is,
∞∑
s=0
βsθsHEt
{
YH,t+s
[
PNEWH,t (pit+s−1)
κ − ε
ε− 1PH,t+sMCH,t+s
]}
= 0
9The wholesale price is determined by the marginal cost for the intermediate goods producers,
discussed in sub-section 5.1.4.1.
10As it is assumed that households are the owners of the distributing (retailer) ﬁrms in this model,
retailers will distribute back all proﬁts to households. Hence, the stream of retailer's future proﬁt is
discounted based on household's discount factor, β .
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Then, using the above FOC expression, the optimal price is,
PNEWH,t = µ
∑∞
s=0 β
sθsHEt {YH,t+s [PH,t+sMCH,t+s]}∑∞
s=0 β
sθsHEt {YH,t+s [(pit+s−1)κ]}
where µ = ε
ε−1 is the retailer's desired gross mark-up over wholesale price. The equation
above indicates the determinant of the retailer's optimal price under the environment
of staggered pricing. Given the possibility that its price may remain ﬁxed for multi-
ple periods, retailers take into account two factors in setting price for period t - the
expected future path of the real marginal cost and the movement of the inﬂation rate.
To get the expression for domestic inﬂation, ﬁrst log-linearize the optimal price equation
above,
pNEWH,t ≈ (1− βθH) [pH,t +mcH,t] + (βθH)
[
Et
{
pNEWH,t+1
}− κpi,t−1]
where mcH,t+s = p
W
H,t+s−pH,t+s . Also, log-linearized the domestic price equation (from
equation (5.23)) to get,
piH,t = (1− θH)
[
pNEWH,t − pH,t−1
]
+ θHκpit−1
Now, with a simple substitution and rearrangement, the expression for domestic
inﬂation is,
piH,t =
1
1 + βκ
[
βEt {piH,t+1}+ κpit−1 + ΛHmcH,t
]
(5.24)
where parameter ΛH = (1−βθH)(1−θH)
θH
measures the degree of price rigidity of the home
good. Note that parameter ΛH is decreasing in θH . The above expression shows
that given the staggered price-setting structure of the retail goods, domestic inﬂation
is determined by three determinants - expectation of the future domestic inﬂation, lag
CPI inﬂation and the current real marginal cost of producing domestic intermediate
goods.
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5.1.5.2 Foreign Goods Retailers
For the foreign goods, the law of one price is assumed to hold at the wholesale level.
Hence, import retailers purchase the products from foreign producers at the whole-
sale price PWF,t = StP
∗
t (expressed in the local currency). With the assumption that
these retailers operate in a monopolistic competitive structure, they resell these im-
ported products at the retail price PF,t . At the retail level, LOPG does not necessarily
hold. The possible divergence between the retail price of foreign goods in the domestic
economy and the price of the foreign good in its country of origin (PF,t 6= StP ∗t ), intro-
duces the eﬀect of the incomplete exchange rate pass-through into the model.
Similar to the home good retailers, retailers for the imported goods ﬁx their price in a
staggered fashion. Let PF,t (z) be the price set by the imported good retailer z , for the
period t . Import retailers re-optimize their price by choosing PF,t (z) = P
NEW
F,t with
a ﬁxed probability (1− θF ). The remaining import retailers who do not re optimize
(which happens with probability θF ), simply update their price based on the last period
CPI inﬂation;
PF,t (z) = PF,t−1 (z) (pit−1)
κ
Under the assumed price-setting structure, the aggregate price level for the foreign good
is given by
PF,t =
(
(1− θF )
(
PNEWF,t
)1−ε
+ θF (PF,t−1 (pit−1)
κ)
1−ε
) 1
1−ε
(5.25)
Like home good retailers, import retailers set their optimal price by solving this problem;
max
PNEWF,t
∞∑
s=0
βsθsFEt
{
YF,t+s (z)
[
PNEWF,t (pit+s−1)
κ − PF,t+s
PWF,t
PF,t+s
]}
subject to the demand constraint, YF,t+s (z) ≤
(
PNEWF,t
PF,t+s
(pit+s−1)
κ
)−ε
YF,t+s , with total
aggregate demand for the foreign goods of YF,t =
(´ 1
0
YF,t (z)
ε−1
ε dz
) ε
ε−1
. Like before,
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PWF,t
PF,t+s
= MCF,t+s is the real marginal cost for the import retailers. Import retailer's
optimal price is,
PNEWF,t = µ
∑∞
s=0 β
sθsFEt {YF,t+s [PF,t+sMCF,t+s]}∑∞
s=0 β
sθsFEt {YF,t+s [(pit+s−1)κ]}
To get the expression for foreign inﬂation, log-linearize the equation above,
pNEWF,t ≈ (1− βθF ) [pF,t +mcF,t] + (βθF )
[
Et
{
pNEWF,t+1
}− κpi,t−1]
where mcF,t = p
W
F,t − pF,t . Also, by using the deﬁnition that pWF,t = st + p∗t , then the
link between import retailer's real marginal cost and LOPG can also be written as,
mcF,t = st + p
∗
t − pF,t ≡ lopgt
Log-linearizing equation (5.25),
piF,t = (1− θF )
[
pNEWF,t − pF,t−1
]
+ θFκpit−1
Now, with a simple rearrangement, the expression for foreign good inﬂation is,
piF,t =
1
1 + βκ
[
βEt {piF,t+1}+ κpit−1 + ΛF lopgt
]
(5.26)
where parameter ΛF = (1−βθF )(1−θF )
θF
measures the degree of price rigidity for the foreign
good due to incomplete exchange rate pass-through. ΛF is decreasing in θF . Like its
domestic counterpart, foreign good inﬂation is also determined by three determinants -
expectation of the future foreign good inﬂation, lag CPI inﬂation and the current LOPG
(which represent the real marginal cost for purchasing foreign goods at the wholesale
level).
CPI Inﬂation
Lastly, by substituting equation (5.24) and (5.26) to equation (5.5), the speciﬁcation of
the CPI inﬂation for this small open economy is given by expression,
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pit =
1
1 + βκ
[
βEt {pit+1}+ κpit−1 + (1− γ) ΛHmcH,t + γΛF lopgt
]
(5.27)
It is clear from the above equation that the determinant of the CPI inﬂation in this
economy is a combination of domestic and foreign factors. On the domestic side, the
cost of the factor inputs for producing intermediate goods determines the real marginal
cost. Similarly, the impact of the foreign factor is transmitted through the measure for
the law of one price gap (LOPG), lopt . The relative importance between the domestic
and foreign factors in inﬂuencing the overall dynamics of the CPI inﬂation is determined
by the parameter γ , the degree of economic openness.
5.1.6 The Central Bank
Results of Chapter 3 highlighted three main characteristics of BNM's reaction function
- BNM is forward-looking, does not react to the exchange rate movement and practices
interest rate smoothing. Based on these results, monetary policy in this DSGE model
is represented by a forward looking HMT type interest rate rule;
rt = (1− ρ) [βpipit+1 + Θyyt+1] + ρrt−1 + εMPt (5.28)
where εMPt ∼ iid
(
0, σ2mp
)
is the monetary policy shocks.
5.1.7 Market Clearing Condition
5.1.7.1 Foreign Sector
The consumption demand of the foreign country has the same structure as the one
described in section 5.1.1. Analogous to equation 5.3, the optimal demand for the
home good abroad (imported goods for the recipient country) is,
C∗H,t = γ
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−η
Y ∗t
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where Y ∗t = C
∗
t is the total foreign output (exogenously given). Law of one price is
assumed to hold for the export sector with the price of the home good sold abroad
is P ∗H,t =
PH,t
St
. This allows the demand for the home good abroad to be written as,
C∗H,t = γ
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η (
Pt
StP ∗t
)−η
Y ∗t . Then, using the deﬁnition of the real exchange rate,
RERt ≡ St P
∗
t
Pt
, the export demand of the home good is,
C∗H,t = γ
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η (
1
RERt
)−η
Y ∗t (5.29)
The dynamics of the foreign sector is represented by a simple AR(1) process,
y∗
t
= µy∗y
∗
t−1 + ε
y∗
t
i∗
t
= µi∗i
∗
t−1 + ε
r∗
t
(5.30)
pi∗
t
= µpi∗pi
∗
t−1 + ε
pi∗
t
where µi ∈ [0, 1] , i = y∗t , i∗t , pi∗t is the respective AR(1) coeﬃcient and εit ∼ iid (0, σ2i )
is the respective random shocks.
5.1.7.2 Aggregate Resource Constraint
In each period, the home ﬁnal good (YH,t) is used for consumption, investment and
export activities. The demand comes from domestic households for consumption
purposes (CH,t). Entrepreneurs utilize home ﬁnal goods for investment purposes (INVH,t).
Lastly, demand for home ﬁnal goods comes from the foreign country (C∗H,t). Hence, in
aggregate, total demand for the home good is YH,t = CH,t + INVH,t + C
∗
H,t . Using
their respective demand function from equations (5.2) and (5.29), the market clearing
condition for the the home ﬁnal goods can be written as,
YH,t =
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η [
(1− γ) [Ct + INVt] + γ
(
1
RERt
)−η
Y ∗t
]
or in log-linear form,
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yH,t =
C
Y H
(1− γ) ct+ INV
Y H
(1− γ) invt+γy∗t +ηγ
(
2− γ
(1− γ)
)
rert− ηγ
1− γ lopt (5.31)
A ﬁnancial intermediary lends funds to entrepreneurs. To ﬁnance its operation, the
ﬁnancial intermediary collects deposits from domestic households at a cost Rt .
For simplicity, the ﬁnancial intermediary operates in a competitive manner with zero
proﬁt. The risk premium that it charges entrepreneurs, is fully utilized to cover
monitoring/auditing cost. In addition, it is also assumed that the ﬁnancial interme-
diary does not borrow funds from abroad. Hence, in equilibrium, the amount of funds
available for the ﬁnancial intermediary to ﬁnance the borrowing demand from the
entrepreneur is,
Dt = Ft
i.e. total deposits placed by households is equal to total loans extended to the
entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs then transform this loan into capital.
5.1.7.3 Evolution of net foreign assets
The evolution of the aggregate net foreign asset for the economy (used to calculate the
country risk premium in the UIP equation) is,
Zt = R
∗
t−1Ψ
B
(
Zt−1, AUIPt−1
)
Zt−1 + YH,t − (Ct + INVt)
where Zt =
StBt
Y¯ Pt
is the economy's aggregate net foreign assets. The above equation
determines the dynamic of net foreign assets, Zt , as a function of the current account
position, YH,t − (Ct + INVt) and the ﬂow of interest payments generated by Zt−1 .
The current account position reﬂects the net movement of the physical goods (exports
minus imports) between the domestic economy and the rest of the world. In return,
the domestic economy will accumulate net foreign assets which aﬀects the country's
debt-elastic risk premium. In log-linear form, the equation that governs the country's
net foreign asset position is,
130
zt =
1
β
zt−1 + yH,t − (ct + invt)− γ
(1− γ) (rert − γlopgt) (5.32)
5.1.8 Solving the model
For the purpose of estimation, a log-linear approximation to the model's optimal-
ity conditions around a non-stochastic steady-state value is employed. The complete
representation of the system of equations to be estimated is summarized in Table 5.1.
The system consists of 22 equations and 22 variables ( yH , c , inv , pi , rer , lopg , r ,
rG , rK , q , k , n , lH , mc , wH , wE , z , y
∗ , i∗ , pi∗ , AUIP , AY ) and seven exogenous
shocks ( εY , εUIP , εMP , εLOPG , εi∗ , εy∗ , εpi∗ ). All the seven exogenous shocks are
assumed to be i.i.d process.
A variety of numerical techniques are available to solve this linear rational expectations
model. Among others are methods proposed by Blanchard and Kahn (1980), McKibbin
and Sachs (1991), Uhlig (1999), Klein (2000) and Sims (2002). See among others, Dave
and DeJong (2007) for a review on this topic. The approximate solution takes the form
of state-space representation,
Xt+1 = Λ1Xt + Λ2vt+1
Yt = ΦXt + wt
where Xt is the vector of state variables, Yt is the vector of observed variables, Λ1
and Λ2 are solution matrices of the rational expectation model and Φ is the matrix of
parameters deﬁning the link between the state and observed variables. vt+1 and wt are
the vector of uncorrelated shocks. The above state-space representation of the DSGE
model can be estimated with the Kalman ﬁlter. See chapter 13 of Hamilton (1994) for
a detail discussion on this area.
The above log-linearized DSGE model is solved and estimated using DYNARE v3.65.11
To solve the model, DYNARE employs the numerical method proposed by Klein (2000)
11DYNARE is a set of MATLAB codes to solve, simulate and estimate DSGE models.
See http://www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare/ for details.
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Table 5.1: Summary of Log-linearized System of Equations
Demand Side
Aggregate Demand: yH,t = CY H (1− γ) ct +
I
Y H
(1− γ) invt + γy∗t + ηγ
(
2−γ
(1−γ)
)
rert − ηγ1−γ lopgt
Consumption: ct −Υct−1 = Et (ct+1 −Υct)− (1−Υ) (rt − Etpit+1)
Investment: rK,t + qt−1 =
(
1− (1−δ)
RK
)
rG,t +
(1−δ)
RK
qt
qt = ψI (invt − kt)
EtrK,t+1 = rt − Etpit+1 − χ (nt+1 − qt − kt+1)
Supply Side
Labour supply: lH,t = 1Ψ
[
wH,t − 11−Υ (ct −Υct−1)
]
CPI inﬂation: pit = 11+βκ
[
βEt {pit+1}+ κpit−1 + (1− γ) ΛHmcH,t + γΛF lopt
]
with ΛH = (1−βθH)(1−θH)θH and Λ
F = (1−βθF )(1−θF )θF
Production function: yH,t = αkt + (1− α) ΩlH,t +AYt
Cost of factor inputs: rG,t = yH,t +mcH,t − kt −
(
γ
1−γ (rert − lopgt)
)
wH,t = yH,t +mcH,t − lH,t −
(
γ
1−γ (rert − lopgt)
)
wE,t = yH,t +mcH,t −
(
γ
1−γ (rert − lopgt)
)
LOPG: lopgt = ρLOPGlopgt−1 + εLOPGt
Other State Variables
RER : rert+1 − rert = (rt − Etpit+1)−
(
r∗t − Etpi∗t+1
)
+ ψBzt +AUIPt
Capital accumulation: kt+1 = δinvt + (1− δ)kt
Net-worth: nt+1 = (Γ5 + 1) WEK wE,t (with Γ5 =
K
N
− 1)
+ςRK {(Γ5 + 1) rK,t − Γ5 (rt−1 − pit)− χΓ5 (qt−1 + kt) + χ (Γ5 + 1)nt}
Net foreign assets: zt = 1β zt−1 + yH,t − (ct + invt)− γ(1−γ) (rert − γlopgt)
Monetary Policy
HMT rule: rt = (1− ρ) [βpipit+1 + Θyyt+1] + ρrt−1 + εMPt
Foreign Block
Output y∗
t
= µy∗y∗t−1 + ε
y∗
t
Interest rates i∗
t
= µi∗i∗t−1 + ε
r∗
t
Net-worth: pi∗
t
= µpi∗pi∗t−1 + ε
pi∗
t
Shocks process
UIP AUIPt = ρUIPA
UIP
t−1 + ε
UIP
t
Productivity AYt = ρYA
Y
t−1 + ε
Y
t
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and Sims (2002). Then, the Bayesian estimation method is used to estimate the
parameters of the model. The methodological discussion of the Bayesian method as
well as the results of the estimation exercise of the DSGE model is presented in the
next section.
5.2 Estimation Strategy
There are several techniques that have been used in the literature to parametrize and
evaluate the DSGE model. Canova (2007), Dave and DeJong (2007) and Ruge-Murcia
(2007) review the use of diﬀerent techniques to confront DSGE models to data. These
techniques range from the calibration method, to estimation exercises using various
techniques. Among the examples of DSGE models that use the calibration method are
the work by Kydland and Prescott (1982, 1996); McKibbin and Sachs (1991); Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and Gali and Monacelli (2005). The diﬀerent estimation
techniques that have been used in the literature to estimate DSGE models are the GMM
method (e.g. Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992)), the minimum distance method that
is based on discrepancy among VAR and DSGE model impulse response functions (e.g.
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997); Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005); Meier
and Muller (2006)) and the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) method
(e.g. Leeper and Sims (1994); Kim (2000) and Ireland (2004)). In recent years, the
Bayesian method has become an increasingly popular technique to estimate DSGE
models. Examples in the literature that use this method include DeJong, Ingram, and
Whiteman (2000); Smets and Wouters (2003) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2005).
The Bayesian method has also been applied to estimate the DSGE model in an open
economy setting. For example, Lubik and Schorfheide (2005) apply the Bayesian
method to estimate the open economy DSGE model for the large economy of the US
and the Euro area. Using the same estimation method, this approach has been extended
to the case of smaller economies of developed countries. Among the examples include
Kam, Lees, and Liu (Forthcoming) and Justiniano and Preston (2006) which estimate
the model for Australia, New Zealand and Canada; and Adolfson, Laseen, and Lindé
(2008) for Sweden. Conversely, as stated before, examples of published work involving
developing countries are limited. Medina and Soto (2005, 2007) and Castillo, Montoro,
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and Tuesta (2006) apply the Bayesian approach to estimate a DSGE model for Chile
and Peru respectively.
Conceptually, the application of Bayesian estimation on a DSGE model is a bridge
between the calibration and the maximum likelihood methods. In this regard, Lubik
and Schorfheide (2005) list three main characteristics of the Bayesian approach in the
context of estimating the DSGE model. First, the Bayesian approach is a system-
based methodology that ﬁts the DSGE model to a vector of time series. As opposed
to GMM estimation which is based on particular (partial) equilibrium relationships
(such as the Euler equation in consumption), the Bayesian approach takes advantage
of the general equilibrium philosophy - all the theoretical restrictions implied by the
model for the likelihood function and the full dimensions of the data are taken into
account for estimation. Second, the estimation of the Bayesian approach is based on
the likelihood function generated by the DSGE model, rather than, for instance, the
discrepancy between DSGE model responses and vector autoregression (VAR) impulse
responses. Third, the Bayesian approach involves the introduction of prior distributions
on the model's parameters.
There are several advantages of using this approach in the DSGE framework. For
instance, An and Schorfheide (2007) elaborate in detail how the three characteristics
listed above, are instrumental in making the Bayesian approach cope with the poten-
tial problem of model misspeciﬁcation and possible lack of parameter identiﬁcation in
estimating the DSGE model. While the Bayesian approach does not solve the model
misspeciﬁcation and parameter identiﬁcation problems per se - the common challenges
face by any estimation method - An and Schorfheide (2007) argue that it provides
admonition about the problems to the user.12 Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez
(2004) highlight another important strength of the Bayesian approach as the estima-
tion tool for the DSGE model. They ﬁnd that the Bayesian estimation has a strong
small sample behaviour that outperforms the results of the DSGE model estimated
using the Maximum Likelihood approach. Most importantly, they also show that even
in the case of misspeciﬁed and/or non-nested models, results from Bayesian estimation
are asymptotically consistent. Lastly, the Bayesian approach provides a platform for
researchers to easily perform model comparisons that best ﬁt the data. To do so, the
posterior odds ratio is constructed using the information gathered from the posterior
12See also Canova and Sala (2006) and Del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets, and Wouters (2007) for
detailed discussion regarding identiﬁcation and misspeciﬁcation problems in the DSGE model.
134
distribution of the competing models. In the case of equal prior probabilities across
models, the posterior odds ratio is simply the ratio of marginal likelihoods between
the competing models. Among the examples of literature that utilize this method is
Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez (2005). They compare the ﬁt of four competing speciﬁca-
tions of a closed economy DSGE model and Lubik and Schorfheide (2005) compare a
closed and open economy version of a DSGE model.
5.2.1 Bayesian Estimation
This sub-section provides a sketch on the application of the Bayesian methodology in the
DSGE framework.13 Unlike the Classical approach which assumes there exists a ﬁxed,
true value for the parameters, the fundamental diﬀerence of the Bayesian approach is
the assumption that the parameter of interest is not ﬁxed, but a random variable with a
probability distribution. To brieﬂy illustrate the mechanics of the Bayesian estimation,
let ΘM denotes the vector of parameters for the speciﬁc model M , and YT is the
vector of observed data with T the sample size. Also let p (ΘM |M) be the prior
density of the parameters and p (ΘM | YT ,M) the posterior density of the parameters
conditional on the observed data. L (ΘM | YT , M) ≡ p (YT | ΘM , M) is the likelihood
function describing the density of the observed data conditional on the model and its
parameters. The likelihood function is recursive and can be written as:
p (YT | ΘM , M) = p (y0 | ΘM , M)
T∏
t=1
p (yt | YT−1, ΘM , M)
The Bayesian estimation works as follows. The aim is to obtain the posterior density
p (ΘM | YT ) of the model's parameters by using the information of the prior density
and the likelihood function. Combining the prior density and likelihood function using
the Bayes theorem, the posterior density can be written as:14
13An and Schorfheide (2007) provide a detail overview of the Bayesian methodology in the DSGE
framework. See also Chapter 12 of Hamilton (1994) and Chapter 9 of Canova (2007) and reference in
them for technical discussions of the Bayesian estimation.
14In general form, Bayes theorem states that p (Θ | YT ) = p(Θ∩YT )p(YT ) . Similarly, expressed on the
opposite condition, p (YT | Θ) = p(Θ∩YT )p(Θ) ⇐⇒ p (Θ ∩ YT ) = p (YT | Θ)× p (Θ).
Hence, p (Θ | YT ) = p(Θ∩YT )p(YT ) ≡
p(YT |Θ)×p(Θ)
p(YT )
. Equation for the posterior density (equation 5.33)
utilizes this property.
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p (ΘM | YT ,M) = p (YT | ΘM , M)× p (ΘM |M)
p (YT |M) (5.33)
where p (YT |M) is the marginal data density conditional on the speciﬁc DSGE model
that it tries to ﬁt;
p (YT |M) =
ˆ
ΘM
p (YT | ΘM , M)× p (ΘM |M) dΘM (5.34)
The objective of the Bayesian approach is to reconstruct the parameter's posterior
density and use it to characterize the parameter's statistical moments. The central
part of doing this is to exploit the parameter's posterior kernel equation,
K (ΘM | YT ,M) ≡ p (ΘM | YT ,M) ∝ p (YT | ΘM , M)× p (ΘM |M)
The construction of the parameter's posterior distribution involves two main steps.
First, is the estimation of the posterior kernel using the information from the likelihood
function. The recursive likelihood function of the model is estimated using the Kalman
ﬁlter. Second, is to use the posterior kernel to characterize the shape of the parameter's
posterior distribution. However, as the parameter's posterior distribution is nonlinear
and is a complicated function of the parameters ΘM , its explicit form is unknown.
Hence, the simulation exercise by generating random draws from the parameter's pos-
terior distribution is needed. To do so, these random draws are generated using the
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method, such as the Metropolis-Hastings (MH)
algorithm.
To perform model comparison, say between model M and N , the Bayesian approach
utilizes the information from the model's posterior distribution. Let p (M) and p (N)
be the prior distribution for each model. The posterior distribution for each model,
generated from the same data set YT , is given by the expression,
p (M | YT ) = p (M) p (YT |M)
p (M) p (YT |M) + p (N) p (YT | N)
p (N | YT ) = p (N) p (YT | N)
p (M) p (YT |M) + p (N) p (YT | N)
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where p (YT |M) , p (YT | N) is the marginal data density (given by equation 5.34).15
The posterior odds ratio (or Bayes factor),K , is calculated as follows:
K ≡ p (M | YT )
p (N | YT ) =
p (M)
p (N)
× p (YT |M)
p (YT | N)
Without any prior beliefs about which model is more likely to ﬁt the data, it can be
assumed that p (M) = p (N) . Hence, the Bayes factor is normally expressed as;
K =
p (YT |M)
p (YT | N)
Jeﬀreys (1961) and Kass and Raftery (1995) give the scale for interpreting K . From
Kass and Raftery (1995) (page 777), this scale is summarized as follows:
loge K K Evidence favouring model M
0 to 2 1 to 3 Not worth more than a bare mention
2 to 6 3 to 20 Positive
6 to 10 20 to 150 Strong
>10 >150 Very strong
The Bayesian estimation in this chapter was performed using DYNARE v3.65. The
following options were used to run the estimation process.
• Christopher Sims 'csminwel' algorithm as the optimizer for computing the mode
of parameter's posterior density. This value is then used to initiate the simulation
using the MCMC method.
• Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm to generate draws from the posterior density.
The following options were used for the MH algorithm:
15The practical diﬃculty to calculate the Bayes factor is to obtain the marginal data density. One
of the common methods to do this (and the one used in this chapter) is to use the Modiﬁed Harmonic
Mean Estimator (see Geweke (1999)), which involves the simulation of the marginal density using the
MH algorithms. See Canova (2007) and An and Schorfheide (2007) for detailed discussion on the
alternative estimator to calculate the marginal data density.
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 2 parallel Markov chains
 500,000 draws for each chain, with the ﬁrst 30% of draws discarded as burn-in
 The scale coeﬃcient for the variance-covariance matrix of the random walk
chain was set to give the acceptance rate between 20-30%.
5.2.2 Choice of Priors and Fixed Parameters
The choice of priors for the Bayesian estimation in this chapter is guided by two main
considerations - the restrictions imposed on the theoretical grounds as well as the speciﬁ-
cations and results from other studies. The theoretical restrictions on the parameter
values like the interval boundaries and the non-negativity constraints aﬀects the choice
of the probability distribution used as the prior. Beta distribution is used when the
parameters are constrained on the unit-interval while Gamma and Normal distribution
is chosen for parameters that are restricted to be on the positive domain. After deciding
a suitable prior distribution, the next step is to ﬁnd a suitable value for the prior mean
and standard deviation of each parameters. In doing so, results from other empirical
studies are used.
Table 5.2 summarizes the prior distribution of the estimated parameters. The main
challenge of ﬁnding the parameter's priors for the estimation exercise is the lack of
published studies that use a DSGE modelling framework involving Malaysia's data that
can be used as a reference. There is only one known published study that applies this
modeling framework to the Malaysia's data - Ramayandi (2008). Ramayandi estimated
Gali-Monacelli's small open economy DSGE model for 5 ASEAN countries using the
Maximum Likelihood (ML) method. Even though Ramayandi used a shorter sample
period for his estimation of structural parameters on the Malaysian economy - quarterly
data of 1991 to 2004 - information from his point estimates is useful in guiding us to set
the priors for most of the parameters in this exercise. Summary of his results is given in
Table 5.6 (place in Appendix). Hence, by utilizing the information from Ramayandi's
estimation results on the deep parameters for the Malaysian economy, fairly tight priors
are imposed on the deep parameters Υ , Ψ , η , κ , θD , θF .
The introduction of the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism in the DSGE model requires
ﬁnding a suitable prior for parameter χ , the elasticity of the external ﬁnance premium.
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Table 5.2: Prior Distributions
Description Domain Density Mean Std. Dev.
Υ Habit Persistence [0,1] Beta 0.50 0.05
Ψ Inv. Elasticity of Lab. Supply R+ Gamma 2 0.50
η Elasticity Subst. Home/Foreign Goods R+ Gamma 0.50 0.10
κ Price Indexation [0,1] Beta 0.50 0.10
θD Calvo pricing - domestic goods [0,1] Beta 0.80 0.10
θF Calvo pricing - imported goods [0,1] Beta 0.80 0.10
ρ HMT rule - smoothing [0,1] Beta 0.50 0.25
βpi HMT rule - inﬂation R+ Normal 1.20 0.25
Θy HMT rule - output R+ Normal 1.00 0.25
µy∗ AR(1) : Foreign output [0,1] Beta 0.50 0.25
µi∗ AR(1) : Foreign int. rate [0,1] Beta 0.50 0.25
µpi∗ AR(1) : Foreign inﬂation [0,1] Beta 0.50 0.25
ρUIP AR(1) : UIP shocks [0,1] Beta 0.50 0.25
ρLOPG AR(1) : LOP shocks [0,1] Beta 0.50 0.25
ρY AR(1) : Technology shocks [0,1] Beta 0.50 0.25
σMP Std. dev. MP shocks R+ Inverse Gamma 0.05 Inﬁnity
σy∗ Std. dev. foreign output shocks R+ Inverse Gamma 0.05 Inﬁnity
σi∗ Std. dev. foreign int. rates shocks R+ Inverse Gamma 0.05 Inﬁnity
σpi∗ Std. dev. foreign inﬂation shocks R+ Inverse Gamma 0.05 Inﬁnity
σUIP Std. dev. UIP shocks R+ Inverse Gamma 0.05 Inﬁnity
σLOPG Std. dev. LOP shocks R+ Inverse Gamma 0.05 Inﬁnity
σY Std. dev. technology shocks R+ Inverse Gamma 0.05 Inﬁnity
χ Financial Accelerator [0,1] Beta 0.07 0.02
There is a wide range of values that has been used and found in the literature. BGG
set this parameter to 0.02 (or 200 basis points), referring to the historical average of the
risk spread between the prime lending rate and the 6-month Treasury bill in the US.
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Devereux, Lane, and Xu (2006) used the same value when calibrating their model using
the Korean data. Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2007) set this parameter at 0.035,
a higher value than used by Devereux, Lane, and Xu (2006) with the argument that
the capital market in Korea is less developed relative to the US. In contrast, results of
a few estimation exercises found a higher value for this parameter than those used in
the calibration approach. Meier and Muller (2006) estimated a closed economy DSGE
model with a ﬁnancial accelerator for the US economy using the minimum distance
method. Using the sample period of 1980-2003, they estimated this parameter to be
around 0.06. Using the FIML method and the same sample period, Christensen and
Dib (2008) found a higher point estimate of 0.09 for the US economy.
For this chapter, priors for parameter χ is set to be Beta distribution with mean 0.07
and standard deviation 0.02. Using the same approach used by BGG, the value for
the prior mean is chosen based on the historical average of interest rate risk-spread in
Malaysia. For the period 1975-2005, the average risk-spread between the commercial
bank's average lending rate and the 3-month Treasury bill rate is about 550 basis
points (or 0.055). Considering that Malaysia's capital market is less developed than
the US and Korea, setting the prior mean higher than the calibrated value used by
BGG, Devereux, Lane, and Xu (2006) and Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2007) is
reasonable. In addition, by taking into account the estimation results of Meier and
Muller (2006) and Christensen and Dib (2008) which found estimated values of this
parameter are higher than the one used in the calibration exercise, we also expect
the value for χ in Malaysia to be higher than 0.055. Hence, to allow for a possible
large range for this parameter, we put a fairly loose prior for χ , by setting the prior
distribution's standard deviation to 0.02.
The remaining priors are fairly standard. Based on the estimation results of BNM's
reaction function in Chapter 3, prior mean for parameter βpi and Θy is set at 1.2
and 1.0 respectively. However, in order to investigate the possible diﬀerences of the
HMT rule coeﬃcients estimated as a single equation (as conducted and presented in
Chapter 3) and those estimated from the system of equations used in here, a loose priors
is set for the HMT-rule parameters ρ, βpi and Θy. We also set fairly uninformative
priors for the shocks parameters. Priors for all the AR(1) coeﬃcients of the shocks takes
mean value of 0.5 and standard deviation of 0.25. The standard error of the shocks
follows the Inverse-Gamma distribution, with all shares a common mean of 0.05 and
inﬁnite standard deviation.
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As in other studies that estimate DSGE models, some parameters are ﬁxed because
the data used in the estimation exercise contain little information about them. For the
estimation exercise in this chapter, few parameters in the model are set to the common
value used in the literature. Household discount parameter, β , takes the value of 0.985.
The share of capital in the production function, α , is set at 0.35. The depreciation
rate parameter, δ , is 0.025, which implies an annual depreciation rate of 10%. The
degree of retailer's monopoly power, ε, is set at 6, which implies a gross steady-state
price markup (µ) of 1.20. The parameter measuring capital adjustment cost ψI , is set
at 0.5.16 Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003), the parameter for the elasticity of
the risk premium (ψB) is set to 0.01.
Most of the parameters for the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism are the same as in BGG.
The probability that an entrepreneur will survive for the next period, ς , is set at 0.9728,
implying that the expected working life of an entrepreneur is 36 years. The proportion
of the household labour relative to the entrepreneur labour, Ω , is ﬁxed at 0.99. The
only departure from the BGG's set-up is on the choice of the capital to net-worth ratio
(K
N
) in the steady state. BGG ﬁxed this ratio at 2, which they state is consistent with
the 200 basis points risk-spread between the prime lending rate and 6-month treasury
bill rate for the US's data. Devereux, Lane, and Xu (2006) suggest that the use of a
higher ratio than BGG's set-up is more consistent with the higher leverage observed in
emerging market economies. For this reason, in their calibrated DSGE model on Korea,
they set this ratio at 3. Following their suggestion, the same value is chosen for this
exercise. The higher capital-net worth ratio is also in line with the larger risk-spread
seen in Malaysia's data. As mentioned earlier, the average risk-spread in Malaysia was
about 550 basis points, much larger than the one seen in the US's data.
5.2.3 Data and Estimation Period
Like in the earlier chapters, the estimation exercise uses quarterly data series of output
gap, CPI index, 3-month interbank nominal interest rate and index of the Real Exchange
16BGG noted that there is no ﬁrm consensus in the literature about the value for this parameter.
They suggest a value between 0 to 0.5 is a reasonable assumption for the capital adjustment cost.
Hence, BGG and Devereux, Lane, and Xu (2006) set this parameter at 0.25, while Gertler, Gilchrist,
and Natalucci (2007) use 0.5.
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Rate. All the data are demeaned. The sample period for the estimation of the DSGE
model is 1975Q1 to 2005Q2.
5.3 Estimation Results for Full Sample Period: 1975Q1
to 2005Q2
The main objective of this estimation exercise is to estimate the structural or deep
parameters of the Malaysian economy. In doing so, two model speciﬁcations were
estimated - with a ﬁnancial accelerator (FA) and without a ﬁnancial accelerator (NFA).
In the NFA model, the eﬀect of credit friction is switched oﬀ by ﬁxing parameter χ to
zero. There are two reasons why we estimate these two model speciﬁcations. First, is
to investigate how the estimation of the deep parameters for the Malaysian economy
are aﬀected by the choice of these two speciﬁcations. Second, is to investigate which
of these two model speciﬁcations are better in describing the Malaysian economy. The
outcome of this investigation will also verify the ﬁndings of Razi (1998) and Tang (2006)
that the credit channel has an important role in the Malaysian economy. Discussion on
the diﬀerences in the estimation results between FA and NFA model speciﬁcations will
be discussed in Section 5.4.
This section starts with the general overview of the estimation results of FA and NFA
models for the whole sample period - 1975Q1 to 2005Q2. It follows with discussion
comparing the estimation results of the FA and NFA model with the results of another
open economy DSGE model for Malaysia by Ramayandi (2008).
5.3.1 Estimates
Table 5.3 summarizes the estimation results for the FA and NFA model speciﬁca-
tions. It presents the posterior mean and the 95% conﬁdence interval for the estimated
parameters. Besides this statistical information, additional information on the
estimation results is presented in Figure 5.1 to 5.2, which plots the prior (in Grey)
and posterior (in Black) distributions for some of the estimated parameters. The
dotted line (in Black) in the ﬁgures is the mode value of the posterior distribution.
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Table 5.3: Posterior Distributions: 1975Q1-2005Q2
Model with Fin. Accelerator Model without Fin. Accelerator
Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI
Υ 0.565 [0.471 , 0.661] 0.554 [0.460 , 0.652]
Ψ 0.720 [0.443 , 1.007] 1.045 [0.623 , 1.460]
η 0.465 [0.333 , 0.576] 0.601 [0.482 , 0.721]
κ 0.626 [0.497 , 0.761] 0.590 [0.443 , 0.731]
θD 0.716 [0.666 , 0.766] 0.787 [0.751 , 0.824]
θF 0.738 [0.691 , 0.783] 0.796 [0.763 , 0.829]
ρ 0.607 [0.530 , 0.685] 0.642 [0.573 , 0.712]
βpi 2.251 [1.990 , 2.523] 2.100 [1.800 , 2.398]
Θy 1.303 [1.002 , 1.599] 1.501 [1.188 , 1.819]
µy∗ 0.881 [0.815 , 0.948] 0.883 [0.817 , 0.950]
µi∗ 0.728 [0.675 , 0.783] 0.725 [0.676 , 0.776]
µpi∗ 0.904 [0.871 , 0.938] 0.886 [0.856 , 0.918]
ρUIP 0.751 [0.638 , 0.866] 0.690 [0.581 , 0.803]
ρLOPG 0.843 [0.797 , 0.890] 0.804 [0.749 , 0.858]
ρY 0.885 [0.822 , 0.948] 0.771 [0.659 , 0.891]
σMP 0.012 [0.010 , 0.014] 0.012 [0.011 , 0.013]
σy∗ 0.008 [0.007 , 0.009] 0.008 [0.007 , 0.009]
σi∗ 0.016 [0.014 , 0.018] 0.016 [0.014 , 0.018]
σpi∗ 0.008 [0.007 , 0.010] 0.009 [0.008 , 0.010]
σUIP 0.020 [0.015 , 0.024] 0.022 [0.017 , 0.026]
σLOPG 0.020 [0.015 , 0.025] 0.015 [0.012 , 0.018]
σY 0.013 [0.010 , 0.016] 0.018 [0.011 , 0.023]
χ 0.032 [0.010 , 0.053] - -
LogL: -2403.56 LogL: -2422.44
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Figure 5.1: Prior and Posterior Distributions: FA Model 1975Q1-2005Q2
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Figure 5.2: Prior and Posterior Distributions: NFA Model 1975Q1-2005Q2
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Three interesting observations are evident from the ﬁgures depicting prior and posterior
distribution of the estimated parameters. First, all the posterior distribution of the
estimated parameters seems to be well behaved. Besides having a bell-shaped curve,
they display another important feature of normal distribution - their posterior mode
and mean are very close to each other. Second, in almost all parameters, their posterior
distributions are less diﬀuse than their respective priors. Third, except for parameter η ,
these prior and posterior distributions are generally well apart and do not overlap with
each other. Hence, the three observations on the behaviour of posterior distributions of
the estimated parameters suggest the data contains informative information to update
the initial priors that we set in most of the model's parameters.
The estimates of the structural parameters are also found to be plausible and gene-
rally comparable to the values found in the literature. This applies to both model
speciﬁcations. Also, based on the 95% conﬁdence interval of the estimated parameters,
the results indicate that all estimated parameters are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
In a way, this outcome indicates that the simple open economy DSGE model presented
in Section 5.1 is able to ﬁt the data and represent the Malaysian economy reason-
ably well. Next, we analyze the point estimates of the structural parameters for the
Malaysian economy in more detail.
Estimates for pricing behaviour parameters are comparable to those commonly found in
the literature. Estimates for the degree of price indexation (κ) are centered around 0.6,
suggesting a fairly high degree of inﬂation persistence in the Malaysian economy. The
Calvo pricing parameters - θD and θF - are estimated to be between 0.7 to 0.8. This is
very close to the standard value of 0.75 used in many calibration exercises in the DSGE
literature (example Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), Gali and Monacelli (2005),
Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2007)). The close estimated values for parameter θD
and θF also indicate retailers of the home and foreign goods have almost the same
behaviour in setting the retail price. Based on the estimates for these two parameters,
the average duration of the price contracts for both types of goods is estimated to be
around 4.3 quarters. This is very much in line with the estimated duration in the
Philippines and Singapore reported by Ramayandi (2008).
Estimates of parameters describing household's preferences are mixed. The estimate
for the degree of habit persistence (Υ) of 0.6 is relatively low compared to the esti-
mates of around 0.7-0.9 reported in Adolfson, Laséen, and Villani (2007) for the Euro
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area, Kam, Lees, and Liu (Forthcoming) for Australia, Canada and New Zealand;
Liu (2006) for New Zealand and Ramayandi (2008) for Indonesia, Thailand and
Philippines. Estimates measuring the elasticity of substitution between domestic and
foreign goods (η) are around 0.5-0.6. This is close to the values found in many of
the open-economy DSGE literature, among others by Lubik and Schorfheide (2005),
Justiniano and Preston (2006) and Adolfson, Laséen, and Villani (2007). The less than
unitary estimate for η indicates substitution between domestic and foreign goods is
inelastic. This suggests consumption preferences in Malaysia are biased towards
domestic produced goods. Meanwhile, estimates for the inverse elasticity of labour
supply (Ψ) are centered around 0.7-1.0. Interestingly, these estimates are on the low
side, compared to the values of 1.5 to 2 found in Kam, Lees, and Liu (Forthcoming)
and Justiniano and Preston (2006) for Australia, Canada and New Zealand; Liu (2006)
for New Zealand; and 1 to 4 found by Ramayandi (2008) in the ASEAN countries.
The ﬁnding that the estimate of Ψ is less than 1 indicates that the labour supply in
Malaysia is elastic. This implies, in general, a one percentage change in wage will induce
a more than proportional change in labour supply. This prediction is largely consistent
with development in the Malaysian labour market during the estimation period. The
large employment creation, particularly in the export-oriented manufacturing sector,
and the subsequent increase in real wages during the post-1980 period were instru-
mental in reducing the unemployment level in Malaysia (page 20, Athukorala (2001)).
Consequently, this induced a higher labour force participation from the Malaysian
population. The rate of labour force participation in Malaysia increased consistently
from around 60% in 1980, to over 67% in the post-1995 period.17 In addition, besides
the increase of labour force from the native Malaysian population through the increase
in participation rate, the large and consistent inﬂux of immigrant workers into the
country throughout the 1990s further expanded the pool of labour supply in the
Malaysian economy. These developments could explain why the labour supply in
Malaysia is found to be more elastic, particularly if compared to the other ASEAN
countries as reported in Ramayandi (2008).
Another interesting observation about the above estimation results is the point estimate
for the parameter measuring the elasticity of external ﬁnance premium (χ). Surpri-
singly, the estimate for parameter χ is smaller than what we anticipated. Posterior
17Source: Data published by International Labour Organization (ILO) Bureau of Statistics, from
http://laborsta.ilo.org/
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mean of 0.03 for χ is much lower than the average risk-spread of 0.055 found in the
Malaysian data. Having said that, the estimated value for χ for the Malaysian economy
is still higher than the calibrated value of 0.02 used by BGG (for the US economy) and
very close to the value of 0.035 used in Devereux, Lane, and Xu (2006) and Gertler,
Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2007) (for the case of Korea economy). In a way, this outcome
is consistent with the fact that the Malaysian capital market is less developed than in
the US.
Lastly, the estimated autoregressive coeﬃcients for shocks - ρUIP , ρLOPG, ρY - range
between 0.7 to 0.9. The size of these parameters are plausible and suggest shocks that
hit the economy are fairly persistent. Likewise, the estimated standard deviation of the
shocks also have reasonable values.
5.3.1.1 BNM's reaction function
Estimates for the HMT interest rate rule parameters are also fairly standard and provide
a good description about the way monetary policy is conducted during the estimation
period. In particular, the estimated BNM's reaction function shows strong responses to
both inﬂation and output gap, as well as the tendency for policy inertia. The estimate
for βpi is found to be around 2.1-2.2 while Θy is about 1.3-1.5. The estimate for ρ
which measures the degree of interest rate smoothing is about 0.6.
An interesting observation from the above results is the fact that they are dissimilar
to the results we found in Chapter 3. Recall that in Chapter 3, we represent BNM's
reaction function with the same HMT interest rate rule and the estimation exercise
was conducted as a single equation. However, in this chapter, the same interest rate
rule is estimated under a diﬀerent estimation approach. As part of the equations in the
DSGE model, the parameters of HMT interest rate rule are estimated simultaneously
with other parameters in the system of equations. Interestingly, the use of a diﬀerent
estimation approach produces a diﬀerent estimation results for the BNM's reaction
function. Comparing the results between the two approaches, we ﬁnd the estimate for
the feedback coeﬃcient on inﬂation is much higher when the HMT rule is estimated
as a system of equations. Estimates for βpi of around 2.1-2.2 generated in the DSGE
model are twice the size of the estimate of the single equation estimation (βpi = 1.1 in
Chapter 3). The higher estimate for βpi implies BNM responds much more forcefully
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to inﬂation than what we conceived before. Similarly, the estimate for the interest
rate smoothing parameter (ρ) of around 0.6 in this chapter is lower than the value of
around 0.8 found in Chapter 3. This suggests BNM's behaviour in setting the interest
rate is less persistent than what we envisaged earlier. In contrast, estimates for BNM's
response to the output gap (Θy) of between 1.3-1.5 is close to the value of 1.2 reported
in Chapter 3.
The diﬀerences in the HMT parameter estimates between the two estimation approaches
highlighted above, provide an important admonition about the use of estimated reac-
tion functions as a tool to analyze BNM's policy behaviour. Results of the estimated
reaction function are inﬂuenced by the way the HMT interest rate rule is estimated.
Obviously, diﬀerent estimation results lead to diﬀerent analysis and understanding
about the subject matter. While both methods are equally useful in describing BNM's
reaction function - in revealing the variables that policymakers respond to -
the diﬀerences in the parameter estimates of HMT rule provides diﬀerent qualitative
information about describing BNM's policy behaviour. For example, the estimate for
βpi in the DSGE model is found to be twice the size of the estimate of the single
equation, which leads us to deduce BNM responds much more forcefully to the inﬂation
movement. Similarly, the diﬀerence in the estimate for ρ gives a diﬀerent description
about the degree of interest rate smoothing that BNM practices when executing its
policy action. Hence, a new question arises. Since they produce diﬀerent results,
which of these two approaches is better in producing the estimates of BNM's reaction
function?
We do not have a deﬁnitive answer to the above question. Instead of trying to
argue and select which method is better in generating the estimates of BNM's reaction
function, we take the view that the results of both methods should not be looked at
in isolation. Both methods have their own strengths and weaknesses. Estimation of
the reaction function as a single equation as conducted in Chapter 3, has the advan-
tage of simplicity, ease to generate and the ability to ﬁt the data very well. But, as
is generally known, the simplicity of a single equation estimation raises fundamental
questions about the validity of assuming the variables that interest rates rule respond
to, are exogenous. In contrast, while estimation of the reaction function as part of
the system of equations like in the DSGE model overcomes the fundamental question
about exogeneity of the variables included in the HMT interest rate rule, the estimation
of a system of equations has other fundamental questions to answer. Not only is the
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estimation result for the system of equations more complex and diﬃcult to generate, but
also the possible invalid cross equation restrictions in them can cause other problems
like a more severe misspeciﬁcation and identiﬁcation problem, which can also distort
the estimation outcomes. Due to these reasons, ﬁnding the absolute answer on which
of the estimation methods produce a better outcome is not easy. Thus, our estimation
results of BNM's reaction function as reported in Chapter 3 and this chapter, should
be used to complement each other as a tool to analyze BNM's behaviour in formulation
of monetary policy in Malaysia.
In a way, the stand that we take on this issue is consistent with the suggestion made in
Fukac and Pagan (2008). Given uncertainty about the model, they advocate looking at
the estimation results of the single equation methods in combination with the estimation
results generated from the DSGE model. According to Fukac and Pagan, the single
equation and system measures of ﬁts were complements, and not substitutes. Thus, it
is wise to look at the building blocks as well as the complete model.
5.3.2 Comparing estimation results with the other DSGE model
for Malaysia
Interestingly, except for parameter Ψ , our estimations of the deep parameters of
the Malaysian economy are not much diﬀerent to the estimates of those reported in
Ramayandi (2008). As stated before, Ramayandi estimated a DSGE model for Malaysia
by applying Gali-Monacelli's open economy DSGE model without capital. Ramayandi
used the ML estimation method and covered a shorter sample period of 1991-2004.
Since this is the only known study that attempts to estimate the deep parameters
for the Malaysian economy, the similarities of ours and Ramayandi's results are quite
reassuring. Comparing the results between the two studies also highlight four interesting
observations about the estimation of the DSGE model involving Malaysian data.
First, the introduction of capital into the original Gali-Monacelli's open economy DSGE
model as used in Ramayandi (2008), does not change signiﬁcantly the estimation
outcome of the deep parameters. As stated before, the main extension of our DSGE
model is the introduction of capital into the original Gali-Monacelli's open economy
DSGE model. This extension also allows the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism to
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operate. The similarities between ours and Ramayandi's estimates of the deep para-
meters suggest this extension is not very crucial in inﬂuencing the estimation outcome.
While this extension may enrich the models structure, it does not lead to the estimates
of the deep parameters behaving diﬀerently. In other words, this outcome suggests the
absence of capital from the the original Gali-Monacelli's open economy DSGE model
does not make the model seriously misspeciﬁed to the extent that it aﬀects the outcome
of parameter estimates. To further validate this point, we try to replicate Ramayandi's
estimation results by re-estimating our DSGE model with the same sample period
as used in Ramayandi (2008). The results are presented in Table 5.6 (placed in the
Appendix). Unsurprisingly, except for parameter Ψ , results for most of the estimated
parameters from our DSGE model using the Bayesian method for the 1991Q1-2004Q4
period, are very close to the original results reported by Ramayandi. This outcome
suggests both models are equally capable of representing Malaysia's economy and ﬁt
the data fairly well.
Another interesting observation from this exercise is the diﬀerence in the point estimate
for parameter Ψ . Based on our estimation results, the introduction of capital into the
DSGE model produces a lower estimate for the parameter on inverse elasticity of labour
supply (Ψ). In our extended open economy DSGE model for Malaysia, estimates for
this parameter Ψ decline to around 0.7-1.0, compared to the estimate of around 2
reported by Ramayandi. A lower value for parameter Ψ means the labour supply in
our DSGE model is more elastic than what is estimated in Ramayandi's model. There
is a theoretical explanation to this lower estimate for Ψ . Intuitively, moving away from
a single into a dual factor inputs, allows the substitution eﬀects to operate in the model.
In equilibrium, substitution eﬀects cause larger changes in the equilibrium wage and
this triggers a bigger adjustment in the quantity of labour supply to achieve market
clearing. This mechanism may explain why labour supply is found to be more elastic
in our DSGE model with capital, compared with Ramayandi's estimation results for
Malaysia and ASEAN countries.
Third, the diﬀerence in the sample period does not signiﬁcantly change the estimation
outcome. The fact that ours and Ramayandi's estimation results are generated by a
diﬀerent sample period, suggest estimates of the deep parameter in our DSGE model for
Malaysia are not very sensitive to the choice of estimation sample. This outcome also
suggests most of the deep parameters of the Malaysian economy could be constant over
time. As will be seen and discussed in Chapter 6, estimates for the deep parameters
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for Malaysia for the sub-sample periods are also found to be fairly constant across the
diﬀerent sample periods.
The last interesting observation on the similarities of ours and Ramayandi's estima-
tion results is regarding the performance of the estimation method. As mentioned
by Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2004), Bayesian estimation has a strong
small sample behaviour which outperforms the results of the ML approach. Based
on this knowledge and given the relatively short sample period used by Ramayandi's
estimation, we expect the estimation results from the Bayesian method, would be
diﬀerent from those generated by Ramayandi's ML estimates. However, this turns
out to be not really the case. As presented in Table 5.6, both estimation methods
produce an almost similar outcome. This suggests, that for the size of the sample pe-
riod that we are dealing with, the outcome of the Maximum Likelihood approach in
estimating the DSGE model could be as good as the Bayesian method.
5.4 Comparing Results between FA and NFA DSGE
Models
As stated earlier, one of the objectives of this chapter is to investigate the role of
the ﬁnancial accelerator in aﬀecting the empirical properties of our model. In doing
so, we estimate the open economy DSGE model with two model speciﬁcations - with
and without a ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism. As credit frictions are an important
feature in a developing economy, the outcome of this investigation will indicate the
eﬀects of leaving out the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism in the standard open economy
DSGE model on the estimation of the structural parameters in Malaysia. Hence, the
discussion in this section starts with a comparison on the point estimates of these two
model speciﬁcations. Then, dynamic features of the estimated model using the impulse
response function and variance decomposition are analyzed. Lastly, by calculating the
Bayes factor, it also indicates which of these two model speciﬁcations ﬁt the Malaysian
data better.
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5.4.1 Parameter estimates
A general observation on the estimation results indicates that the point estimates for
most of the structural parameters in the FA and NFA model speciﬁcations are quite
similar to each other. However, small diﬀerences occur to the parameter estimates
for the inverse elasticity of labour supply (Ψ). Interestingly, the FA model produces
a slightly lower estimate of 0.7 (1.0 in NFA) for this parameter. As we explained in
sub-section 5.3.2, this suggests in the presence of the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism,
household's labour supply is more elastic to the changes in the real wages.
Another interesting outcome is the observation that the use of diﬀerent model speci-
ﬁcations does not aﬀect the behaviour of BNM in conducting monetary policy. By
referring to results in Table 5.3, it is clear that the estimated parameters of the HMT
rule in the FA and NFA model are very similar to each other. This observation
suggests that the presence of the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism does not alter the
way BNM sets the interest rates. This outcome is quite surprising. As stressed by
BGG, ﬁnancial friction introduces additional rigidities to the real sector, particularly
aﬀecting the ability of entrepreneurs to adjust the investment level. The presence
of a ﬁnancial accelerator contributes to the propagation mechanism, which eﬀectively
ampliﬁes the eﬀect of shocks to the movement of output and inﬂation. Thus, policy-
makers need to respond more aggressively to changes in these variables than they would
if there were no ﬁnancial accelerator. Due to this factor, we would expect BNM's
behaviour in setting interest rates to be diﬀerent in the FA and NFA model. After
taking into account the propagation mechanism, the presence of a ﬁnancial accelerator
mechanism in the FA model is expected to produce a more forceful monetary policy
action from the policymakers - most probably in the form of higher parameter estimates
for βpi and Θy in the FA model compared to the NFA model. This turns out not to
be the case.
The eﬀect of the ﬁnancial accelerator as the propagation mechanism can be clearly
demonstrated by comparing the impulse response function and variance decomposition
generated by the FA and NFA model speciﬁcations. This will be discussed next.
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5.4.2 Impulse Response Function and Variance Decomposition
As mentioned before, the use of FA and NFA model speciﬁcation does not much aﬀect
the estimation results of the structural parameters. However, the presence of credit
frictions aﬀects the dynamic response of the estimated models to shocks. The diﬀerence
in the model dynamics is reﬂected in the comparison of the impulse response function
between the FA and NFA model. As can be seen in Figure 5.3, a positive monetary
policy shocks causes nominal interest rates to increase. In the FA and NFA model,
interest rates rise in almost the same magnitude. However, as also found in BGG, the
same interest rate rise leads to diﬀerent responses to other variables in the model. The
impulse response functions of variables in the FA model reacted with a bigger magnitude
than those in the NFA model. This is consistent with the BGG's proposition that the
presence of a ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism ampliﬁes the eﬀect of monetary policy
shocks.
The clearest evidence to indicate the operation of the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism
can be seen on the response of investment to the monetary policy shocks. As presented
in Table 5.4, the contribution of monetary policy shocks to the dynamics of invest-
Figure 5.3: FA vs. NFA Speciﬁcation: Comparison of IRF 1975Q1-2005Q2
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Table 5.4: Comparison of Variance Decomposition: FA vs. NFA model
(in %)
Variables Model Shocks (1 s.d.)
εUIPt ε
lopg
t ε
r∗
t
εpi
∗
t
εy
∗
t
εYt ε
MP
t
Output FA 12.7 40.2 8.2 4.1 0.5 18.9 15.4
NFA 22.8 37.0 14.5 5.8 0.2 6.4 13.2
Inﬂation FA 8.6 11.5 5.6 6.9 0.6 60.3 6.6
NFA 6.8 11.6 5.0 5.1 0.8 64.4 6.3
Interest Rates FA 15.3 8.0 10.0 12.1 0.3 49.8 4.5
NFA 17.1 3.4 13.7 13.1 0.4 44.4 7.8
RER FA 32.8 16.6 21.3 20.3 0.1 0.8 8.1
NFA 33.0 16.0 24.5 22.3 0.4 0.4 3.5
Investment FA 8.2 9.3 7.9 18.8 0.2 32.8 22.9
NFA 8.0 25.7 9.3 28.8 0.3 8.1 13.8
Net Worth FA 2.9 0.2 1.8 1.9 0.1 40.2 53.0
NFA 10.0 2.6 5.0 0.2 0.0 50.3 31.9
ment is bigger in the FA than in the NFA model. Also note that the monetary policy
shock is the biggest contributor to the dynamics of the entrepreneur's net-worth. The
ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism takes eﬀect when monetary policy shocks aﬀect the
entrepreneur's net-worth position through the rise in the borrowing cost. As entre-
preneurs face a credit constraint, a fall in their net-worth position reduces their borrow-
ing ability. Hence, as can be seen in the impulse response function following monetary
policy shocks, investment activities decline a lot more in the FA model than when the
ﬁnancial accelerator is not in operation.
To further illustrate the role of the ﬁnancial accelerator in propagating the eﬀect of other
shocks, Figures 5.4 to 5.6 (placed in the Appendix) put together the impulse response
function of the key variables to six other shocks - LOPG, UIP, technology, foreign
output, foreign inﬂation and foreign interest rates. Like the case for the monetary
policy shock, in general, most of the these variables respond more forcefully to other
shocks when the ﬁnancial accelerator is in operation. This outcome is consistent with
the proposition made by BGG that endogenous developments in credit markets work
to propagate and amplify shocks to the economy.
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5.4.3 Model Fit
Table 5.5 presents standard deviations and autocorrelations for the data and those
implied by the model. The model implied statistics are constructed using the para-
meter estimates reported earlier. The model is then used to generate 10,000 series of
simulated data to compute the moment of interest. By comparing the actual and the
model's moments for interest rates, inﬂation and output, it can be seen that both model
speciﬁcations perform reasonably well in replicating the features of the Malaysian data.
However, the model is not able to mimic the RER data. Both model speciﬁcations
over-predict the volatility and persistence of the real exchange rate. These limitations
could be attributed to the inadequacy of the simple risk-adjusted UIP condition that
represents the real exchange rate movement.
Another important characteristics about the ﬁtting performance of the estimated model
with the FA and NFA speciﬁcations, is the diﬀerences in the value of the simulated
moments. Standard deviations for the simulated data in the FA model are higher
than those produced by the NFA model, indicating that movement of variables in the
model in the presence of ﬁnancial friction is more volatile than in the model without
this feature. Furthermore, simulated data from the FA model displays a higher de-
gree of persistence. The diﬀerent degree of volatility and persistence between the two
model speciﬁcations are consistent with the assertion made by BGG on the eﬀect of the
ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism to the model's properties. As stressed by BGG, the
ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism ampliﬁes the eﬀect of exogenous (like monetary and
Table 5.5: Model Fit: FA vs. NFA Model Speciﬁcation
Standard Deviation
Actual DSGE Model
FA NFA
Interest Rates 0.025 0.031 0.023
Inﬂation 0.020 0.027 0.022
RER 0.033 0.111 0.101
Output 0.029 0.038 0.035
Autocorrelation Coeﬃcients
Actual DSGE Model
FA NFA
Interest Rates 0.930 0.904 0.835
Inﬂation 0.890 0.888 0.868
RER 0.350 0.725 0.668
Output 0.670 0.696 0.492
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technology) shocks that hit the economy. Consequently, as displayed in the impulse
response function in the previous section, this ampliﬁcation contributes to higher volatil-
ity in the variables like investment and output. Furthermore, the ﬁnancial accelerator
serves as additional friction in the model and acts to reduce the ability of some variables
(like investment and net-worth) to adjust more instantaneously. The end result from
the adjustment delay is the increase in persistence of the key variables in the FA model.
5.4.4 Model Selection
In choosing the two model speciﬁcations that best ﬁt the Malaysian data, information
from the model's log marginal likelihood is used. The log marginal likelihood for each
model was generated using the Modiﬁed Harmonic Mean Estimator and is reported
in the last row of Table 5.3. The results indicate that the model with the ﬁnancial
accelerator performs better than the alternative model in ﬁtting the data. The diﬀerence
between the log marginal likelihood of the two models, is 18.9. Hence, based on the
scale suggested by Kass and Raftery (1995), there is very strong evidence that the data
favours the FA model against the NFA model.
The outcome that the data strongly supports the inclusion of the ﬁnancial accelerator
mechanism in the DSGE model for Malaysia is expected. As seen from the results in
Table 5.3, parameter χ is estimated away from zero. The non-zero estimate for the
parameter measuring the elasticity of external ﬁnance premium supports the notion that
credit friction is one of the important features for a developing economy like Malaysia.
The outcome that the DSGE model with the ﬁnancial accelerator performs better in
ﬁtting the Malaysian data is also consistent with the proposition made by Razi (1998)
and Tang (2006) about the importance of the credit channel as one of the monetary
transmission channels in Malaysia. Due to this reason, estimation results using the
DSGE model with a ﬁnancial accelerator is taken as the better representation of the
Malaysian economy and will be used in the subsequent analysis of this thesis.
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5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we employ the DSGE modelling framework to the case of the Malaysian
economy. The model is developed based on the DSGE model of Gali and Mona-
celli (2005) for a small open economy, but modiﬁed to include the eﬀect of a ﬁnan-
cial accelerator mechanism along the line of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999).
Using a Bayesian methodology, we estimate the model for the 1975Q1-2005Q2
period. We ﬁnd estimates of the structural parameters for the Malaysian economy to be
plausible and generally comparable to the values reported in the literature.
The estimation exercises also reveal a few interesting outcomes. We ﬁnd estimates
of BNM's reaction function in this chapter are fairly diﬀerent to the results that we
reported in Chapter 3. This ﬁnding provides an important caveat about analyzing
BNM's policy behaviour based on its estimated reaction function. Results of esti-
mated BNM's reaction function are inﬂuenced by the way the HMT interest rate rule is
estimated. To investigate the impact of ﬁnancial frictions on the empirical properties
of our DSGE model, we also estimate the model with two speciﬁcations - with and
without a ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism. The results indicate estimates for most of
the structural parameters between the two model speciﬁcations are very similar to each
other. However, results of posterior odds ratio comparing both models indicate the
model with a ﬁnancial accelerator performs better than the alternative model in ﬁtting
the Malaysian data. This reaﬃrms the notion that credit friction is one of the important
features for a developing economy like Malaysia. Analysis using the impulse-response
functions and variance decomposition between the two model speciﬁcations demon-
strate how the operation of a ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism ampliﬁes and propagates
the eﬀects of transitory shocks to economic activities.
In the next chapter, we extend the discussions about estimation results that we present
in this chapter, to investigate two issues regarding the estimation of DSGE model.
First, is about the stability of structural parameters over time. For this, like in the
previous chapters, estimations using sub-sample periods will be conducted. In doing
so, we analyze the estimates of the model's parameters for three sub-sample periods
- 1975Q1-1986Q4, 1987Q1-1998Q2 and 1998Q3-2005Q2. Comparing the estimation
outcomes for sub-sample periods will indicate whether the structural parameters for
a developing economy like Malaysia are stable over time. Second, is regarding the
158
possible identiﬁcation problems faced by the estimated parameters in the DSGE model.
Identiﬁcation problem is one of unresolved issues surrounding the estimation of the
DSGE model. Moreover, in the case where the DSGE models are estimated using
Bayesian methods, potential identiﬁcation problems largely remain hidden due to the
use of tight priors. As a result, it is often unclear to what extent the reported esti-
mates reﬂect information in the data instead of subjective beliefs or other considerations
reﬂected in the choice of prior distribution for the parameters. On this regard, in the
next chapter, we will focus on detecting the possible identiﬁcation problem in our
Bayesian estimation of the DSGE model for Malaysia. The outcome of this investiga-
tion reveals whether there are any beneﬁts from estimating instead of calibrating the
structural parameters of the DSGE model that we present in this chapter.
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5.6 Appendix
Steady-state conditions
It is assumed that in the steady-state, the following conditions holds;
• All prices equal unity, i.e. P = PH = P F = P ∗ = 1 and all corresponding
inﬂation rates equal zero, i.e. pi = piH = piF = pi
∗ = 0 .
• Complete exchange rate pass-through, with law of one price gap (LOPG), lopg =
0. Thus, P F = SP
∗
. Then, the nominal exchange rate in the steady-state is
S ≡ PF
P
∗
.
= 1. Also, RER = 1 .
• Productivity factor, A = 1.
• Home good real marginal cost, P
W
H
PH
≡MCH = 1µ = ε−1ε .
• Domestic deposit and holding of foreign bonds is zero, D¯ = B¯ = 0. With this
assumption, the net foreign asset in the steady-state is also zero, Z¯ ≡ S¯B¯
Y¯ P¯
= 0.
• From household's Euler equation, the gross domestic interest rate in the steady
state, is 1
R
= β .
• The link between level of investment and capital, is INV = δK.
• From entrepreneur optimality condition, RK =
(
N
QK
)−χ
R. Then, by using 1
R
=
β, the return on capital in the steady-state, is RK =
(
N
K
)−χ
1
β
.
• The relationship between return on capital and capital rent is derived from RK =
[RG]+(1−δ)Q
Q
. Then by using RK =
(
N
K
)−χ
1
β
and Q = 1, the rental on capital in
the steady-state is RG =
(
N
K
)−χ
1
β
− (1− δ).
• The output-capital ratio is derived from RG = αY HK
P¯WH
P¯H
P¯H
P¯
. Then use P
W
H
PH
≡
MCH =
1
µ
, P = PH = 1, the output capital ratio in the steady-state is
Y H
K
= RG
µ
α
.
• Entrepreneur's wages to capital ratio is WE
K
= (1− α) (1− Ω) Y H
K
.
• Investment to output ratio, is INV
Y H
= δ K
Y H
.
• Consumption to output ratio, is C
Y H
= 1− INV
Y H
.
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Table 5.6: Estimated DSGE model for Malaysia: Comparison with Ramayandi (2008)
Sample Period: 1991Q1-2004Q4
FA Model NFA Model Ramayandi (2008)*
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Υ 0.5484 0.1869 0.5194 0.1446 0.55 0.13
Ψ 0.8528 0.2332 1.1956 0.3012 1.99 0.46
η 0.5752 0.0926 0.6070 0.0877 0.50 0.08
κ 0.6191 0.0919 0.6467 0.0878 0.49 0.21
θD 0.8111 0.0298 0.8524 0.0196 0.82 0.03
θF 0.8368 0.0260 0.8652 0.0187 0.89 0.15
ρ 0.3750 0.1042 0.4446 0.0923 - -
βpi 2.1617 0.1647 2.1379 0.1717 - -
Θy 0.9648 0.1527 1.0580 0.1697 - -
µy∗ 0.8218 0.0826 0.8244 0.0831 - -
µi∗ 0.8617 0.0433 0.8333 0.0428 - -
µpi∗ 0.6918 0.0986 0.6750 0.0944 - -
ρUIP 0.7727 0.0734 0.7332 0.0686 - -
ρLOPG 0.8422 0.0430 0.8043 0.0474 0.99 0.01
ρY 0.8633 0.0721 0.7783 0.0890 0.81 0.02
σMP 0.0087 0.0008 0.0088 0.0008 - -
σy∗ 0.0069 0.0006 0.0069 0.0006 - -
σi∗ 0.0075 0.0007 0.0077 0.0007 - -
σpi∗ 0.0072 0.0006 0.0072 0.0006 - -
σUIP 0.0141 0.0021 0.0148 0.0022 0.10 0.02
σLOPG 0.1625 0.0304 0.1529 0.0256 0.06 0.01
σY 0.0166 0.0027 0.0220 0.0047 0.16 0.02
χ 0.0566 0.0179 - - - -
LogL: -1197.62 LogL: -1204.66 LogL: Not Available
* Note: in Ramayandi (2008), parameters for the HMT rule and foreign block were not estimated as part of the DSGE
model. Parameters for HMT rule are estimated as a single equation, while parameter for the foreign block come from his
VAR(1) estimates. Since these estimates were not estimated as part of the DSGE system, they are not reported here.
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Figure 5.4: FA vs. NFA Speciﬁcation: Comparison of IRF 1975Q1-2005Q2 (continue)
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Figure 5.5: FA vs. NFA Speciﬁcation: Comparison of IRF 1975Q1-2005Q2 (continue)
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Figure 5.6: FA vs. NFA Speciﬁcation: Comparison of IRF 1975Q1-2005Q2 (continue)
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Chapter 6
An Estimated DSGE Model of the
Malaysian Economy: Sub-sample
Periods and Possible Identiﬁcation
Problems
This chapter extends the discussion about the estimation of the DSGE model of the
Malaysian economy from Chapter 5, by looking at two on-going issues surrounding
the estimation of the model. The ﬁrst issue concerns stability of parameters. How
stable over time are the so-called structural parameters of DSGE models? If in the
previous chapters we ﬁnd empirical evidence suggesting the conduct of monetary policy
evolves over time, it will be equally interesting to see whether the estimates of structural
parameters for the Malaysian economy follow the same suit. The second issue is related
to the identiﬁcation problems. Are the estimated parameters of our DSGE model
adequately identiﬁed? Since identiﬁcation problems are likely to cause the estimated
parameters to be biased and inaccurate, it is important to know how well the structural
parameters that we estimated pick-up the information from the data. In particular, in
the case where the DSGE models are estimated using Bayesian methods, potential
identiﬁcation problems largely remain hidden due to the use of tight priors. As a
result, it is often unclear to what extent the reported estimates reﬂect information in
the data instead of subjective beliefs or other considerations reﬂected in the choice of
prior distribution for the parameters.
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To investigate the ﬁrst issue, the DSGE model presented in Chapter 5 will be re-
estimated using sub-sample periods. In doing so, we analyze the estimates of the
model's parameters for three sub-sample periods - 1975Q1-1986Q4, 1987Q1-1998Q2
and 1998Q3-2005Q2. Comparing the estimation results for sub-sample periods will
indicate whether the structural parameters for a developing economy like Malaysia are
stable over time. On the second issue, we conduct two analysis to detect the possible
identiﬁcation problem in our estimated DSGE model. First, we examine carefully
properties of prior and posterior distributions of the estimated parameters. Then, we
complement this analysis by conducting another diagnostic procedure. We look at
the robustness of the estimated parameters with a looser prior. The outcome of this
investigation reveals the extent of identiﬁcation problems that our estimated DSGE
model faces.
We divide this chapter into three parts. Section 6.1 discusses the estimation results for
the sub-sample periods and Section 6.2 investigates the possible identiﬁcation problems
faced by the structural parameters that we estimate. The last section provides a brief
conclusion.
6.1 Estimation Results for Sub-sample Period
This section explores the behaviour of the estimated parameters of a DSGE model of
the Malaysian economy using the sub-sample period. The main objective of estimating
the model using the sub-sample period, is to investigate the stability of the estimated
structural parameters across a diﬀerent time period. Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-
Ramírez (2007) raise this issue, by questioning how stable over time are the so-called
"structural parameters" of the DSGE models. In their model estimated using the US
data, they allow for parameter drifting and rational expectations of the agents with
respect to this drift. Using this approach, they found strong evidence to indicate
that the estimated parameters for the monetary reaction functions and parameters
characterizing the pricing behavior of ﬁrms and households are not stable over time.
Their results raises doubts on the assumption that the DSGE parameters are constant
over the period.
The estimation exercise in this section tries to shed some lights on the above issue
in the context of estimating the DSGE model for a developing economy like Malaysia.
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However, in this exercise, we do not introduce a dedicated parameter drifting mechanism
like the approach used in Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2007). Instead,
investigation about the stability properties of structural parameters for the Malaysian
economy is only limited to run the estimation using diﬀerent sub-sample periods and
see how the estimated parameters behave across diﬀerent estimation periods. Due to
this limitation, the results of this investigation should be taken as preliminary. A more
systematic approach like the one used by Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez
(2007) to address this issue, is an interesting extension for future research.
For this purpose, we re-estimate the DSGE model with a ﬁnancial accelerator that we
presented in Chapter 5. The re-estimation of the model with the Bayesian method is
conducted using the same prior speciﬁcations as the full sample period (see Table 5.2 in
Chapter 5). The estimation results for all three sub-periods - 1975Q1-1986Q4, 1987Q1-
1998Q2 and 1998Q3-2005Q2 - are presented in Table 6.1. Like before, besides this
statistical information, Figure 6.1 and 6.2 provides the plots of the prior (in Grey)
and posterior (in Black) distributions of the estimated parameters. The dotted line (in
Black) in the ﬁgures is the mode value of the posterior distribution.
6.1.1 Estimates
General observation on Table 6.1 indicates that estimates for most of the structural
parameters are fairly constant across diﬀerent sub-sample periods. The ﬁndings that
the point estimates for most of these parameters are relatively constant across diﬀer-
ent sample periods highlight one interesting feature about the behaviour of the deep
parameters for the Malaysian economy. In general, they imply that most of the deep
parameters are not aﬀected by the transformation of the Malaysian economy in the
past 30 years.
While the estimates for most of the structural parameters are relatively constant, small
changes are seen on the point estimates for the autoregressive coeﬃcients ρLOPG and
ρY across diﬀerent sub-sample periods. Estimates for ρLOPG which are fairly stable at
around 0.8 for the sub-sample periods prior to 1998Q3, decreases to around 0.5 when the
ﬁxed exchange rate regime was in place. This suggests the LOPG shock is less persistent
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Table 6.1: Posterior Distributions: FA Model for Sub-sample Periods
1975Q1-1986Q4 1987Q1-1998Q2 1998Q3-2005Q2
Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI
Υ 0.506 [0.420 , 0.592] 0.485 [0.398 , 0.571] 0.488 [0.408 , 0.571]
Ψ 1.092 [0.677 , 1.509] 1.052 [0.578 , 1.565] 1.062 [0.696 , 1.790]
η 0.429 [0.311 , 0.555] 0.640 [0.412 , 0.898] 0.570 [0.379 , 0.763]
κ 0.637 [0.502 , 0.770] 0.563 [0.367 , 0.686] 0.641 [0.507 , 0.784]
θD 0.689 [0.628 , 0.752] 0.809 [0.754 , 0.876] 0.844 [0.798 , 0.891]
θF 0.704 [0.644 , 0.765] 0.829 [0.783 , 0.886] 0.827 [0.747 , 0.909]
ρ 0.505 [0.372 , 0.642] 0.554 [0.405 , 0.734] 0.477 [0.250 , 0.725]
βpi 1.818 [1.565 , 2.085] 1.721 [0.841 , 2.259] 2.039 [1.647 , 2.455]
Θy 0.700 [0.381 , 1.013] 1.238 [0.858 , 1.691] 0.816 [0.395 , 1.248]
µy∗ 0.853 [0.753 , 0.957] 0.804 [0.659 , 0.956] 0.738 [0.549 , 0.936]
µi∗ 0.542 [0.418 , 0.665] 0.824 [0.737 , 0.915] 0.722 [0.584 , 0.868]
µpi∗ 0.869 [0.805 , 0.937] 0.822 [0.713 , 0.936] 0.558 [0.272 , 0.842]
ρUIP 0.694 [0.487 , 0.904] 0.785 [0.656 , 0.921] 0.706 [0.529 , 0.867]
ρLOPG 0.870 [0.809 , 0.934] 0.795 [0.683 , 0.889] 0.479 [0.182 , 0.875]
ρY 0.851 [0.747 , 0.963] 0.571 [0.058 , 0.929] 0.853 [0.620 , 0.995]
σMP 0.017 [0.013 , 0.021] 0.009 [0.007 , 0.011] 0.010 [0.007 , 0.012]
σy∗ 0.011 [0.009 , 0.013] 0.007 [0.006 , 0.009] 0.009 [0.007 , 0.011]
σi∗ 0.025 [0.020 , 0.029] 0.008 [0.007 , 0.010] 0.011 [0.008 , 0.013]
σpi∗ 0.011 [0.009 , 0.014] 0.008 [0.006 , 0.009] 0.009 [0.007 , 0.011]
σUIP 0.024 [0.014 , 0.033] 0.014 [0.010 , 0.018] 0.015 [0.010 , 0.021]
σLOPG 0.022 [0.015 , 0.029] 0.018 [0.011 , 0.024] 0.074 [0.044 , 0.103]
σY 0.014 [0.010 , 0.018] 0.034 [0.010 , 0.074] 0.019 [0.011 , 0.026]
χ 0.040 [0.015 , 0.064] 0.050 [0.024 , 0.077] 0.045 [0.020 , 0.068]
LogL: -823.67 LogL: -951.30 LogL: -589.22
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Figure 6.1: Prior and Posterior Distributions: Sub-Sample Period
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Figure 6.2: Prior and Posterior Distributions: Sub-Sample Period (continue)
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under the ﬁxed exchange rate regime environment. Similarly, compared to the 1975-
1986 period, estimates for ρY are lower in the 1987Q1-1998Q2 period, suggesting that
the technology shock was less persistent during the era when the Malaysian economy
was rapidly expanding.
One interesting feature about the estimation results for the sub-sample periods is that
the estimates of the model parameters are less precise than what has been produced
by the estimation exercise using the full sample period. This is shown by the larger
conﬁdence interval of the parameter estimates. By comparing the 95% conﬁdence
interval of the estimated parameters for the full sample (see Table 5.3 in Chapter 5)
and those from the sub-sample periods (Table 6.1) we can see that the 95% conﬁdence
interval in the latter are generally wider than the former. For example, conﬁdence
interval of parameter η for the full sample period stands at [0.33 , 0.58]. This interval
widens to [0.41 , 0.90] for 1987Q1-1998Q2 and [0.38 , 0.76] for 1998Q3-2005Q2. The
same outcome is also observed on the estimates of other structural parameters.
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Likewise, estimates for ρLOPG and ρY in the sub-sample periods are also generated
with less accuracy. Conﬁdence interval for ρLOPG increases steadily from [0.81 , 0.93]
for 1975Q1-1986Q4, to [0.68 , 0.89] for 1987Q1-1998Q2 and further to [0.18 , 0.88]
for 1998Q3-2005Q2. Similarly, the conﬁdence interval for ρY widens sharply from
[0.75 , 0.96] for 1975Q1-1986Q4 to [0.06 , 0.93] for 1987Q1-1998Q2, before it narrows
to [0.62 , 0.99] for 1998Q3-2005Q2. Doubts on the precision of the estimates for ρY is
compounded by looking at the shape of its posterior distribution. From Figure 6.1(b),
it is found that the posterior distribution for ρY for the 1987Q1-1998Q2 has twin peaks
- one at a value about 0.3 and another at around 0.8 . This could be the reason why
its posterior mean for this period settles at a lower value of around 0.6 , which is about
the mid point between the values of the two peaks.
In a way, reduction in accuracy for the estimation results using the sub-sample periods is
expected. Compared to the estimations results for the full sample period, results for the
sub-sample periods are generated with a shorter number of observations. Obviously,
with a less amount of information used to generate them, makes it more diﬃcult to
estimate the parameters. Thus, the increase in uncertainty on the point estimates
featured above means that the estimation results for the sub-sample periods should
be taken and interpreted cautiously. For example, in arriving at the conclusion that
the estimate of structural parameters for the Malaysian economy mostly do not evolve
over time, consideration should also be given to the fact that the estimates for the
sub-sample periods are generally produced with a lower precision. Hence, while the
stability of the structural parameters for the Malaysian economy found above could
be genuine, there are also possibilities that such stability could be superﬁcial, simply
because the parameter estimates come with a greater uncertainty. In the same context,
the instability in the estimates for parameter ρLOPG and ρY seen above should also be
taken with a critical view. Perhaps, variations in the estimates for these two parameters
may not represent the actual changes in their behaviour over time, but merely the
outcome of the increasing diﬃculty in estimating them following the shorter sample
period.
6.1.1.1 BNM's reaction function
Results in Table 6.1 indicate that coeﬃcients for BNM's reaction function are not
constant over time. In particular, when the model is estimated using diﬀerent sub-
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sample periods, there are visible changes on the estimates for BNM's feedback coeﬃcient
for inﬂation and output gap - βpi and Θy. Estimates for βpi stand around 1.7-1.8 during
the ﬁrst two sub-periods but increases to around 2 during the period when the capital
control and ﬁxed exchange rate regime was in place. A more drastic change happens
to the estimates for Θy. The point estimate for the feedback coeﬃcient on output gap
increases from 0.7 in the 1975Q1-1986Q4 to 1.2 in the 1987Q1-1998Q2 and declines to
0.8 during the 1998Q3-2005Q2 period. Unsurprisingly, variations in the point estimates
for βpi and Θy for the sub-sample periods are largely consistent to our earlier ﬁndings
in Chapter 3. As reported in that chapter, the estimation results when the HMT rule
was estimated as a single equation also change quite widely across the same sub-sample
periods. The same observation applies when the HMT rule is estimated as part of
the DSGE model using the Bayesian method, which supports the earlier ﬁndings that
BNM's reaction function is evolving over time.
Having said that, as in the case of the full sample period reported in Chapter 5, the point
estimates of HMT rule in the DSGE model for the sub-sample periods are also fairly
diﬀerent compared to the results of the single equation estimation found in Chapter 3.
More interestingly, for this time around, the diﬀerence in the estimation results between
them are more than the magnitude of the point estimates for the parameters of HMT
rule. In some cases, the point estimates for parameter βpi and Θy between the two
methods are not consistent with each other, which lead to contradictory conclusions in
describing BNM's policy behaviour during the period under review. These diﬀerences
are listed below.
First, the size of the point estimate for βpi in the 1975-1986 period from the DSGE
model is large and is not in-line with the estimation results in Chapter 3. Recall that in
that chapter, estimate for βpi is found to be less than 1, suggesting BNM's behaviour
during that period was violating the Taylor's principle. The same outcome does not
happen when the HMT rule is estimated as part of the DSGE model. The point estimate
of βpi for the 1975-1986 period in Table 6.1 is 1.8, which is well above the estimate of
around 0.3-0.5 reported earlier in Chapter 3. In addition, the 95% conﬁdence interval
of the estimate with the Bayesian method is [1.56 , 2.08]. Statistically, this implies
there is a very remote probability for parameter βpi to have the point estimate below
1. In other words, the outcome of the estimation using a DSGE model contradicts the
ﬁnding in Chapter 3 that BNM's behaviour during the 1975Q1-1986Q4 period was not
consistent with the Taylor's principle.
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Second, is the diﬀerence in the way BNM responds to the output gap during the period
when the Malaysian economy was experiencing rapid expansion. In Chapter 3, the
point estimate for Θy during the 1987-1998 period is lower than the estimate for the
1975-1986 period.1 We take this outcome as the empirical evidence to indicate BNM
responded less forceful to the output gap during the second sub-sample period, possibly
due to the diﬃculty of the policymakers to assess the true state of the economy following
the robust economic growth experienced during the large part of the 1990's. In contrast,
in the estimation of HMT rule as part of the DSGE model, the opposite observation
happens. The point estimate for Θy during the 1987-1998 period is found to be higher
than the 1975-1986 period (refer to Table 6.1). This suggests BNM increases the focus
of its policy action towards output stabilization during the 1987-1998 period.
The third diﬀerence is the estimate of parameter βpi during the period when the capital
control and ﬁxed exchange rate regime was in place. In Chapter 3, we ﬁnd no statistical
evidence to indicate there was a change in the way BNM responded to the inﬂation
outlook during the 1998Q3-2005Q2 period.2 However, the estimation results of the
HMT rule when it is estimated as part of the DSGE model indicates otherwise. From
the results in Table 6.1, the estimates for βpi for the last sub-sample period rises to 2
(from 1.7 in 1987Q1-1998Q2 period), suggesting there was an apparent change in the
policymaker's response to the inﬂation outlook during this period. In other words, the
above result indicates during the period when the capital control and ﬁxed exchange
rate regime was in place, interest rate policy was set with an increased focus towards
achieving price stability.
The three diﬀerences highlighted above, reaﬃrm the proposition we made in Chapter 5
that the parameters of BNM's reaction function are inﬂuenced by the way the HMT
interest rate rule is estimated. In the estimation results using the sub-sample periods,
the diﬀerences in the estimation results between the single equation method (from
Chapter 3) and the DSGE model method (Table 6.1 in this chapter) are more explicit.
The diﬀerences in the estimation results of BNM's reaction function between the two
estimation methods also lead to diﬀerent analysis about BNM's policy behaviour for
the sub-sample periods.
1The estimate was 1.13 for 1975-1986 period and 0.57 for 1987-1998 period. Refer to results in
Table 3.2 in Chapter 3 for details.
2Estimate for the interactive dummy ∂βpi is not statistically signiﬁcant. Refer to results in Table 3.2
in Chapter 3 for details.
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6.2 Possible Identiﬁcation Problems
This section investigates one of the unresolved issues surrounding the estimation of the
DSGE model - the possible identiﬁcation problems on the estimates of the structural
parameters. One reason why identiﬁcation is an important issue is that DSGE models
are increasingly being used for analyzing policy-relevant questions, such as the design
of optimal monetary policy. Such analysis often hinges crucially on the values assigned
to the parameters of the model. However, identiﬁcation problems likely to cause the
estimated parameters to be biased and inaccurate. It is, therefore, important to know
how informative the data is to identify the parameter of interest, and whether there
are any beneﬁts from estimating instead of calibrating the parameters that we include
in the models we use to address policy questions.
Unfortunately, in most empirical DSGE papers the question of parameter identiﬁcation
is not confronted directly. Usually, if some of the parameters are considered to be
of lesser interest, and/or with potentially problematic identiﬁability, their values are
calibrated and assumed known, instead of being estimated. Furthermore, in the case
where the DSGE models are estimated using Bayesian methods, potential identiﬁcation
problems largely remain hidden due to the use of tight priors. As a result, it is often
unclear to what extent the reported estimates reﬂect information in the data instead
of subjective beliefs or other considerations reﬂected in the choice of prior distribution
for the parameters. On this regard, in this section, our analysis will be focused on
detecting the possible identiﬁcation problem in our Bayesian estimation of the DSGE
model for Malaysia.
Various aspects regarding identiﬁcation problems surrounding the DSGE model are
discussed in more detailed by Beyer and Farmer (2004), Canova and Sala (2006) and
An and Schorfheide (2007). In short, Canova and Sala (2006) list four reasons why
identiﬁcation might not be achieved in the DSGE model. First, is due to what they
call observational equivalence. This occurs if the population objective function does
not have a unique maximum, which makes the mapping between structural parameters
and reduced form statistics not unique. The implication is that diﬀerent models, with
potentially diﬀerent interpretations, may be indistinguishable from the point of view of
the objective function. The second reason is related to under-identiﬁcation problems.
This occurs if the objective function is constant for all values of that parameter in a
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selected range. In practice this may arise if a parameter disappears, say for instance, due
to the log-linearization of the model or if two parameters enter the objective function in
a proportional manner. In the traditional systems of simultaneous linear equations, this
phenomenon is popularly known as partial identiﬁcation problem. The third reason
happens if the objective function has insuﬃcient curvature (weak identiﬁcation). In
such a case, diﬀerent values of the parameters around a neighborhood may lead to
the same value of the objective function. The last reason is associated with the limited
information identiﬁcation problem. In this case, a parameter may be identiﬁed if all the
information is employed, but it remains under-identiﬁable if only partial information
is employed. For instance, because only certain responses are employed, this type of
identiﬁcation problems may arise if certain shocks are missing from the model.
As mentioned by An and Schorfheide (2007), it is diﬃcult to detect directly identiﬁca-
tion problems in the large DSGE model since the mapping of the structural parameters
into the state-space representation is highly non-linear. Nevertheless, as identiﬁcation
problems can arise owing to a lack of informative data, the feature of the prior and
posterior distribution from the Bayesian estimation can provide a hint on the possible
existence of this problem. When the data does not consist of much information about
the estimated parameter, the almost overlapping prior and posterior distribution indi-
cates that the prior distribution is not updated in the direction of the parameter space.
Hence, a direct comparison of priors and posteriors can provide valuable insights into
how much the data can provide information about the parameter of interest (An and
Schorfheide (2007)).
Having said that, in certain occasions, merely comparing the prior and posterior
distribution is not enough to satisfactorily detect the possible identiﬁcation problem of
the estimated parameters. This is particularly so for parameters that are constrained
in a certain domain. When the parameter space is not variation free - for reasons
like stability, non-explosiveness conditions or theoretically motivated non-negativity
constraints - the prior of non-identiﬁed parameters may be marginally updated even if
the likelihood has no information (Poirer (1998)). In this case, the ﬁnding that prior
and posterior distributions diﬀer does not guarantee that the observed data is informa-
tive to identify the parameter. A tightly speciﬁed prior can also produce a well behaved
posterior distribution, even if the data has little information (Canova and Sala (2006)).
Due to this reason, Canova and Sala (2006) suggest the use of another diagnostic
procedure to detect the possible identiﬁcation problem. This diagnostic procedure
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involves tracking the stability of the estimated parameters under a sequence of prior
distributions with increasing spreads (i.e. loosening the priors by increasing the prior
standard deviation).
In this section, we use the combination of both methods mentioned above to detect the
possible identiﬁcation problem for the parameter estimates in our model.3 The outcome
of this investigation for the estimations results for the full sample (from Chapter 5) and
sub-sample periods (from Section 6.1) are orderly discussed in the two sub-sections be-
low.
6.2.1 Possible identiﬁcation problem: Full sample period
We start the investigation by looking at the behaviour of prior and posterior distri-
bution of the estimated parameters for the full sample period that we presented in
Chapter 5. For easy reference, we reproduce them here. By referring to Figure 6.3
below, a classic sign of possible identiﬁcation problem is shown on parameter η. While
the estimate for η seems reasonable, note that its respective prior and posterior distri-
bution is almost overlapping with each other. In contrast, signs of possible identiﬁca-
tion problems are less prevalent in other parameters. From their respective prior and
posterior distributions, one can see that the distance between the respective prior and
posterior distribution for these parameters are duly apart. At this stage, this suggests
the possible identiﬁcation problems on the parameters other than η, are less prevalent.
In a way, the possible identiﬁcation problem that we encounter for parameter η is not
really uncommon in the empirical literature. The diﬃculty in estimating the parameter
on the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods is a well known
problem for the researchers. Reﬂecting the large uncertainty surrounding this para-
meter, diverse estimates have been reported in various studies. Adolfson (2007) looks
at this issue in more detail and she claims that estimates for this parameter are largely
inﬂuenced by the choice of variables used in the estimation exercise. In particular,
3Iskrev (2008) suggests another method to detect the possible identiﬁcation problem in the DSGE
model, using the analytical evaluation of the Fisher Information matrix. Admittedly, the method
proposed by Iskrev is more rigorous than the two approaches that we used in this chapter. However, it
is much more diﬃcult to be conducted and it is not attempted here. Perhaps, this alternative method
can be employed in future research.
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Figure 6.3: Prior and Posterior Distributions: 1975Q1-2005Q2 Period
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Adolfson ﬁnds the estimates obtained from the disaggregated time series and trade
data usually are a lot larger than those resulting from the aggregate macroeconomic
data. For example, in the case of the Euro area data, Lubik and Schorfheide (2005)
do not match their DSGE model against any trade (import or export) data and report
an estimate of around 0.4. On the other hand, from the same data, Adolfson, Laséen,
and Villani (2007) show that by including imports among the observed variables in
their estimation procedure leads to totally diﬀerent results. When the import data is
included, they get a much higher estimate of 5 for this parameter compared to about
0.5 when imports are excluded. The uncertainty around the same parameter also apply
in our case. Perhaps, in the context of estimating the DSGE model for Malaysia, the
estimation exercise that includes the trade data as one of the observed variables can
be explored in the future to get improved estimates for this parameter. This is an
interesting area for future extension and research. In the mean time, we will use the
estimates for η that we have here with caution.
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Table 6.2: Posterior Estimates with More Diﬀuse Priors: 1975Q1-2005Q2
Original Alternative 1 Alternative 2
Prior SD Post. Mean Prior SD Post. Mean Prior SD Post. Mean
Υ 0.05 0.565 0.10 0.843 0.25 0.996
Ψ 0.50 0.720 0.60 0.798 1.00 0.824
η 0.10 0.465 0.15 0.552 0.25 0.802
κ 0.10 0.626 0.15 0.696 0.25 0.316
θD 0.10 0.716 0.15 0.749 0.25 0.852
θF 0.10 0.738 0.15 0.764 0.25 0.831
χ 0.02 0.032 0.03 0.010 0.05 0.003
LogL: -2403.56 LogL: 2411.22 LogL: -2441.34
After investigating the behaviour of the prior and posterior distributions of the
estimated parameters for the full sample period, next, we conduct another diagnostic
procedure to detect the possible identiﬁcation problems in our estimated DSGE model.
Following the suggestion by Canova and Sala (2006), this diagnostic analysis looks at
the robustness of the estimated parameters with a looser prior. This is done by re-
estimating the original model but with the use of a larger prior standard deviation for
the parameters concerned. For our purpose, the structural parameters that have been
re-estimated are - Υ, Ψ, η, κ, θD, θF and χ. Recall that except for χ , we initially
imposed tight priors on these structural parameters based on the information derived
from Ramayandi (2008) estimation results. In this diagnostic analysis, we increase
the prior standard deviation for these structural parameters in two stages, which we
named as Alternative 1 and Alternative 2. In producing the estimation results for
this diagnostic procedure, the Bayesian estimation under the two alternative priors are
conducted by keeping the prior speciﬁcations for the remaining parameters unchanged
(see Sub-section 5.2.2 of Chapter 5 for details). The point estimates of this robustness
exercise is presented in Table 6.2.
The estimation results using looser priors reveal a few more possible identiﬁcation prob-
lems on the estimated parameters of our DSGE model. Besides η, - which we already
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detected before to have identiﬁcation problems - the diagnostic procedure suggested by
Canova and Sala (2006) indicates parameter Υ and κ may also suﬀer from a similar
problem. This can be seen by the large changes in the value of their posterior mean
under the alternative prior standard deviation. The value of the posterior mean for Υ ,
which measures the degree of consumption smoothing, increases consistently when the
prior standard deviation is widened in two stages. The posterior mean for Υ jumps
from 0.6 (original prior s.d. 0.05) to 0.8 (prior s.d. 0.10), before it increases further
towards its upper bound limit of 1 (prior s.d. 0.25). The same case happens to the
estimates for parameter κ. The posterior mean for κ is relatively stable at around
0.6-0.7 when the prior standard deviation is widened from 0.10 to 0.15, but it decreases
sharply to around 0.3 when the prior standard deviation is widened further to 0.25.
The large change in the point estimates suggests the identiﬁcation problem faced by
parameter Υ and κ is quite severe and their estimated values are possibly sensitive to
the choice of priors used to generate them. More importantly, the identiﬁcation problem
faced by parameter Υ and κ seems to be hidden under tightly speciﬁed priors that
we initially used under the original speciﬁcation. Identiﬁcation problem on these two
parameters can only be detected when the prior standard deviation is widened. Hence,
the outcome of our results reaﬃrm the suggestion made by Canova and Sala (2006)
about the beneﬁt of conducting the robustness analysis like above as a tool to detect
the identiﬁcation problem in the DSGE model. By simply observing the feature of
the prior and posterior distribution of the estimated parameters sometimes are not
adequate to detect this problem. This is particularly so, for the estimated parameters
whose priors are tightly speciﬁed.
Having said that, what will happen if the same diagnostic test is conducted on the
parameter which does not initially start with a tight prior? The results of the robustness
exercise for parameter χ could shed some light on this question. Recall that the reason
to allow the data to inform us about the degree of ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism in
the Malaysian economy (see Sub-section 5.2.2), we initially impose a fairly loose prior
for this parameter. The initial prior standard deviation for χ is set at 0.02, which is
considered fairly large for the prior mean of 0.07. In the robustness exercise to detect
the possible identiﬁcation problem for this parameter, we loosen the initial prior even
further. We widened the prior standard deviation in two stages, ﬁrst to 0.03 and second
to 0.05. The results indicate that in both stages, the point estimate for χ also changes
widely. From 0.032 initially, the posterior mean for χ decreases to 0.010 in the ﬁrst
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stage and decreases further to 0.003 in the second stage. This suggests this parameter
may also suﬀer identiﬁcation problem. Interestingly, because of its loosely speciﬁed
initial prior and the well apart prior and posterior distributions, parameter χ is the
least suspected candidate to have this problem. Apparently, this turns out not to be the
case. Hence, the point estimate for parameter χ that measures the degree of ﬁnancial
accelerator in our DSGE model on Malaysia, should also be taken judiciously.
6.2.2 Possible identiﬁcation problem: Sub-sample periods
We also conduct the same analysis to detect the possible identiﬁcation problems on
the estimation results of our DSGE model for the sub-sample periods. Like before, we
start the analysis by trying to ﬁnd the initial symptom of the identiﬁcation problem
by inspecting the properties of the prior and posterior distributions of the estimated
parameters. This follows with a diagnostic analysis by re-estimating the parameters
with looser priors.
From inspecting Figure 6.1 and 6.2 that we presented in Section 6.1, two interesting
observations on the behaviour of posterior distributions for parameter Υ, η and κ
catch our attention. First, in the estimation results of the sub-sample periods, the
prior-posterior distribution curve for parameter Υ and η is found to be overlapping.
This is a clear symptom suggesting estimates of these two parameters are not adequately
identiﬁed. Second, a symptom of an identiﬁcation problem also exists for parameter κ,
but it is not common in all the sub-sample periods under review. The overlapping prior-
posterior distribution curve for this parameter is only limited to the 1987Q1-1998Q2
period. This indicates the possible identiﬁcation problem faced by parameter κ could
be dependent on the choice of estimation period.
Next, we conduct the diagnostic analysis by increasing the prior standard deviation of
the selected parameters in each of the estimation exercises involving the sub-sample
periods. Again, the involved parameters are - Υ, Ψ, η, κ, θD, θF and χ. The results of
the robustness exercise for each of the the sub-sample periods are presented in Table 6.3,
6.4 and 6.5 respectively.
Similar to the case for the full sample period, the use of the diagnostic procedure
suggested by Canova and Sala (2006) on the estimation results of the sub-sample periods
produces few interesting results. These are highlighted below.
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Table 6.3: Posterior Estimates with More Diﬀuse Priors: 1975Q1-1986Q4
Original Alternative 1 Alternative 2
Prior SD Post. Mean Prior SD Post. Mean Prior SD Post. Mean
Υ 0.05 0.506 0.10 0.586 0.25 0.976
Ψ 0.50 1.092 0.60 1.057 1.00 1.192
η 0.10 0.429 0.15 0.482 0.25 0.677
κ 0.10 0.637 0.15 0.707 0.25 0.659
θD 0.10 0.689 0.15 0.712 0.25 0.787
θF 0.10 0.704 0.15 0.725 0.25 0.792
χ 0.02 0.040 0.03 0.019 0.05 0.017
LogL: -823.67 LogL: -827.72 LogL: -841.41
Table 6.4: Posterior Estimates with More Diﬀuse Priors: 1987Q1-1998Q2
Original Alternative 1 Alternative 2
Prior SD Post. Mean Prior SD Post. Mean Prior SD Post. Mean
Υ 0.05 0.485 0.10 0.422 0.25 0.984
Ψ 0.50 1.052 0.60 1.267 1.00 0.847
η 0.10 0.640 0.15 0.912 0.25 0.835
κ 0.10 0.563 0.15 0.527 0.25 0.260
θD 0.10 0.809 0.15 0.816 0.25 0.807
θF 0.10 0.829 0.15 0.823 0.25 0.839
χ 0.02 0.050 0.03 0.033 0.05 0.003
LogL: -951.30 LogL: -954.49 LogL: -963.66
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Table 6.5: Posterior Estimates with More Diﬀuse Priors: 1998Q3-2005Q2
Original Alternative 1 Alternative 2
Prior SD Post. Mean Prior SD Post. Mean Prior SD Post. Mean
Υ 0.05 0.488 0.10 0.451 0.25 0.935
Ψ 0.50 1.062 0.60 1.329 1.00 0.961
η 0.10 0.570 0.15 0.774 0.25 0.858
κ 0.10 0.641 0.15 0.738 0.25 0.891
θD 0.10 0.844 0.15 0.864 0.25 0.868
θF 0.10 0.827 0.15 0.830 0.25 0.867
χ 0.02 0.045 0.03 0.035 0.05 0.014
LogL: -589.22 LogL: -591.46 LogL: -595.66
• Signs of an identiﬁcation problem faced by parameters Υ, η and χ are very
obvious. In every sub-sample period, estimates for these three parameters are
sensitive to the use of looser priors.
• Signs of an identiﬁcation problem for parameter κ is limited to only two sub-
sample periods - 1987Q1-1998Q2 and 1998Q3-2005Q2. The estimate for κ in the
1975Q1-1986Q4 period is fairly robust to the looser priors.
• The robustness analysis reveals a new parameter with the sign of identiﬁcation
problem - the inverse elasticity of labour supply (Ψ). The estimate for this param-
eter changes quite a lot under more loosely speciﬁed priors. However, like parame-
ter κ, signs of an identiﬁcation problem is only limited to the 1987Q1-1998Q2 and
1998Q3-2005Q sub-sample periods. The estimate for Ψ in the 1975Q1-1986Q4
period is fairly intact to the widening of the prior standard deviation.
• There is no sign of an identiﬁcation problem for parameter θD and θF . Their
estimates are fairly stable across the board.
The identiﬁcation problem is related to the ability to draw inference about the model's
parameters from the observed sample. We have encountered a similar problem for
parameter η in the case of the full sample period and the recurrence of the same
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symptom in each of the sub-sample periods is not really surprising. Possibly, the absence
of a trade variable from the list of the observed variables continues to be the reason for
the diﬃculty to identify this parameter when the model is estimated with the sub-sample
periods. On the same note, the occurrence of the same symptoms to the estimates of
parameter Υ , χ and κ in the sub-sample periods are also expected. They reaﬃrm the
results of the robustness analysis conducted in the full sample period that the estimation
of these three parameters are also not free from identiﬁcation problems.
Obviously, results of the diagnostic analysis presented in Table 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 provide
clear evidence to suggest estimates of Υ in the sub-sample periods are not properly
identiﬁed. The estimates are not robust to a more loosely speciﬁed prior. However,
a more interesting matter regarding the identiﬁcation problem for parameter Υ in
the sub-sample periods is the fact that its detection is achieved in a more easily and
straightforward manner. Unlike the case of the full sample period in which this problem
is initially hidden under a well behaved posterior distribution and is only revealed
after conducting the robustness analysis, the sign of the identiﬁcation problem for
parameter Υ in the sub-sample periods is more obvious and can be easily detected
from looking at the property of its posterior distribution curve. The problem is no
longer disguised under a well apart prior-posterior distribution curve. Comparing the
two cases, the overlapping prior-posterior distribution curves for Υ in the sub-sample
periods indicates that the posterior distribution for this parameter has not been updated
in the same manner as in the case of the full sample period. Hence, this suggests the
identiﬁcation problem for parameter Υ becomes more imminent and transparent when
the model is estimated with a smaller number of observations. Consequently, this makes
the symptom of the identiﬁcation problem becoming more visible.
In contrast, the opposite case happens to parameter χ . The property of its poste-
rior distribution still fails to provide a correct symptom of the identiﬁcation problem
faced by this parameter. Like the case of the full sample period, the prior-posterior
distribution curves for χ in each of the sub-sample periods are fairly well apart.
Only after conducting the robustness analysis do the symptoms of the identiﬁcation
problem emerge. Estimates of this parameter in all the sub-sample periods are not
robust to the loosely speciﬁed priors. The instability of the estimates in all the sub-
sample periods reconﬁrms our earlier ﬁnding that our DSGE model is not able to
adequately identify the parameter measuring the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism. This
happens independently of the estimation sample.
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The most interesting result from conducting the diagnostic analysis for the sub-sample
periods is the detection of an identiﬁcation problem faced by the parameter measuring
the inverse elasticity of labour supply (Ψ). For the record, this is the ﬁrst instance that
any sign of an identiﬁcation problem emerges for this parameter. In the case of the
full sample period, parameter Ψ is found to be totally free from any symptom of an
identiﬁcation problem. Even in the estimation results for the sub-sample periods, the
symptom is initially wrapped under a well behaved posterior distribution. Each of Ψ
prior-posterior distribution curves in the sub-sample periods is well apart suggesting the
non-existence of any identiﬁcation problem. However, the results of diagnostic analysis
for the sub-sample periods indicates otherwise. Under looser priors, estimates of Ψ
vary quite distinctly in two sub-sample periods. For the 1987Q1-1998Q2 period, the
estimate initially increases from around 1 (original prior s.d. 0.5) to 1.3 (prior s.d. 0.6),
before it decreases sharply to around 0.8 (prior s.d. 1). About the same movement is
also shown in the estimates for the 1998Q3-2005Q2 period. This suggests parameter
Ψ is not actually free from the identiﬁcation problem. However, the problem is only
detected when the model is estimated with a reduction in the sample size.
The above ﬁndings demonstrate one important feature regarding the estimation of
a DSGE model with Malaysia's data - the sample size plays an important role in
inﬂuencing the identiﬁability of certain structural parameters. Compared with the full
sample period, estimation results with shorter data points in the sub-sample periods
produce more visible symptoms of identiﬁcation problems. What happens to parameters
Υ , κ and Ψ in the sub-sample periods indicate how the estimation exercise with a
small sample size can aggravate the identiﬁcation problems in the DSGE model. This
outcome is also consistent with one of the ﬁndings by Canova and Sala (2006). Their
experiment indicates that the use of a small sample period to estimate a DSGE model
will compound the identiﬁcation problems experienced by the parameters.
Besides the sample size, the choice of sample period can also play a role in inﬂuencing
the identiﬁcation problem faced by certain structural parameters. This is shown by
identiﬁcation problems on parameters κ and Ψ in the sub-sample periods. For both
parameters, signs of identiﬁcation problems in the sub-sample periods are only found in
the 1987Q1-1998Q2 and 1998Q3-2005Q2, but they are completely absent in the 1975Q1-
1986Q4. In contrast, when the full sample period is used, symptoms of identiﬁcation
problems for Ψ do not arise at all. This outcome highlights another important feature
about estimating the DSGE model involving Malaysian data. When one attempts to
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estimate the DSGE model using a short sample size, it is important for the researcher
to experiment and then select the appropriate sample period. Failure to do so can lead
to some structural parameters in the model to be inadequately identiﬁed.
The outcome of the above investigation highlights few identiﬁcation problems in our
estimated DSGE model. As stressed by Canova and Sala (2006), the uncritical use
of Bayesian methods may sometimes hide identiﬁcation problems faced by the DSGE
model, instead of highlighting them. Hence, the use of a robustness test is beneﬁcial.
We conduct this robustness analysis and highlight possible identiﬁcation problems on
the few parameters. While we do not try to ﬁnd the exact source nor suggest the
solution to this problem, the above ﬁndings should be used in a diﬀerent way. They
serve as an important admonition about the possible inaccuracy of our estimates of
structural parameters for the Malaysian economy.
Identiﬁcation problems highlighted above also indicate the information content of the
four observable variables used in this exercise - real GDP, inﬂation, interest rate and
RER - is not really adequate to identify satisfactorily the structural parameters of con-
sumer preference (Υ and η), the degree of inﬂation indexation (κ) and the elasticity of
external ﬁnancial premium (χ). Perhaps, the use of additional observable variables like
aggregate consumption, banking system loans and trade data in the Bayesian estimation
exercise will provide more information to better identify these parameters. However,
introducing additional variables to the estimation exercise does not come without a
price. The number of observable variables used in the estimation, must match the
number of exogenous shocks in the model. In the context of the DSGE model that we
used in this chapter, this involves the introduction of new parameters and equations
into the model, which increases its dimension and complexities. Perhaps, this extension
can be attempted in future research. On a more positive note, the above outcomes also
suggest the same observable variables that we used in this chapter contain informative
information to successfully estimate some of the structural parameters. Hence, instead
of relying on the calibrating method, the structural parameters like Ψ , θD and θF
of our DSGE model can be adequately estimated with the use of the four observable
variables listed before.
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6.3 Conclusion
This chapter looks at two on-going issues surrounding the estimation of the DSGE
model - stability of structural parameters over time and the identiﬁcation problems of
the estimated parameters. To investigate the stability of the structural parameters over
time, the DSGE model of the Malaysian economy that we developed and estimated
using a full sample period in Chapter 5, is re-estimated using the sub-sample peri-
ods. Comparing the estimation results across the three sub-sample periods, there is no
evident sign to suggest estimates of structural parameters for the Malaysian economy
change over time. While parameter estimates for the HMT interest rate rule exhibit
some changes and suggest the evolution of BNM's policy behaviour over time, estimates
of structural parameters like household's preferences and Calvo pricing are found to be
largely intact. Having said that, we also oﬀer a caveat to this ﬁnding. Compared
to the estimation results for the full sample period that we presented in the previous
chapter, estimates of structural parameters using the sub-sample periods are less
accurate. Hence, analysis using the estimated DSGE model involving the sub-sample
periods should be taken judiciously.
We also highlight another weakness of the estimation results of the structural para-
meters of the Malaysian economy that we presented. Some of the estimated parameters
in our model are detected to suﬀer from identiﬁcation problems. While we do not try
to oﬀer any solution to the identiﬁcation problems found in this chapter, we regard
the results of this investigation beneﬁcial in other ways. They reveal which of the
estimated structural parameters from our model are less susceptible to the identiﬁcation
problems and hence can be used with greater conﬁdence. These results also suggest the
four observable variables that we used to estimate the DSGE model with the Bayesian
method - real GDP, inﬂation, interest rate and RER - contain informative information
to successfully estimate some of the structural parameters. Hence, instead of relying
on the calibrating method, the structural parameters like elasticity of labour supply
(Ψ) and probability of retailers changing price (θD and θF ) of our DSGE model can be
adequately estimated.
Based on the ﬁndings of the last two chapters, in Chapter 7, we use the estimated
DSGE model for the 1975Q1-2005Q2 for simulation exercises. Using this model as
a workhorse, we do a policy experiment to answer this question - What happens to
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Malaysia's economic outcomes during 1975Q1-2005Q2 if BNM was to change its relative
policy preferences between controlling inﬂation, stabilizing output and smoothing the
interest rate? We conduct this policy experiment by varying the parameter of BNM's
loss function. Then, by assuming monetary policy is conducted through the optimal
interest rate rule, the estimated DSGE model that we presented in Chapter 5, is used
to provide the likely outcomes of this policy experiment.
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Chapter 7
Simulating Bank Negara Malaysia's
Behaviour in Formulating Monetary
Policy: Policy Experiment using a
DSGE Model
Empirical results in previous chapters have provided us with a fairly good understanding
about the way Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) conducts monetary policy in Malaysia.
Up to now, we have established the speciﬁcation of BNM's reaction function, economic
variables that BNM responded to in setting interest rates, policy objectives that BNM
tries to pursue, as well as the way BNM prioritizes the multiple objectives that it
attempts to achieve. There is also evidence suggesting that in conducting monetary
policy, BNM's behaviour was evolving over time. All in all, BNM's past policy behaviour
and actions have contributed to shaping the outcomes of the Malaysian economy. The
next interesting question to ask is, what would happen to Malaysia's economic outcomes
if BNM was to behave diﬀerently than what we found empirically?
This chapter conducts a simulation exercise to look at the impact on Malaysia's
economic outcomes for the 1975Q1-2005Q2 period, if BNM was to follow a diﬀerent
policy preference than what we have established and understood from the empirical
exercises in Chapter 4. Similar types of counter-factual experiments involving policy
behaviour of the US Federal Reserve are discussed in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998),
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and Soderlind (2004). For our purpose, recall that
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estimation results in Chapter 4, reveal the following information about BNM's policy
objectives and relative policy preferences:
• BNM had multiple objectives for monetary policy. Estimates of preference
parameters for other policy objectives are statistically signiﬁcant and greater than
one (i.e. λ1 ,λ3 > 1). Hence, compared to the objective of price stability, BNM
has a higher preference for output stability and interest rate smoothing.
• No statistical evidence to show BNM puts exchange rate smoothing as one of its
policy objectives. The estimate of parameter λ2 is small and is not statistically
signiﬁcant.
While the above information may reﬂect the actual BNM's policy behaviour during
the 1975Q1-2005Q2 period, in this chapter, we undertake a diﬀerent exercise. We try
to replay history and ask the what if question regarding BNM's policy behaviour.
What happens to Malaysia's economic outcomes during 1975Q1-2005Q2 if BNM had
a diﬀerent set of relative preferences? More speciﬁcally, the policy experiment that we
conduct in this chapter tries to answer the following questions regarding the alternative
way that BNM could prioritize its policy objectives during this period:
• What would happen to Malaysia's economic outcomes during the period if BNM
became an inﬂation nutter and adopted a strict inﬂating targeting framework
(i.e. λ1 , λ2 , λ3 = 0) ?
• What would be the impact if BNM puts inﬂation as its ﬁrst policy priority
(i.e. λ1 ,λ3 < 1) and not as what it has been practicing?
• What if BNM puts an equal weights to all its policy objectives (i.e. λ1 ,λ2 , λ3 =
1) ?
• What would be the outcomes if BNM's policy objectives were to include exchange
rate smoothing (i.e. λ2 > 0) ?
We break this chapter into three main sections. First, a short discussion on the
assumptions we make to conduct the simulation exercises. Then, Section 7.2 presents
the simulation results of the policy experiment. The last section concludes.
190
7.1 Assumptions
The main framework of the simulation exercise that we conduct in this chapter is
derived from information and knowledge that we gathered in the previous chapters.
For example, from Chapter 3 and 5, the Henderson-McKibbin-Taylor (HMT) interest
rate rule is known to represent BNM's reaction function fairly well. This will be used
to establish BNM's reaction function. In Chapter 4, we reveal the policy objectives and
relative preferences of BNM by using a linear-quadratic loss function and an optimal
interest rate rule. In Chapter 5, we have developed and estimated a small open-economy
DSGE, which reveals estimates of structural parameters for the Malaysian economy.
This estimated model is used to represent the operation of the Malaysian economy
during the 1975Q1-2005Q2 period. Thus, assumptions that we used in these simulation
exercises are summarized below:
1. Throughout the 1975Q1-2005Q2 period, BNM treats formulation of monetary
policy as a solution to the optimal control problem. BNM sets its policy instru-
ment in such a way as to minimize a speciﬁed loss function subject to the dynamics
of the Malaysian economy described by a speciﬁed model's equations.
2. BNM's policy objective is to minimize the following linear quadratic loss function
Loss = Et
∞∑
j=0
δj
[
(pia
t+j
)2 + λ1(yt+j)
2 + λ2(rert+j)
2 + λ3(rt+j − rt+j−1)2
]
(7.1)
where Et denotes expectation conditional on information available at time t;
0< δ<1 is the discount factor; yt is the output gap; pi
a
t is the average inﬂa-
tion (deﬁned as pi
a
t
=
1
4
3∑
j=0
pit−j , with pit is the annual inﬂation for the quarter);
rt is the short-term interest rate and rert is the real exchange rate. Parameter
λ1, λ2 , λ3 > 0 , is the weight of BNM's policy preference given to the output
gap, exchange rate stabilization and interest rate smoothing respectively. These
objectives are expressed relative to BNM's concern for inﬂation stabilization,
which is normalized to one.
3. Monetary policy is conducted according to the HMT interest rate rule
rt = (1− ρ) [βpipit+1 + Θyyt+1] + ρrt−1 (7.2)
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It is assumed BNM acts optimally to set the interest rates. In doing so, subject
to the constraint given by the economic model, value of parameter βpi , Θy and
ρ is chosen such that the HMT interest rate rule above minimizes the value of the
loss function given by equation 7.1. Steps and mechanics to obtain the optimized
HMT rule are largely similar to the one we used in Chapter 4. However, note that
there is a slight diﬀerence in the speciﬁcations of the optimized HMT rule that we
use here and the one in Chapter 4. In this chapter, we use the optimized simple,
HMT-type interest rate rule (with three arguments - pit+1, yt+1 and rt−1 ) and not
the fully (unrestricted) optimal interest rate rule (which responds to ALL state
variables). The main reason for our preference in using the optimized HMT rule
instead of the unrestricted optimal rule for the simulation exercise in this chapter,
is its simplicity. The number of state variables in the DSGE model that we use
in this chapter is far greater than the simple small open economy model that we
used in Chapter 4. Hence, ﬁnding the optimal coeﬃcients for the full-ﬂedged,
unrestricted optimal rule with the numerical method is far more diﬃcult to reach
convergence.
Having said that, we do not think this simpliﬁcation will greatly aﬀect the results.
As found in Chapter 3 and 5, the HMT rule is known to represent BNM's reaction
function fairly well. Thus, the speciﬁcation that we used in this chapter is closed to
the actual decision rule that BNM adopted during the period. More importantly,
as noted by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), in most cases, the HMT rule with
the optimized coeﬃcients (with three arguments) comes close to matching the
unrestricted optimal rule (with all state variables as arguments).
The parameter for the optimized HMT rule is searched using a numerical method.
Like the Bayesian estimation in Chapter 5, this was performed using the OSR
algorithm in DYNARE v3.65. DYNARE uses the MATLAB function fminsearch
to ﬁnd the optimized values for the HMT rule that minimize the value of the loss
function, subject to the values set on λ.
4. The estimated DSGE model for the full sample period presented in Chapter 5
is used as the workhorse model representing the operation and dynamics of the
Malaysian economy. Summary of the structural equations of the estimated DSGE
model as well as the value of the parameters presented in Chapter 5, are repro-
duced in Table 7.3 and 7.4 (placed in Appendix) for easy reference.
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Note that, for the simulation exercise in this chapter, estimates of structural
parameters of the DSGE model with a Financial Accelerator for the full
sample period (1975Q1-2005Q2) are used. There are two main reasons why
we only conduct the simulation exercise using the structural parameters for the
full sample period and ignore the estimation results for the sub-sample periods.
First, as discussed in Chapter 6, there are no signiﬁcant changes on the esti-
mates of structural parameters across the diﬀerent sub-sample periods. As such,
there will not be much beneﬁt from the simulation exercise using the estimated
DSGE model for the sub-sample periods as the simulated model will generate very
similar results. Second, and more importantly, estimates of structural parameters
for the sub-sample periods were generated with less accuracy and subject to the
greater degree of identiﬁcation problems. Hence, we feel more comfortable using
the estimation results for the full sample period in this simulation exercise.
5. In conducting the simulation exercise, size of the shocks that hit the economy
during the 1975Q1-2005Q2 period - σMP , σUIP , σLOPG, σY , σpi∗ , σi∗ , σy∗ - are
assumed to be ﬁxed. Values of standard deviations for these shocks are derived
from the estimated DSGE model presented in Chapter 5.
6. Value for policy preference parameters - λ1 , λ2 , λ3 - in the loss function, is set
between 0 to 1.5. To reﬂect diﬀerent policy preference scenarios, combinations
of several values for these parameters are used. As the preference for inﬂation
stabilization is normalized to one, changing the value of parameters λ1 , λ2 , λ3
will represent the change in the relative importance of the objective variables.
For example, when λ < 1 , inﬂation objective is given a higher priority compared
to other policy objectives, while when λ > 1 other policy objectives supersedes
inﬂation.
Results of the simulation exercises that we conducted are presented and discussed in
the next section.
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7.2 Simulation Results
We report the simulation results in two tables. Table 7.1 displays the simulation results
when BNM does not have exchange rate smoothing as one of its policy objectives
(λ2 = 0), while Table 7.2 provides the simulation results when this additional policy
objective is in eﬀect (λ2 > 0). In part (i) of both tables, there are three diﬀerent
measures of standard deviation - actual data, model's estimation and model's simulation
- for interest rates, inﬂation, real exchange rates (RER) and output. These could be used
to make a quick comparison about the model's performance and analyzing the impact
to economic outcomes under diﬀerent policy actions. Part (ii) of both tables reports
the parameter values for the estimated (historical) and the optimized HMT rule. Note
that, values of estimated and optimized HMT rule are diﬀerent to each other. Parameter
values in the estimated HMT rule are estimated to best ﬁt the historical data and are
not constrained to minimize any sort of loss function. In contrast, as stated before,
parameter values in the optimized HMT rule are generated from the numerical method
to minimize a loss function with a speciﬁc value of λ. The estimated HMT rule is used to
represent BNM's reaction function in the model's estimation, while the optimized HMT
rule is used to represent BNM's reaction function in the model's simulation. Since they
are generated from two diﬀerent conﬁgurations, estimated and optimized HMT interest
rate rule represents a diﬀerent set of BNM's policy actions. Obviously, a diﬀerent set
of policy actions produces diﬀerent economic outcomes. These are represented in two
measures of standard deviations (Model's Estimation and Model's Simulation) that we
report in part (i) of Table 7.1 and 7.2.
Results in column 1 of both tables are the outcome of a special case, a scenario when
BNM only has a single policy objective to target inﬂation. This special case is what
Svensson (1999) classiﬁed as a strict inﬂation targeting policy. Even though up to now
there is no central bank that oﬃcially puts the strict inﬂation targeting policy into
practice, it is interesting to see the eﬀect on the Malaysian economy if BNM was to
adopt this policy preference.1 Also, since it involves setting other preference parameters
to zero, the outcome from the strict inﬂation targeting policy is a good starting point
1Svensson (1997b) oﬀers ﬁve reasons on why s central bank does not put strict inﬂation targeting into
practice. Among others, the reasons are the instrument-instability problem; uncertainties regarding
model parameters, data and state of the economy; issues on predictability, credibility and public
understanding of monetary policy; and conﬂicting shocks with the opposite impact to inﬂation. See
Svensson (1997b) for details.
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for us to build-up our analysis and form conclusions about BNM's policy behaviour
under diﬀerent policy preferences. Simulation of economic outcomes when BNM adopts
diﬀerent policy preferences are reported in column 2 to 6 in both tables.
Analysis of simulation results are divided into four parts. It starts with discussion on
the comparison between the estimated and optimized HMT Rule. Then, the remaining
parts analyze the simulation results when BNM adopts strict inﬂation targeting and
when BNM operates with multiple objectives without exchange rate smoothing. We
also look at the outcomes when BNM aims to smooth the exchange rate movement.
7.2.1 Comparison between Estimated and Optimized HMT
Interest Rate Rule
A quick glance to Table 7.1 and 7.2 indicates two major features about the estimated and
optimized BNM's reaction function. First, from part (ii) of both tables, the estimated
and the optimized values for HMT interest rate rule parameters are fairly diﬀerent to
each other. Second, use of the optimized reaction function produces better economic
outcomes than the estimated reaction function. From part (i) of both tables, it is clear
that standard deviations of all variables from the model's simulation (which uses the
optimized HMT rule to represent BNM's reaction function) are lower than what are
projected in the model's estimation (which uses the estimated HMT rule to represent
BNM's reaction function).
Naturally, diﬀerences in the parameter values between the estimated (historical) and
optimized HMT rules will lead us to the conclusion that BNM's historical monetary
policy action is not consistent with the outcome of the economic optimization problem.
While this could be a factor that we cannot totally rule out, we view this thinking
as not very convincing due to three reasons. First, based on our empirical results in
Chapter 3 and 5, the HMT interest rate rule is able to describe BNM's reaction function
very well. This can be interpreted to indicate there is a systematic component in the
way BNM conducts monetary policy to achieve certain policy objectives. In addition,
the empirical results also show BNM's policy behaviour adheres to Taylor's principle,
which by its own right, is in line with the optimizing policy making behaviour. Second,
one of the key factors to the success story of the Malaysian economy is the contribu-
tion from proﬁcient economic management and good formulation of economic policies
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(Athukorala and Menon (1999); Corden (2002)). Undoubtedly, one of the key compo-
nents to this is the sound conduct of monetary policy. So, it is fair to assume that some
sort of optimum behaviour has been practiced by BNM in conducting its policy aﬀairs.
Lastly, on the theoretical ground, a long-standing principle that is consistently applied
in the economics ﬁeld is any economic behaviour can be understood as a problem of
constrained optimization. Hence, when modelling the behaviour of a central bank, this
principle should equally apply as it does to modelling the behaviour of other economic
agents like consumers and ﬁrms. Due to these reasons, while the size of coeﬃcients
between the estimated and optimized reaction functions could be diﬀerent, it should
not be viewed as suggesting BNM does not behave optimally. The diﬀerence between
the optimized and estimated reaction functions that we encountered above happens due
to other reasons.
Having said that, we do not try to identify explicitly the reasons that cause the diﬀerence
between the optimized and estimated reaction function for BNM that we encountered
in this chapter. However, looking at the related study by Rudebusch (2001) is useful to
give us an idea on the possible source of this outcome. Rudebusch attempts to reconcile
the diﬀerent outcome between the historical estimates and the optimized coeﬃcients
of the interest rate rules for the US Federal Reserve. He suggests three aspects of
uncertainties that the Fed has to face in the formulation of monetary policy in real
life - data, model speciﬁcations and parameter uncertainties. These may explain why
the Fed's observed (estimated) reaction functions are diﬀerent from the optimized.
In particular, these uncertainties make the Fed's estimated reaction function to be less
forceful and timid than the policy action prescribed by the optimized reaction function.
Hence, it is very likely that the same reasons are equally applicable to the case of BNM
which we do not explicitly cover in this chapter. This is an interesting area to be looked
at in future research.
Simulation results also suggest the use of the optimized HMT rule produces a strictly
improved outcome for the Malaysian economy. Compared to its estimated counter-
part, representing BNM's reaction function using the optimized HMT rule produces a
signiﬁcantly lower volatility in inﬂation and a much more stable interest rates move-
ment. Optimized HMT rule also produces more stable RER and output movement.
The reason for this better economic outcomes can be attributed to the way the opti-
mized HMT rule prescribe how BNM should set interest rates. Comparison between
the optimized and estimated reaction function suggests in the optimized policy setting,
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BNM should react much stronger to inﬂation (βpi: 3.2-4.7 in optimized against 2.2 in
estimated), less aggressively to the output gap (Θy: -0.3-0.6 in optimized compared
to 1.3 in estimated) and should practice lower policy inertia (ρ : 0-0.5 in optimized
compared to 0.6 in estimated). These suggest the use of alternative policy action in
accordance to the one suggested by the optimized HMT rule could be more eﬀective
than the representation of historical policy action that we believe was taken by BNM
during the 1975-2005 period.
Having said that, one admonition to this ﬁnding. It should not be viewed as our
comprehensive attempt to evaluate BNM's past policy decisions. Neither does it
suggests BNM made policy mistakes by not setting interest rates for the 1975-2005
according to the recommendations prescribed by the optimized rule. To start with, the
optimized HMT rule reported in part (ii) of Table 7.1 and 7.2 are produced conditional
to the assumptions that we outlined in Section 7.1. Admittedly these assumptions
could be too simplistic to mimic the actual policy making taken by BNM during the
1975-2005 period. There could be other factors that constraint BNM's policy action
which we fail to take into account which caused BNM to behave the way it did.
In addition, in the actual policy setting, we do not expect BNM to set interest rates
by following mechanically the optimized interest rate rule. Every central bank uses
more information than what the simple optimized rule is based on. No central bank,
including BNM, would restrict itself to react mechanically in a pre-described way as
suggested by the optimized rule. Thus, the role of a simple optimized rule is at best,
to provide a baseline and comparison to the policy actually followed. Based on this
premise, the above ﬁnding should not be looked solely at the quantitative diﬀerences in
the coeﬃcients between the optimized and estimated HMT rule. Instead, qualitative
information from these diﬀerences could be more useful. It provides applicable gui-
dance on how BNM should have set its reaction function. From the recommendation
prescribed by the optimized rule, to get better economic outcomes, BNM should set
interest rates by responding more forcefully to inﬂation, less aggressively to the output
gap and practice lower policy inertia.
Next, we discuss in detail the main objective of this chapter - simulation outcomes with
diﬀerent BNM's policy preferences.
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7.2.2 Policy Simulation I: Strict Inﬂation Targeting
First, we look at the simulation results if BNM was to adopt the strict inﬂation targeting
preference during the 1975-2005 period. It produces one important results. Having
price stability as a single policy objective is able to minimize inﬂation volatility to
the Malaysian economy. Compared to other policy scenarios that we considered in
Table 7.1, results in column 1a produces the lowest level of inﬂation volatility (0.007).
However, becoming an inﬂation nutter does not come without cost. There is a clear
trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and output volatility. When BNM is solely concern with
achieving price stability, the simulation results indicate output volatility is also at its
highest level (0.038). In addition, it also produces the highest volatility in the RER
movement (0.105).
The above outcomes are consistent with the assertion made by King (1997) and Svens-
son (2000) about the limitation of this ambitious policy preference. Adoption of strict
inﬂation targeting will produce excessive variability in the economic variables other than
inﬂation. Since keeping inﬂation as close to the target as possible is the only concern
to these policymakers, they will react excessively to bring inﬂation back to its target as
soon as possible. This requires a very vigorous and activist policy action, which involves
drastic interest rate changes. In addition, in the case of the open economy set-up (like
the one we use in this chapter), Svensson argues the direct exchange rate channel has
the shortest lag among the transmission channels. Due to this reason, the central bank
will move the exchange rate aggressively, exploiting the direct impact of the exchange
rate on import prices to bring down inﬂation quickly (Svensson (2000)). As we found in
the simulation exercise, this activist policy action may succeed in stabilizing inﬂation.
However, it causes large variability to other variables as well. This is one of the key
factors that makes strict inﬂation targeting less favourable to the policymakers.
Another interesting observation about the simulation results of BNM adopts strict
inﬂation targeting is the behaviour of the optimized reaction function. The sign for
the feedback coeﬃcient on the output gap (Θy) in the optimized HMT rule is negative
(see Table 7.1(ii)). This suggests under a strict inﬂation targeting framework, BNM
should reduce the interest rate when the economy is experiencing a positive output gap.
We do not have a good explanation for this counter-intuitive result. It only happens in
the case of strict inﬂation targeting and not in other policy scenarios that we considered
in this Chapter. Perhaps, this could be a unique property of the optimized reaction
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function when a central bank is assumed to adopt strict inﬂation targeting. The same
outcome was also reported in Svensson (2000), Smets and Wouters (2002) and Flamini
(2007) when they conducted a similar exercise using a small open economy model. None
of them provide any explanation to this outcome either. We leave ﬁnding the possible
reasons to this outcome to other research.
For the same reasons outlined in Svensson (1997b), strict inﬂation targeting may also
be not preferable to the policymakers in Malaysia. Thus, simulation result of the
remaining scenarios show the economic outcomes when BNM moves away from the
strict inﬂation targeting to the policy preference with multiple objectives. This will be
discussed next.
7.2.3 Policy Simulation II: Multiple policy objectives without
exchange rate smoothing
This sub-section discusses the results of the simulation exercise with the assumption
that BNM does not smooth the exchange rate (λ2 = 0, refer to Table 7.1). We start
the analysis for the policy preference with multiple objectives by looking at another
extreme scenario. What happens to Malaysia's economic outcomes during 1975Q1-
2005Q2 period if BNM puts all the policy objectives equal importance? Scenario 2a
represents this situation, with all the policy objectives in the loss function is given
an equal weight. The outcome of the simulation results suggest there will be little
improvement in economic outcomes when BNM moves away from being an inﬂation
nutter to a policymaker which puts an equal importance to all of its policy objectives.
The latter produces a lower standard deviation for RER as well as a more stable output.
Interestingly, these improved outcomes are achieved with a minimal change to the
interest rates and inﬂation volatility. Hence, moving away from a single policy objective
for price stability does not necessarily cause unfavorable inﬂation outcomes. Even in
the case when BNM is indiﬀerent between the three policy objectives that it tries to
achieve, it still produces generally better economic outcomes than what is achieved by
the strict inﬂation targeting preference.
The above ﬁnding suggests the policy preference with multiple objectives is likely to be
BNM's choice. Particularly, when we already established from the empirical evidence in
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Chapter 4 that in formulating monetary policy, BNM was also concerned with fulﬁlling
other policy objectives. But, how should BNM rank the price stability objective in
the list of policy objectives that it tries to pursue? The answer to this question will
give us an idea about the general relationship between the ranking of price stability
in BNM's preferences and the economic outcomes. For this purpose, we consider two
orderings for the price stability objective. Scenario 3a (with λ1 = λ3 = 0.5) represents
the situation when price stability objective is strictly dominant and is ranked as BNM's
ﬁrst policy priority. Scenario 4a (with λ1 = λ3 = 1.5) is the opposite of scenario 3a.
It assumes BNM puts the inﬂation objective as the least importance and it is ranked
as the last policy priority. We analyze the outcome from changing the ordering of the
price stability objective in BNM's policy preference below.
We ﬁnd the ordering of the price stability objective in BNM's preference has an impor-
tant role in inﬂuencing the overall economic outcomes in Malaysia. In particular, overall
economic conditions generally become more stable when BNM ranks inﬂation ahead of
other policy variables. This is shown by comparing the simulation results between
column 3a and 4a. In the case when the price stability objective is strictly preferred,
both inﬂation and interest rates are less volatile. In addition, the beneﬁt of putting
other policy objectives ahead of inﬂation is not very signiﬁcant. Compared to the out-
comes in Scenario 3a, it only reduces RER volatility slightly. Having a large preference
bias for output stabilization like in Scenario 4a (with λ1 = 1.5) also reduces output
volatility very marginally. A preference bias to smooth interest rates (with λ3 = 1.5)
does not produce the intended results either. In the situation where the price stability
objective is least dominant, interest rates volatility is also higher than the scenario when
λ3 is set at a lower value. Hence, putting the price stability objective at the lowest
policy rank in BNM's list of policy objectives does not produce a signiﬁcant betterment
to the overall economic outcomes. More interestingly, compared to the results of other
policy scenarios that we considered in Table 7.1, results in Scenario 4a produces the
highest volatility for inﬂation. This suggests the importance for BNM to always put
the price stability ahead of other policy objectives that it wants to achieve.
Interestingly, based on the information that we gather from the estimation results in
Chapter 4, putting inﬂation as the least important policy priority as in Scenario 4a is
the closest resemblance to what we found was actually practiced by BNM during the
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1975Q1-2005Q2 period.2 Hence, the above ﬁndings raise one interesting question. Does
it suggests there is room for improvement in the overall economic outcomes during the
1975-2005 period if BNM was to put inﬂation as the ﬁrst policy priority in its past policy
preference? Looking at the results of diﬀerent policy preference scenarios in Table 7.1(i)
able to shed some lights to this question. Simulation results for other scenarios with
the weights attached to output and interest rate smoothing objective is smaller than
or equal to the inﬂation objective (i.e. λ1, λ3 ≤ 1) indicate that they would produce
generally better economic outcomes than the set of policy preferences that we believe
BNM chose in the past.
Next, we conduct a policy experiment to investigate the impact of changing the indivi-
dual size of λ1 and λ3 . This experiment will resemble the situation where BNM varies
its relative policy preferences. As mentioned in Chapter 4, a possible change in BNM's
relative policy preference can happen following the change in the economic circum-
stances, in line with the evolution of the Malaysian economy. Since possible changes in
the relative policy preference is likely to occur from time to time, it is interesting to see
its impact to the economic outcomes. For this purpose, we consider two policy scenarios.
In Scenario 5a, we set the value of λ1 = 0.5 and λ3 = 1. In Scenario 6a, we reverse
this order to λ1 = 1 and λ3 = 0.5. Then, to analyze the impact from changing the
individual value of λ1 and λ3 while holding values of other preference parameters con-
stant, we made the comparison of the simulation results of Scenario 5a and 6a to the
outcomes in Scenario 3a. In Scenario 3a, λ1 and λ3 are both set to 0.5. By com-
paring the outcomes between Scenario 5a to Scenario 3a, it can be used to predict the
impact to the economy when BNM increases its policy preference to smooth interest
rates (↑ λ3 ). Similarly, comparing the results of Scenario 6a to Scenario 3a will pre-
dict the impact when BNM becomes more concerned about stabilizing output (↑ λ1 ).
We analyze the outcomes of these two situations below.3
2Admittedly, estimate of policy preference parameters (λ) are model dependent. This makes com-
parison on the value of policy preference parameters inaccurate. Due to this reason, we do not use
the quantitative information (i.e. parameter estimates) from Chapter 4 here. However, we view quali-
tative information about BNM placed output stabilization and interest rate smoothing ahead of price
stability that we gathered from Chapter 4 are still valid and applicable.
3Note that the same analysis can also be done by comparing results of Scenario 5a and 6a to the
outcomes in Scenario 2a (with λ1 and λ3 are both set to 1). However, it must be done in the reverse
order. For example, comparing results between Scenario 5a to Scenario 2a should be interpreted as
the impact when BNM decreases its policy preference to stabilize output (↓ λ1 ). Similarly, comparing
results between Scenario 6a to Scenario 2a should be taken as the outcome when BNM decreases its
policy preference to smooth interest rates (↓ λ3 ). Hence, the impact to the economic outcomes will
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Comparing the results between column 5a and 3a, an increase in BNM's policy prefe-
rence to smooth interest rates (↑ λ3 ) gives three eﬀects to Malaysia's economic outcomes
during the 1975-2005 period. First, albeit slightly, such action reduces the interest rate
volatility (to 0.014 from 0.016). Second, it does not aﬀect output and inﬂation outcomes
very much. Compared to the outcomes in column 3a, standard deviations for inﬂation
and output in column 5a are virtually unchanged. Third, an increase in BNM's relative
preference to smooth interest rates leads to a more volatile exchange rate movement
(to 0.105 from 0.101). An increase in the policy preference to smooth interest rate also
requires diﬀerent policy action from BNM. From comparing parameters of optimized
HMT rule between column 5a and 3a in Table 7.1(ii), such action requires BNM to
respond more forcefully to inﬂation (↑ βpi), less aggressively to the output gap (↓ Θy)
and place greater policy inertia (↑ ρ).
As mentioned in Chapter 2, there are a few reasons why central banks smooth interest
rates. As argued by Cukierman (1992), one rationale for this is to reﬂect the central
bank's concerns on the stability of the ﬁnancial system. Hence, looking from the same
angle, the above results can be taken to represent this situation. Our simulation results
suggest that when BNM raises its policy preference parameter to smooth interest rates
in order to stabilize the Malaysian ﬁnancial system, such action will not give much
detrimental impact to the inﬂation and output volatility. However, BNM needs to
expect that such action will have a negative consequence to the stability of real exchange
rates. A possible explanation for this result is as follows. In our DSGEmodel, movement
in the real exchange rate acts as an automatic stabilizer in the economy to ensure
equilibrium is achieved. Thus, when BNM is not willing to change interest rates as
much and as frequently as it should due to its concern about ﬁnancial stability, the real
exchange rate will automatically change in a larger scale to ﬁll in the gap.
There is one suggestion that we want to bring forward from the above ﬁnding.
Increases in the RER volatility following BNM's desire to stabilize the ﬁnancial system
should not become a big concern to the policymakers. It is just a natural economic
reaction to its choice of policy preference and action. More importantly, BNM should
refrain from taking a countermeasure action by smoothing the exchange rate movement
through direct intervention in the exchange rate market. Like we explained in Chapter 4,
during the 1975Q1-2005Q2 period, BNM conducts direct intervention in the exchange
also be reverse (decrease instead of increase and vice-versa) to those presented below.
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rate market from time to time to smooth the exchange rate movement. However, we
advocate, such countermeasure action will only create more distortion in the system and
it will deter smooth adjustment to take place in the economy. Consequently, building
up of disequilibrium in the economy requires a much bigger adjustment from the policy-
makers and this will lead to much bigger changes in the interest rates level later on.
Obviously, if this happens, it works against BNM's initial intention to minimize interest
rate volatility by raising its policy preference to smooth interest rates.
Now, we look at the outcomes when BNM increases its relative preference for output
stabilization (↑ λ1). The results indicate an increase in BNM's preference for output
stabilization will not cause much harm to the overall stability of the Malaysian econ-
omy for the 1975Q1-2005Q2 period. From comparing the results between column 6a
and 3a, raising BNM's preference for output stabilization while holding λ3 unchanged,
produces favourable results in reducing volatility for inﬂation and RER. It also makes
output more stable as intended. In fact, compared to other policy scenarios that we
consider in Table 7.1(i), Scenario 6a produces the lowest volatility for inﬂation, RER
and output. However, this action requires a more active use of interest rates to ﬁne
tune the economy and this leads to higher interest rates volatility (to 0.019 from 0.016
previously). The more active policy action under this condition is reﬂected in the size
of optimized HMT coeﬃcients for scenario 6a (see Table 7.1(ii)). Compared to the out-
comes in column 3a, size for optimized parameter measuring the interest rate smoothing
(ρ) is lower in column 6a, suggesting under this condition, the interest rate needs to
be changed in a bigger magnitude and/or more frequently than before. Similarly, value
for the optimized feedback coeﬃcients βpi and Θy are much larger in column 6a than in
column 3a.
7.2.4 Policy Simulation III: Multiple policy objectives with
exchange rate smoothing
This sub-section discusses the outcome when BNM puts exchange rate smoothing as
one of its policy objectives (λ2 = 0.2, refer to Table 7.2). Even though from results in
Chapter 4 we cannot ﬁnd concrete empirical evidence to suggest exchange rate smooth-
ing is one of the policy objectives that BNM pursued during the 1975Q1-2005Q2 period,
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here we try to simulate the impact to the economic outcomes if BNM put it into prac-
tice. For this purpose, we introduce three additional scenarios - Scenarios 2b, 3b and
4b. They produce three interesting results that we discuss below.
First, introducing exchange rate smoothing as an additional policy objective in BNM's
loss function fulﬁlls its purpose in stabilizing the real exchange rate movement. From
comparing the results between column 1b vs. 2b and 6a vs. 4b of Table 7.1(i) and
7.2(i), the standard deviation for RER is much lower for the cases when λ2 = 0.2 than
the outcomes when λ2 = 0. Consistent with Svensson's suggestion that strict inﬂation
targeting will cause excessive exchange rate movement, the biggest decline in the RER
volatility is shown when BNM moves way from the strict inﬂation targeting (column
1b vs. 2b). In that case, moving to the dual monetary policy objectives - stabilizing
inﬂation and smoothing the real exchange rate - reduces the standard deviation for RER
by almost 15% (from 0.105 to 0.090). To further support Svensson's suggestion, we ﬁnd
the magnitude of reduction in the RER volatility declines when the initial BNM's policy
preference is not strict inﬂation targeting. Comparing the outcome between columns
6a and 4b, introducing RER smoothing as an additional objective when λ1 , λ3 > 0 ,
only reduces RER volatility by about 3% (from 0.094 to 0.091 ).
Second, there is a trade oﬀ between the exchange rate and the interest rate
stability. While introducing exchange rate smoothing as an additional policy prefer-
ence is successful to stabilize the exchange rate, it leads to a more volatile interest rate.
From comparing results between columns 1b and 2b, interest rate volatility increases
by almost 40% to 0.021 (from 0.015 in 1b) in the latter. This situation is not unique
only to the situation when BNM moves away from being a strict inﬂation targeter in
favour for dual policy targets (inﬂation and exchange rate). Similar eﬀects can also be
seen from comparing the results between column 6a vs. 4b, a situation when BNM has
multiple objectives as its initial policy preference (i.e. λ1 , λ3 > 0).
Lastly, what happens when BNM tries to mitigate the trade oﬀ between interest and
exchange rate volatility by setting a positive value for parameter λ3? The outcome
from this policy preference can be seen in the results of column 3b. Compared to the
outcome in column 2b, the policy preference like Scenario 3b only solves half of the
problem. While interest rates become more stable (to 0.017 from 0.021) when BNM
increases its preference to smooth interest rates, the action causes a higher volatility
in the RER (to 0.096 from 0.090). This indicates BNM cannot have the best of both
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worlds. Putting interest rate smoothing together with exchange rate smoothing as joint
policy objectives does not work as well as if only each objective is introduced one at a
time.
There are two interrelated explanations to the above ﬁndings.
The ﬁrst explanation is related to the point we mentioned earlier - about the role
of RER as an automatic stabilizer in the economy. This can be easily explained by
looking at the UIP condition that governed the RER movement in our model (UIP
condition: rert+1 − rert = (rt − Etpit+1) −
(
r∗t − Etpi∗t+1
)
+ ψBzt + A
UIP
t ). Suppose
there is an increase in the expected inﬂation (↑ Etpit+1). Without a policy objective
to smooth the exchange rate (λ2 = 0), holding other factors constant, an increase in
expected inﬂation will cause the real exchange rate to appreciate (↓ rert+1). This puts
downward pressure on inﬂation and as such, the central bank does not need to raise
interest rates as much to bring the economy back into equilibrium. In contrast, with
a policy objective to smooth the exchange rate (λ2 = 0.2), the real exchange rate is
not allowed to appreciate as much and this reduces the contractionary eﬀect from the
exchange rate channel to bring down inﬂation. Thus, to bring out the same adjustment
eﬀect to stabilize inﬂation, the central bank needs to raise interest rates with a bigger
magnitude. This leads to increased interest rate volatility.
Second, attempts to smooth the real exchange rate requires BNM to respond to many
factors. Note that, besides domestic interest rates and expected inﬂation, other varia-
bles in the UIP condition like foreign interest rates, foreign inﬂation and net foreign
assets can move the real exchange rate too. Since it tries to smooth RER movement,
BNM needs to respond to counter these destabilizing eﬀects, by changing interest rates.
Thus, interest rates must be used more frequently and aggressively. As a result, it
becomes more volatile. The active use of interest rates as the tool to smooth exchange
rate movement is reﬂected in the size of optimized HMT coeﬃcients (see part (ii) of
both tables). In all cases when λ2 > 0, size for parameter ρ is very small. It indicates
that with the policy objective to smooth exchange rate movement, BNM needs to
change interest rates more aggressively. Similarly, the same case applies to the feedback
coeﬃcients βpi and Θy. Trying to smooth RER movement requires BNM to respond
more forcefully to inﬂation and output gap.
Given the above outcomes, should BNM have put exchange rate smoothing as one of its
policy objectives during the 1975Q1-2005Q2 period? We view there is not much beneﬁt
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to this choice of policy preference. Comparing the results between column 6a and 4b
indicates putting λ2 = 0.2 in the latter only produces marginal improvement to the
RER and output stability. This improvement comes at the expense of higher interest
rates and inﬂation volatility. Most importantly, value of loss function for Scenario 6a
is smaller than what is produced in Scenario 4b. Thus, it is fairly obvious which of
these two sets of policy preferences should have been favoured by BNM during the
1975Q1-2005Q2 period.
7.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, we replay history by conducting simulation exercises to answer this
question - what would have happened to Malaysia's economic outcomes during the
1975Q1-2005Q2 period if BNM was to change its policy preferences in conducting
monetary policy? We conduct this policy experiment by varying the parameters of
BNM's loss function. Then, by assuming monetary policy is conducted through the
optimized interest rate rule, the estimated DSGE model for the 1975Q1-2005Q2 period
is used as a workhorse to provide the likely outcomes of this diﬀerent policy behaviour.
All in all, these simulation results have given us a good idea on how Malaysia's economic
outcomes during the 1975Q1-2005Q2 would have changed if BNM behaved diﬀerently
during that period.
The simulation exercises produce several interesting outcomes. On the policy action,
there are diﬀerences between the estimated and optimized reaction function. In all
cases, in order to produce better economic outcomes, the optimized HMT rule recom-
mends that BNM respond more strongly to inﬂation and less strongly to output gap
than what has been practiced in the past. The optimized rule also suggests a lower
degree of interest rate smoothing. In relation to policy preferences, the results suggest
that strict inﬂation targeting is not a good policy option to be practiced in Malaysia.
Except for inﬂation, strict inﬂation targeting produces high volatility in other macro-
economic variables. Thus, policy preferences with multiple objectives turns out to
be a better option to BNM. In doing so, we suggest BNM should always place the
inﬂation objective ahead of other policy objectives that it wants to pursue. It will
produce better economic outcomes than the choice of policy preference that we
estimated BNM practiced in the past.
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We also analyze the possible impact to the economic outcomes if BNM changed its
relative policy preferences. When BNM raises its policy preference parameter to smooth
interest rates in order to stabilize the Malaysian ﬁnancial system, such action will
not give much detrimental impact to the overall stability of the Malaysian economy.
However, the consequence to this policy change is the rise in the volatility of the real
exchange rate. On this development, we suggest BNM should not take countermeasure
action by intervening directly in the exchange rate market. BNM should allow the
change in the real exchange rate to gravitate smooth adjustment to take place in
the economy. Similarly, an increase in BNM's preference for output stabilization pro-
duces favourable economic outcomes. However, in order to accommodate this policy
preference, BNM must be willing to move interest rates more aggressively.
Lastly, we conducted a simulation exercise to represent the situation if BNM puts
exchange rate smoothing as one of its policy objectives. We ﬁnd, when exchange rate
smoothing is introduced as the additional policy objectives, it diminishes BNM's ability
to minimize interest rates volatility.
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7.4 Appendix
Table 7.3: Summary of Log-linearized System of Equations
Demand Side
Aggregate Demand: yH,t = CY H (1− γ) ct +
I
Y H
(1− γ) invt + γy∗t + ηγ
(
2−γ
(1−γ)
)
rert − ηγ1−γ lopgt
Consumption: ct −Υct−1 = Et (ct+1 −Υct)− (1−Υ) (rt − Etpit+1)
Investment: rK,t + qt−1 =
(
1− (1−δ)
RK
)
rG,t +
(1−δ)
RK
qt
qt = ψI (invt − kt)
EtrK,t+1 = rt − Etpit+1 − χ (nt+1 − qt − kt+1)
Supply Side
Labour supply: lH,t = 1Ψ
[
wH,t − 11−Υ (ct −Υct−1)
]
CPI inﬂation: pit = 11+βκ
[
βEt {pit+1}+ κpit−1 + (1− γ) ΛHmcH,t + γΛF lopt
]
with ΛH = (1−βθH)(1−θH)θH and Λ
F = (1−βθF )(1−θF )θF
Production function: yH,t = αkt + (1− α) ΩlH,t +AYt
Cost of factor inputs: rG,t = yH,t +mcH,t − kt −
(
γ
1−γ (rert − lopgt)
)
wH,t = yH,t +mcH,t − lH,t −
(
γ
1−γ (rert − lopgt)
)
wE,t = yH,t +mcH,t −
(
γ
1−γ (rert − lopgt)
)
LOPG: lopgt = ρLOPGlopgt−1 + εLOPGt
Other State Variables
RER : rert+1 − rert = (rt − Etpit+1)−
(
r∗t − Etpi∗t+1
)
+ ψBzt +AUIPt
Capital accumulation: kt+1 = δinvt + (1− δ)kt
Net-worth: nt+1 = (Γ5 + 1) WEK wE,t (with Γ5 =
K
N
− 1)
+ςRK {(Γ5 + 1) rK,t − Γ5 (rt−1 − pit)− χΓ5 (qt−1 + kt) + χ (Γ5 + 1)nt}
Net foreign assets: zt = 1β zt−1 + yH,t − (ct + invt)− γ(1−γ) (rert − γlopgt)
Foreign Block
Output y∗
t
= µy∗y∗t−1 + ε
y∗
t
Interest rates i∗
t
= µi∗i∗t−1 + ε
r∗
t
Net-worth: pi∗
t
= µpi∗pi∗t−1 + ε
pi∗
t
Shocks process
UIP AUIPt = ρUIPA
UIP
t−1 + ε
UIP
t
Productivity AYt = ρYA
Y
t−1 + ε
Y
t
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Table 7.4: Parameter Value used in the Simulation Exercise
Source: Estimation Results for 1975Q1-2005Q2 of Chapter 5
Estimated Parameters
Υ Habit Persistence 0.565 ρLOPG AR(1) : LOP shocks 0.843
Ψ Inv. Elast. Lab. Sply. 0.720 ρY AR(1) : Tech. shocks 0.885
η Elast. Sub. H/F Goods 0.465 σMP S.D. MP shocks 0.012
κ Price Indexation 0.626 σy∗ S.D. Foreign outp. shocks 0.008
θD Calvo pricing - domestic 0.716 σi∗ S.D. Foreign i/r shocks 0.016
θF Calvo pricing - imported 0.738 σpi∗ S.D. Foreign inﬂ. shocks 0.008
µy∗ AR(1) : Foreign output 0.881 σUIP S.D. UIP shocks 0.020
µi∗ AR(1) : Foreign int. rate 0.728 σLOPG S.D. LOP shocks 0.020
µpi∗ AR(1) : Foreign inﬂation 0.904 σY S.D. tech. shocks 0.013
ρUIP AR(1) : UIP shocks 0.751 χ Fin. Accelerator 0.032
Fixed Parameters
β Discount parameter 0.985
α Cap share in prod. 0.35
δ Depreciation rate 0.025
ψI Capital adjustment cost 0.5
ψB Elast. risk premium 0.01
ς Prob. entrep. surviving 0.972
Ω Prop. entrep. labour 0.99
K
N
Cap Net-worth ratio in SS 3
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
Despite being one of the most inﬂuential and important participants in an overall
economic system, central bank behaviour in arriving at monetary policy decisions is
not yet fully understood by most non-policymakers. Hence, analysis of a central bank's
behaviour in formulating monetary policy is of considerable interest to both academic
researchers and ﬁnancial market participants. The current literature that analyzes
central banks' behaviour in formulating monetary policy is mainly concentrated on the
experience of developed countries. In order to analyze how a central bank in developing
countries executes its monetary policy task, this thesis applied the same analytical
framework and estimation approaches to the case of Malaysia. Faced with a diﬀe-
rent economic structure and perhaps diﬀerent economic objectives, this thesis explored
the applicability of these approaches as a tool to analyze policymakers' behaviour for
a small, open and developing economy like Malaysia. In doing so, certain modiﬁca-
tions on the current analytical framework have been made. Besides using the open
economy set-up to represent the Malaysian economy, the thesis also explored the role
of exchange rates in the overall conduct of monetary policy in Malaysia. It also
investigated how Bank Negara Malaysia's (BNM) behaviour changed over time in line
with the change in Malaysia's economic landscape. For this, besides using the full
sample period of 1975Q1-2005Q2, estimation exercises using the sub-sample periods
were also attempted.
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This Conclusion Chapter is divided into two short sections. We start with discussions
on information that we have gathered from the empirical exercises conducted in the
previous chapters. The second section then suggests the main areas that could be
suitable for a further research.
8.1 What Have We Learned?
8.1.1 Understanding BNM's Policy Behaviour
Empirical exercises in this thesis established a few important features which assist us
to understand better BNM's behaviour in formulating monetary policy. Among them
are:
1. BNM's reaction function and systematic components of interest rate
movement
Results in Chapter 3, 5 and 6 indicate modelling BNM's reaction function
using a simple Henderson-McKibbin-Taylor (HMT) type interest rate rule tracks
the interest rate movement in Malaysia generally well. This suggests the two
macroeconomic variables that form the HMT interest rate rule - inﬂation and
output gap - are the two main variables that inﬂuence the general interest rate
movement in Malaysia. In addition, we also ﬁnd BNM practices interest rate
smoothing. Thus, the level of the interest rate for the last period plays a role
too in inﬂuencing BNM's interest rate decision. We also fail to ﬁnd any empi-
rical evidence to relate BNM's reaction function and the movement of exchange
rates. In terms of model speciﬁcations, estimated HMT interest rate rule with a
backward looking speciﬁcation performs poorly in tracking Malaysia's historical
interest rate. HMT rule with contemporaneous and forward-looking speciﬁcation
gives a better ﬁt. This provides empirical evidence that BNM has always adopted
a forward-looking approach in its policy making.
However, we ﬁnd one important caveat about analyzing BNM's policy behaviour
based on its estimated reaction function. Results of the estimated BNM's
reaction function are inﬂuenced by the way the HMT interest rate rule is
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estimated. Results, when the HMT rule is estimated as a single equation (as
in Chapter 3), are fairly diﬀerent to the results when the same rule is estimated
in the system of equations (as in Chapter 5 and 6). This diﬀerence in the estima-
tion results between the two estimation methods becomes more apparent for the
sub-sample periods. In some cases, the results contradict each other. Hence, this
outcome should be used as admonition about the use of an estimated reaction
function as a tool to analyze a central bank's monetary policy behaviour. Having
said that, we also acknowledged that both estimation methods have their own
strengths and weaknesses. Thus, ﬁnding the absolute answer on which of the
estimation methods produce a better outcome is not easy. As such, instead of
trying to argue and select which method is better in generating the estimates
of BNM's reaction function, we take the view that the results of both methods
should not be looked at in isolation. Both results should be used to complement
each other as a tool to analyze BNM's behaviour in formulation of monetary
policy in Malaysia.
2. Objectives of monetary policy
Results in Chapter 4 indicate, based on its past policy action, BNM formulates
monetary policy in order to fulﬁll three objectives - to achieve price stability, to
stabilize output and to smooth the interest rate. This shows BNM does not adopt
a strict inﬂation targeting framework. As results in Chapter 7 suggest, the strict
inﬂation targeting is not a good policy option to be practiced in Malaysia. Except
for inﬂation, strict inﬂation targeting produces high volatility to other macroe-
conomic variables. Thus, policy preferences with multiple objectives which has
been practiced by BNM turns out to be a better option for the Malaysian economy.
3. BNM's relative preferences between multiple objectives
Results in Chapter 4 also reveal important information about the way BNM bal-
ances the trade-oﬀ between price stability and output growth. BNM puts greater
weight on attaining output stability ahead of stabilizing inﬂation. This ﬁnding
reaﬃrms the proposition made by Tang (2006) that the objective of monetary
policy in Malaysia is the attainment of sustainable economic growth with price
stability.
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In Chapter 7, we also analyze the possible impact on the economic outcomes if
BNM were to change its relative policy preferences. When BNM raises its policy
preference parameter to smooth interest rates in order to stabilize the Malaysian
ﬁnancial system, such action will not give much detrimental impact to the ove-
rall stability of the Malaysian economy. However, consequence to this policy
change is the rise in the volatility of the real exchange rate. On this outcome, we
suggest BNM should not take countermeasure action by intervening directly in
the exchange rate market. BNM should allow the change in the real exchange rate
to facilitate smooth adjustment to take place in the economy. Similarly, increase
in the BNM's preference for output stabilization produces favourable economic
outcomes. However, in order to accommodate this policy preference, BNM must
be willing to move interest rates more aggressively.
4. Role of the exchange rate in the conduct of monetary policy
Based on its past policy action, BNM is known to give much attention to the
stability of exchange rate movement. There is lots of confusion among the non-
policymakers about the role of the exchange rate to BNM. Is it a policy objective
that BNM wanted to pursue or just another policy variable that BNM responded
to? In this regard, in Chapter 4, we do not ﬁnd concrete empirical evidence to
indicate exchange rate stabilization is one of BNM's policy objectives. So, what
is actually the role of exchange rate stabilization to BNM? We propose another
role for exchange rate smoothing in the conduct of monetary policy in Malaysia.
BNM uses the stable real exchange rate environment as a means to achieve its
other policy objectives.
In Chapter 7, we conducted a simulation exercise to represent the situation if
BNM puts exchange rate smoothing as one of its policy objectives. We ﬁnd,
when exchange rate smoothing is introduced as the additional policy objectives,
it diminishes BNM's ability to minimize interest rate volatility. Results of the
simulation exercises also suggest this additional policy objective only produces
marginal improvement to RER and output stability. This marginal improvement
also comes at the expense of higher interest rates and inﬂation volatility. Thus,
we view there is not much beneﬁt to this choice of policy preference.
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5. BNM's policy behaviour evolves over time
As well as using the full sample covering the 1975-2005 period, estimation exer-
cises in this thesis were also conducted with three sub-sample periods - 1975Q1-
1986Q4, 1987Q1-1998Q2 and 1998Q3-2005Q2. In most cases, estimation results
of BNM's reaction function using sub-sample periods are fairly diﬀerent to each
other. Hence, this is empirical evidence to suggest BNM's decision rules and
policy action was evolving over time.
By employing the standard approach used in the literature to model central banks
behaviour, Chapter 4 models BNM's policy behaviour as the solution to the opti-
mal control problem. The results indicate that this standard approach represents
BNM's policy behaviour reasonably well. However, this representation is limited
to the sample that excludes the September 1998-July 2005 period. During the
period when the capital control and the ﬁxed exchange rate regime was in place,
this standard approach fails to generate any results. This suggests during the
implementation of this controversial policy measure, BNM's behaviour in formu-
lating monetary policy was "abnormal" and different to other periods that we
considered.
Results using diﬀerent sample periods other than 1998Q3-2005Q2 suggest para-
meters of BNM's loss function are also dependent on the choice of sample periods.
The change in BNM's relative preferences over the period could be attributed to
the change in its policy emphasis, in line with the evolution of the Malaysian
economy. The results also show that BNM's relative preference to smooth output
increases in the later period, suggesting BNM's desire to contain the economic
overheating problem experienced during the ﬁrst half of 1990s. In addition, the
improvement in the overall monetary transmission mechanism as well as with the
more resilient banking system during the post-1986 period, explains the marked
decline in BNM's relative preference to smooth interest rates. Besides changing
its relative preferences over diﬀerent policy objectives, the results also suggest
BNM has a lower implicit inﬂation target during the later period.
6. Policy evaluation
In general, the sound conduct of monetary policy requires that central banks
always be aggressive in ﬁghting inﬂation. Not only will such action put inﬂation
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at bay, but also it beneﬁts the aggregate stability of the economy in the form of
lower output variability. In BNM's case, we demonstrated the importance of this
proposition in three ways:
• The importance of BNM to set interests rate according to the Taylor's
principle was reported in the estimation results of Chapter 3. Estimate
for parameter βpi (the feedback coeﬃcient for inﬂation), during the period
of 1975-1986 is small and is not statistically signiﬁcant. BNM's failure to
comply with the Taylor's principle during this period caused inﬂation to be
much higher and volatile than what was experienced during the later period.
Inﬂation during 1975-1986 remained high for an extended period and peaked
at 10.5% in Q2 1984 (refer to table and graph in Figure 3.2 of Chapter 3 for
details).
• On the policy action, results in Chapter 7 indicate there are diﬀerences
between the estimated and optimized reaction function. In all cases, in order
to produce better economic outcomes, the optimized HMT rule recommends
BNM to respond more strongly to inﬂation and less strongly to output gap
than what has been practiced in the past. The optimized rule also suggests
a lower degree of interest rate smoothing.
• In term of policy preferences, we also ﬁnd the ordering of price stability
objective in BNM's preference has an important role in inﬂuencing the ove-
rall economic outcomes in Malaysia. In particular, overall economic condi-
tion generally becomes more stable when BNM ranks inﬂation ahead of other
policy variables.
To sum up, the main objective of this thesis is to increase our general understanding of
BNM's behaviour in formulating and conducting monetary policy in Malaysia.
To some extent, as we listed above, we think this objective has been achieved. Hopefully,
the better understanding of BNM's policy behaviour, which we bring out in this thesis,
will provide a helpful guide to the non-policymakers to better comprehend, rationalize
and predict BNM's policy action in the future.
218
8.1.2 Estimated DSGE Model for the Malaysian Economy
A by-product of our main motivations to better understand BNM's policy behaviour,
is the outcome of an estimated DSGE model for the Malaysian economy. In Chapter 5
and 6, using a Bayesian methodology, we estimate a DSGE model for a small open
economy with a ﬁnancial accelerator for the 1975Q1-2005Q2 period and three sub-
sample periods. We ﬁnd estimates of the structural parameters for the Malaysian
economy to be plausible and generally comparable to the values reported in the DSGE
literature.
To investigate the stability of the structural parameters over time, the DSGE model in
Chapter 6 is also estimated using the sub-sample periods. Comparing the estimation
results across the three sub-sample periods, there is no evident sign to suggest estimates
of structural parameters for the Malaysian economy change over time. While parameter
estimates for HMT interest rate rule exhibit some changes and suggest the evolution of
BNM's policy behaviour over time, estimates of structural parameters like household's
preferences and Calvo pricing are found to be largely intact. Having said that, we
also oﬀer a caveat to this ﬁnding. Compared to the estimation results for the full
sample period, estimates of structural parameters using the sub-sample periods are less
accurate. Hence, analysis using the estimated DSGE model involving the sub-sample
periods should be taken with care.
We also highlight another weakness on the estimation results of the structural
parameters. Some of the estimated parameters are detected to suﬀer from identiﬁca-
tion problems. While we do not try to oﬀer any solution to the identiﬁcation problems
that we found in our estimated DSGE model, we regard the results of this investigation
beneﬁcial in other ways. They reveal which of the estimated structural parameters from
our model are less susceptible to the identiﬁcation problems and hence can be used with
greater conﬁdence.
8.2 Limitations and Area for Further Research
Undoubtedly, this thesis contains several limitations and weaknesses. In this last
section, we highlight some of them and provide suggestions for possible improvement
in the future.
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One of the main weaknesses that we think this thesis has is the assumption of linearity
that we imposed in the overall model set-up. One area involving non-linearity is on
speciﬁcation of a central bank's loss function and decision rule. For example, Nobay and
Peel (2003) and Ruge-Murcia (2002, 2004), among others, challenge the assumption of a
linear-quadratic loss function. Other studies also ﬁnd empirical support for the presence
of non-linearity in central bank interest rate reaction functions. This include Kim,
Osborn, and Sensier (2004), Bec, Salem, and Collard (2002) and Dolado, Maria-Dolores,
and Ruge-Murcia (2004). This approach could be useful to represent BNM's monetary
policy behaviour during 1998Q3-2005Q2, the period when the capital control and ﬁxed
exchange rate regime was imposed. For example, instead of using a dummy variables
approach as we did in Chapter 3, the use of a non-linear reaction function approach
to represent BNM's decision rule during this period can be attempted. Similarly, to
get a clearer picture about BNM's policy objectives and relative preferences during the
1998Q3-2005Q2 period, the use of a non-linear loss function as suggested by Nobay and
Peel (2003) can be included in the model set-up of Chapter 4.
In a much broader scope, simplicity of linearity to represent development of a
developing economy like Malaysia has a few limitations. For example, Lim and McNelis
(2008) state that the use of the ﬁrst-order perturbation methods such as the standard
log-linearization approach of the Euler equations in the DSGE model, by construction,
approximates the solution around the deterministic steady state and it is only valid
within a speciﬁc (local) radius of convergence. Hence, this method assumes the shocks
must be small. For a developing country like Malaysia, which experienced continuous
expansion and major economic transformation over the relatively short period, the use
of this method may not be very suitable. The assumption of a developing economy
reaching a deterministic steady state is too simplistic. Furthermore, many of the
shocks or policy changes facing policymakers in the developing economies hardly repre-
sent small or local departures or movement around a steady state (McNelis (2001)).
Thus, McNelis argues the use of a non-linear model may be more applicable to the case
of a developing country. Perhaps, this can be attempted in the future.
Another interesting area that can be looked at is the issue regarding stability of struc-
tural parameters over time. This could be an important issue for policymakers in
developing economies, which experience rapid economic transformation. Thus, it is
likely that the deep parameters could also change in line with the change in the
economic structure. While our results in Chapter 5 do not ﬁnd any evidence to
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suggest this has happened in the case of Malaysia, we acknowledged the fact that the
method we used to establish this conclusion is quite simple. We estimate the DSGE
model with sub-sample periods which involve shorter sample points. Due to this factor,
Bayesian estimates using the sub-sample periods were generated with less accuracy and
this creates some doubt on our suggestion that the estimates of deep parameters for
the Malaysian economy were constant. Thus, to verify our ﬁnding, the approach used
in Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2007), which involves the introduction of
a dedicated parameter drifting mechanism, should be attempted.
Despite all of these caveats, this thesis has presented a range of results that could be
helpful to the non-policymakers to get a general understanding about the behaviour of
Bank Negara Malaysia in formulating monetary policy for the past 30 years. Perhaps,
with the extension that we suggested above, the current understanding that we have
about this topic could be further enhanced in future research.
221
222
Bibliography
Abeysinghe, T., and C. Lee (1998): Best Linear Unbiased Disagregation of Annual
GDP to Quarterly Figures: The case of Malaysia, Journal of Forecasting, 17.
Adolfson, M. (2007): Comment on Erceg, Gust and Lopéz-Salido's "The Transmis-
sion of Domestic Shocks in Open Economies", in Forthcoming NBER Book: Inter-
national Dimensions of Monetary Policy, ed. by J. Gali, and M. J. Gertler. University
of Chicago Press.
Adolfson, M., S. Laseen, and J. Lindé (2008): Evaluating an Estimated New
Keynesian Small Open Economy Model, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Con-
trol, 32 (8), 26902721.
Adolfson, M., S. Laséen, and M. Villani (2007): Bayesian Estimation of an
Open Economy DSGE Model with Incomplete Pass-Through, Journal of Interma-
tional Economics, 72, 481511.
(2008): Empirical Properties of Closed and Open Economy DSGE Models of
the Euro Area, Macroeconomic Dynamics, 12 (S1), 219.
An, S., and F. Schorfheide (2007): Bayesian Analysis of DSGE Models, Econo-
metric Reviews, 26(2-4), 113172.
Ang, J. B. (2008): Financial Development and Economic Growth in Malaysia. Rout-
ledge.
Assenmacher-Wesche, K. (2006): Estimating Central Banks' Preferences from
a Time-Varying Empirical Reaction Function, European Economic Review, 50(8),
1951.
Athukorala, P. (1998): Trade Policy Issues in Asian Development. Routledge.
223
(2001): Crisis and Recovery in Malaysia: The Role of Capital Controls. Ed-
ward Elgar.
Athukorala, P., and J. Menon (1999): Outward Orientation and Economic De-
velopment in Malaysia, The World Economy, 22(8), 11191139.
Baillie, R. T., andW. P. Osterberg (1997): Why Do Central Banks Intervene?,
Journal of International Money and Finance, 16(6), 909.
Ball, L. (1999): Policy Rules for Open Economies, in Monetary Policy Rules, ed.
by J. B. Taylor. University of Chicago Press.
Bank for International Settlement (1999): Monetary Policy Operating Pro-
cedures in Emerging Market Economies, BIS Policy Paper, 5.
(2004): Foreign Exchange Market Intervention in Emerging Markets: Mo-
tives, Techniques and Implications, vol. 24. Bank of International Settlement.
http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap24.htm.
Bank Negara Malaysia (1991): Annual Report 1991. Bank Negara Malaysia.
(1994a): Annual Report 1994. Bank Negara Malaysia.
(1994b): Money and Banking in Malaysia, 35th Anniversary Edition, 1959-
1994. Bank Negara Malaysia.
(1996): Annual Report 1996. Bank Negara Malaysia.
(1999): The Central Bank and the Financial System in Malaysia - A Decade
of Change 1989-1999, 40th Anniversary Edition, 1959-1999. Bank Negara Malaysia.
(2001): Annual Report 2001. Bank Negara Malaysia.
Barro, R. J., and D. B. Gordon (1983): Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a
Model of Monetary Policy, Journal of Monetary Economics, 12(1), 101121.
Batini, N., R. Harrison, and S. P. Millard (2001): Monetary Policy Rules for
an Open Economy, Bank of England's Working Paper Series, WP149.
Bec, F., M. B. Salem, and F. Collard (2002): Asymmetries in Monetary Policy
Reaction Function: Evidence for the US, French and German Central Banks, Studies
in Nonlinear Dynamics and Econometrics, 6 (2).
224
Bernanke, B. (2003): "Constrained Discretion" and Monetary Policy, Speech at
Money Marketeers of New York University, New York on 3 February 2003.
Bernanke, B., and I. Mihov (1998): Measuring Monetary Policy, Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics, CXIII(August 1998), 869902.
Bernanke, B. S., and A. S. Blinder (1992): The Federal Funds Rate and the
Channels of Monetary Transmission, The American Economic Review, 82(4), 901
921.
Bernanke, B. S., M. Gertler, and S. Gilchrist (1999): The Financial Acceler-
ator in a Quantitative Business Cycle Framework, in Handbook of Macroeconomics,
ed. by J. B. Taylor, and M. Woodford, vol. 1, pp. 13411393. Elsevier.
Bernanke, B. S., and F. S. Mishkin (1997): Inﬂation Targeting: A New Framework
for Monetary Policy?, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(2, Spring), 97116.
Beyer, A., and R. E. A. Farmer (2004): On the Indeterminacy of New-Keynesian
Economics, ECB Working Paper Series, 323.
Blanchard, O., and C. Kahn (1980): The Solution of Linear Diﬀerences Models
under Rational Expectations, Econometrica, 48(5), 13051311.
Blinder, A. (1998): Central Banking in Theory and Practice. MIT Press.
Borio, C. (1997): The Implementation of Monetary Policy in Industrial Countries:
A Survey, BIS Economic Papers, 47.
Boschen, J., and L. Mills (1991): The Eﬀects of Countercyclical Monetary Policy
on Money and Interest Rates: An Evaluation of Evidence from FOMC documents,
Working Paper Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 91-20(October).
Brainard, W. (1967): Uncertainty and the Eﬀectiveness of Policy, American Eco-
nomic Review, 57(2), 411425.
Calvo, G. (1983): Staggered Prices in a Utility-Maximizing Framework, Journal of
Monetary Economics, 12(3), 983998.
Calzolari, G., and L. Panattoni (1988): Alternative Estimators of FIML Covari-
ance Matrix: A Monte Carlo Study, Econometrica, 56(3), 701.
225
Campa, J. M., and L. S. Goldberg (2006): Pass Through of Exchange Rates to
Consumption Prices: What has Changed and Why?, National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper Series, No. 12547.
Canova, F. (2007): Methods for Applied Macroeconomic Research. Princeton Univer-
sity Press.
Canova, F., and L. Sala (2006): Back to Square One: Identiﬁcation Issues in DSGE
Models, ECB Working Paper Series, 583.
Carlstrom, C., and T. S. Fuerst (1997): Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business
Fluctuations: A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis, American Economic
Review, 87(5), 893910.
Castillo, P., C. Montoro, and V. Tuesta (2006): An Estimated Stochastic Gen-
eral Equilibrium Model with Partial Dollarization: A Bayesian Approach, Central
Bank of Chile Working Papers, 381.
Cecchetti, S. (2000): Making Monetary Policy: Objectives and Rules, Oxford
Review Economic Policy, 16(4), 4359.
Christensen, I., and A. Dib (2008): The Financial Accelerator in an Estimated
New Keynesian Model, Review of Economic Dynamics, 11 (1), 155178.
Christiano, L., M. Eichenbaum, and C. Evans (1996): The Eﬀects of Mone-
tary Policy Shocks: Evidence from the Flow of Funds, Review of Economics and
Statistics, 78(1), 1634.
Christiano, L. J., and M. Eichenbaum (1992): Current Real-Business-Cycle The-
ories and Aggregate Labor-Market Fluctuations, The American Economic Review,
82(3), 430450.
Christiano, L. J., M. Eichenbaum, and C. L. Evans (2005): Nominal Rigidities
and the Dynamic Eﬀects of a Shock to Monetary Policy, The Journal of Political
Economy, 113(1), 145.
Clarida, R., J. Gali, and M. Gertler (1998): Monetary Policy Rules in Practice:
Some International Evidence, European Economic Review, 42(6), 10331067.
226
(1999): The Science of Monetary policy: A New Keynesian Perspective,
Journal of Economic Literature, 37(4), 1661.
(2000): Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability: Evidences and
Some Theory, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(1), 147180.
(2001): Optimal Monetary Policy in Open versus Closed Economies: An
Integrated Approach, American Economic Review, 91(2), 248252.
Collins, S., and P. Siklos (2004): Optimal Monetary Policy Rules and Inﬂation
Targets: Are Australia, Canada, and New Zealand Diﬀerent from the U.S.?, Open
Economies Review, 15, 347362.
Corden, M. (2002): Pragmatic Orthodoxy: Macroeconomic Policies in Seven East
Asian Economies, in The Economic Development of Southeast Asia, ed. by H. Hill.
Edward Elgar.
Craig, B., and O. Humpage (2001): Sterilized Intervention, Nonsterilized Inter-
vention, and Monetary Policy, Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.,
01-10.
Cukierman, A. (1992): Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory
and Evidence. MIT Press.
Dave, C., and D. N. DeJong (2007): Structural Macroeconometrics. Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
de Brouwer, G., and J. Gilbert (2005): Monetary Policy Reaction Functions in
Australia, Economic Record, 81(235), 124134.
DeJong, D. N., B. F. Ingram, and C. H. Whiteman (2000): A Bayesian Approach
to Dynamic Macroeconomics, Journal of Econometrics, 98, 203223.
Del Negro, M., F. Schorfheide, F. Smets, and R. Wouters (2007): On the Fit
of New Keynesian Models, Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 25, 123162.
Dennis, R. (2002): Inferring Policy Objectives from Policy Actions, Federal Reserve
Bank of San Franscisco Economic Letter, (2002-10).
(2004): Inferring Policy Objectives From Economic Outcomes, Oxford Bul-
letin of Economics and Statistics, 66, 735764.
227
(2006): The Policy Preferences of the US Federal Reserve, Journal of Applied
Econometrics, 21(1), 5577.
Dennis, R., and U. Soderstrom (2006): How Important is precommitment for
monetary policy?, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 38(4), 847872.
Devereux, M. B., P. R. Lane, and J. Xu (2006): Exchange Rates and Monetary
Policy in Emerging Market Economies, The Economic Journal, 116(511), 478506.
Dolado, J. J., R. Maria-Dolores, and F. J. Ruge-Murcia (2004): Nonlinear
Monetary Policy Rules: Some New Evidence for the U.S., Studies in Nonlinear
Dynamics & Econometrics, 8(3), Article 2.
Dornbusch, R. (2001): Malaysia: Was it Diﬀerent?, NBER Working Paper Series,
8325.
Ehrmann, M., and F. Smets (2003): Uncertain potential output: implications for
monetary policy, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 27(9), 1611638.
Estrella, A., and J. Fuhrer (2002): Dynamic Inconsistencies: Counterfactual Im-
plications of a Class or Rational Expectations Models, American Economic Review.
Favero, C. A., and R. Rovelli (2003): Macroeconomic Stability and the Pref-
erences of the Fed: A Formal Analysis, 1961-98, Journal of Money, Credit, and
Banking, 35(4), 545556.
Fernandez-Villaverde, J., and J. F. Rubio-Ramirez (2004): Comparing Dy-
namic Equilibrium Models to Data: A Bayesian Approach, Journal of Econometrics,
123, 153187.
Fernández-Villaverde, J., and J. F. Rubio-Ramírez (2007): How Structural
Are Structural Parameters?, NBER Working Paper 13166.
Flamini, A. (2007): Inﬂation targeting and exchange rate pass-through, Journal of
International Money and Finance, 26, 11131150.
Friedman, M. (1969): The Optimum Quantity of Money, in The Optimum Quantity
of Money and Other Essays, ed. by M. Friedman. Aldine.
Friedman, M., and A. Schwartz (1963): A Monetary History of the United States,
1867-1960. Princeton University Press.
228
Fry, M. J. (1995): Money, Interest, and Banking in Economic Development. Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Fry, M. J., C. A. Goodhart, and A. Almeida (1996): Central Banking in Devel-
oping Countries. Routledge.
Fukac, M., and A. Pagan (2008): Limited information estimation and evaluation of
DSGE models, Reserve Bank of New Zealand Discussion Paper Series, DP2008/11.
Gali, J., and M. Gertler (1999): Inﬂation dynamics: A Structural Econometric
Analysis, Journal of Monetary Economics, 44(2), 195222.
Gali, J., and T. Monacelli (2005): Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Volatility
in a Small Open Economy, Review of Economic Studies, (72), 707734.
Gerlach, S., and G. Schnabel (2000): The Taylor Rule and Interest Rates in the
EMU area, Economics Letters, 67, 165171.
Gertler, M., S. Gilchrist, and F. Natalucci (2007): External Constraints on
Monetary Policy and The Financial Accelerator, Journal of Money, Credit and Bank-
ing, 39, 295330.
Geweke, J. (1999): Using Simulation Methods for Bayesian Econometric Models,
Computing in Economics and Finance 1999, 832.
Gomez, E. T., and J. K. Sundram (1997): Malaysia's Political Economy: Politics,
Patronage and Proﬁts. Cambridge University Press.
Goodfriend, M. (1991): Interest rates and the Conduct of Monetary Policy,
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, XXXIV, 730.
Goodhart, C. A. (1989): Money, Information and Uncertainty. Macmillian Educa-
tion Ltd., second edn.
(1995): The Central Bank and the Financial System. MIT Press.
(1999): Central Bankers and Uncertainty, Bank of England Quarterly Bul-
letin, February 1999.
Hamilton, J. D. (1994): Time Series Analysis. Princeton University Press.
229
Hansen, L., and T. Sargent (1980): Formulating and Estimating Dynamic Linear
Rational Expectations Model, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2, 746.
Henderson, D. W., and W. J. McKibbin (1993): A Comparison Of Some Basic
Monetary Policy Regimes For Open Economies: Implications Of Diﬀerent Degrees
Of Instrument Adjustment And Wage Persistence, Carnegie-Rochester Conference
Series on Public Policy, 39, 221317.
Ibrahim, M. (2001): Financial Factors and the Empirical Behaviour of Money De-
mand: A Case Study of Malaysia, International Economic Journal, 15(3), 5572.
Ireland, P. (1997): A Small, Structural, Quarterly Model for Monetary Policy Eval-
uation, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 47, 83108.
Ireland, P. N. (2004): A Method for Taking Models to the Data, Journal of Eco-
nomic Dynamics and Control, 28(6), 12051226.
Iskrev, N. (2008): Evaluating the Information Matrix in Linearized DSGE Models,
Economic Letters, 99, 607610.
Ito, T., and K. Sato (2006): Exchange Rate Changes and Inﬂation in Post-Crisis
Asian Economies: VAR Analysis of the Exchange Rate Pass-Through, National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series, No. 12395.
Jeffreys, H. (1961): Theory of Probability, International series of monographs on
physics (Oxford, England). Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Judd, J. P., and G. D. Rudebusch (1998): Taylor's Rule and the Fed: 1970-1997,
Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San-Francisco, 3, 316.
(1999): The Goals of U.S. Monetary Policy, Economic Review, Federal Re-
serve Bank of San-Francisco, 99-04.
Jurgensen, P. (1983): Report of the Working Group on Exchange Market Interven-
tion, Discussion paper, US Treasury Department, Washington DC.
Justiniano, A., and B. Preston (2006): Monetary Policy and Uncertainty in an
Empirical Small Open Economy Model, mimeo Department of Economics, Columbia
University.
230
Kam, T., K. Lees, and P. Liu (Forthcoming): Uncovering the Hit List of Small
Inﬂation Targeters: A Bayesian Structural Analysis., Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking.
Kaplan, E., and D. Rodrik (2001): Did the Malaysian Capital Controls Work?,
NBER Working paper Series, 8142.
Kass, R., and A. Raftery (1995): Bayes factors, Journal of the American Statis-
tical Association, 90, 773796.
Kim, D. H., D. R. Osborn, and M. Sensier (2004): Nonlinearity in the Fed's
Monetary Policy Rule, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 20 (5), 621639.
Kim, J. (2000): Constructing and Estimating a Realistic Optimizing Model of Mone-
tary Policy, Journal of Monetary Economics, 45, 329359.
Kim, S.-J., and J. Sheen (2002): The Determinants of Foreign Exchange Intervention
by Central Banks: Evidence from Australia, Journal of International Money and
Finance, 21(5), 619.
King, M. A. (1997): Changes in UK Monetary Policy: Rules and Discretion in Prac-
tice, Journal of Monetary Economics, 39, 8197.
King, R., and M. Watson (1996): Money, Prices, Interest Rates and the Business
Cycle, Review of Economics and Statistics, 78(1), 3553.
Kiyotaki, N., and J. Moore (1997): Credit Cycles, Journal of Political Economy,
105 (2), 211248.
Klein, P. (2000): Using the Generalized Schur form to Solve a Multivariate Lin-
ear Rational Expectations Model, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 24,
14051423.
Kozicki, S. (1999): How Useful are Taylor Rules for Monetary Policy?, Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review, 2nd Quarter 1999.
Kydland, F. E., and E. C. Prescott (1977): Rules Rather than Discretion: The
Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, Journal of Political Economy, 85, 473491.
(1982): Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations, Econometrica, 50(6),
13451370.
231
(1996): The Computational Experiment: An Econometric Tool, The Journal
of Economic Perspectives, 10(1), 6985.
Laidler, D. E. (1993): The Demand For Money: Theories, Evidence and Problem.
HarperCollins College Publishers, 4th edn.
Leeper, E. M., and C. Sims (1994): Toward a Modern Macroeconomic Model Us-
able for Policy Analysis, in NBER Macroeconomics Annual, ed. by S. Fisher, and
J. Rotemberg. MIT Press.
Leeper, E. M., C. Sims, and T. Zha (1996): What Does Monetary Policy Do?,
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 163.
Leeper, M. (1993): Has the Romers' Narrative Approach Identiﬁed Monetary Policy
Shocks?, Working Paper Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, No 93-1(February).
Lees, K. (2007): How large are the gains to commitment policy and optimal delegation
for New Zealand?, Journal of Macroeconomics, 29(4), 959975.
Leitemo, K., and U. Soderstrom (2005): Simple Monetary Policy Rules and
Exchange Rate Uncertainty, Journal of International Money and Finance, 24, 481
507.
Levin, A., V. Wieland, and J. C. Williams (1999): Robustness of Simple Mone-
tary Policy Rules under Model Uncertainty, in Monetary Policy Rules, ed. by J. B.
Taylor. University of Chicago Press.
(2003): The Performance of Forecast-based Monetary Policy Rules under
Model Uncertainty., American Economic Review, 93 (3), 622645.
Lewis, K. K. (1995): Are Foreign Exchange Intervention and Monetary Policy Re-
lated, and Does It Really Matter?, The Journal of Business, 68(2), 185.
Lim, G. C., and P. McNelis (2008): Computational Macroeconomics for the Open
Economy. MIT Press, ﬁrst edn.
Lin See Yan (1991): Interaction of Exchange Rate Policy and Monetary Policy: The
Case of Malaysia, in Monetary Policy Instruments for Developing Countries, ed. by
G. C. Jr., and P. Honohan. World Bank.
232
Liu, P. (2006): Gains from Commitment Policy for a Small Open Economy: The case
of New Zealand, CAMA Working Paper Series, 25/2006.
Ljungqvist, L., and T. Sargent (2000): Recursive Macroeconomic Theory. MIT
Press.
Lowe, P., and L. Ellis (1997): The Smoothing of Oﬃcial Interest Rates, in Mon-
etary Policy and Inﬂation Targeting, ed. by P. Lowe, pp. 287312. Reserve Bank of
Australia.
Lubik, T., and F. Schorfheide (2005): A Bayesian Look at New Open Economy
Macroeconomics, in NBER Macroeconomics Annual, ed. by M. Gertler, and K. Ro-
goﬀ. MIT Press.
Lubik, T. A., and F. Schorfheide (2007): Do Central Bank Respond to Ex-
change Rate Movements? A Structural Investigation, Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, 54(4), 10691087.
Lucas, R. (1976): Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique, Carnegie-Rochester
Conference Series on Public Policy, 1, 1946.
Luenberger, D. (1984): Linear and Non-linear Programming. Addison-Wesley.
Macfarlane, I. (1993): The Exchange Rate, Monetary Policy and Intervention,
Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin, December 1993.
Mahadevan, R. (2007): Sustainable Growth and Economic Development: A case
study of Malaysia. Edward Elgar.
McCallum, B. T. (1993): Comment, in Evaluating Policy Regimes: New Research
in Empirical Macroeconomics, ed. by R. Bryant, P. Hooper, and C. Mann, pp. 444
448. Brookings Institution.
(1999): Issues In The Design Of Monetary Policy Rules, in Handbook of
Macroeconomics, pp. 14831530. Elsevier Science North-Holland.
(2000): The Present and Future of Monetary Policy Rules, NBER Working
Paper, 7916.
233
(2003): Misconceptions Regarding Rules vs. Discre-
tion for Monetary Policy, SOMC, University of Rochester,
http://www.somc.rochester.edu/Nov03/McCallum.pdf.
McCallum, B. T., and E. Nelson (1999): Performance of Operational Policy Rules
in an Estimated Semiclassical Structural Model, in Monetary Policy Rules, ed. by
J. B. Taylor. University of Chicago Press.
McKibbin, W. J., and J. Sachs (1991): Global Linkages. Brookings Institution Press.
McNelis, P. D. (2001): Computational Macrodynamics for Emerging Market
Economies, Manuscript (http://www.bnet.fordham.edu/mcnelis/gembi.pdf).
Medina, J. P., and C. Soto (2005): Oil Shocks and Monetary Policy in an Estimated
DSGE Model for a Small Open Economy, Central Bank of Chile Working Papers,
353.
(2007): The Chilean business cycle through the lens of a stochastic general
equilibrium model, Central Bank of Chile Working Papers, 457.
Meier, A., and G. J. Muller (2006): Fleshing Out the Monetary Transmission
Mechanism: Output Composition and the Role of Financial Frictions, Journal of
Money, Credit, and Banking, 38, 20992133.
Mohamed-Zulkhibri, A. M. (2005): Modelling Stability of Money Demand in a
Small Open Economy: The Case of Malaysia, ICFAI Journal of Applied Economics,
March 2005.
Monacelli, T. (2005): Monetary Policy in a Low Pass-Through Environment, Jour-
nal of Money Credit and Banking, 37(N.6), 10471066.
Moreno, R. (2004): Motives for intervention, in Meeting on Foreign Exchange mar-
ket Intervention in Emergin Markets: Motives, Techniques and Implications; BIS
Paper 24.
Navaratnam, R. V. (2003): Malaysia's Economic Challenges. ASEAN Academic
Press.
Nelson, E. (2000): UK Monetary Policy 1972- 97: A Guide Using Taylor Rules,
Bank of England's Working Paper Series, WP120.
234
Nelson, E. (2003): UK Monetary Policy,1972-97:A Guide using Taylor Rules, in
Central Banking, Monetary Theory and Practice: Essays in Honour of Charles Good-
hart, ed. by P. Mizen, vol. 1, pp. 195216. Edward Elgar.
Nobay, R., and D. Peel (2003): Optimal Discretionary Monetary Policy in a Model
of Asymmetric Central Bank Preferences, Economic Journal, 113, 657665.
Obstfeld, M., and K. Rogoff (1995): The Mirage of Fixed Exchange Rates,
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Fall 1995(9 (4)), 7396.
Orphanides, A. (2003): Historical Monetary Policy Analysis and the Taylor rule,
Journal of Monetary Economics, 50(5), 9831022.
Orphanides, A., and J. C. Williams (2007): Robust monetary policy with imper-
fect knowledge, Journal of Monetary Economics, 54, 14061435.
Ozlale, U. (2003): Price Stability Vs. Output Stability: Tales Of Federal Reserve
Administrations, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 27(9), 15951610.
Poirer, D. J. (1998): Revising Beliefs in Nonidentiﬁed Models, Econometric Theory,
14, 183209.
Poole, W. (1999): Monetary Policy Rules?, Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis, March/April 1999.
Rabanal, P., and J. F. Rubio-Ramirez (2005): Comparing New Keynesian Models
of the Business Cycle: A Bayesian Approach, Journal of Monetary Economics, 52,
11511166.
Ramayandi, A. (2008): Essays on the Conduct of Monetary Policy in ASEAN Coun-
tries, Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University.
Ramey, G., and V. A. Ramey (1995): Cross-Country Evidence on the Link Between
Volatility and Growth, American Economic Review, 85(December), 11381151.
Razi, A. (1998): The Monetary Transmission Mechanism in a Dynamic Developing
Country: The Malaysian Case, Ph.D. thesis, University of Manchester.
Ritchie, B. K. (2005): Coalitional Politics, Economic Reform and Technological
Upgrading in Malaysia, World Development, 33(5), 745761.
235
Romer, C., and D. Romer (1989): Does Monetary Policy Matter? A New Test in
the spirit of Friedman and Schwartz, in NBER Macoreconomics Annual 1989, ed.
by O. Blanchard, and S. Fischer, pp. 121170. MIT Press.
Rotemberg, J., and M. Woodford (1997): An Optimization-Based Economet-
ric Framework for the Evaluation of Monetary Policy, in NBER Macroeconomics
Annual, ed. by B. S. Bernanke, and J. Rotemberg. MIT Press.
(1999): Interest Rate Rules in an Estimated Sticky Price Model, inMonetary
Policy Rules, ed. by J. B. Taylor. University of Chicago Press.
Rudebusch, G. D. (2001): Is the Fed Too Timid? Monetary Policy in an Uncertain
World, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 83 (2), 203217.
Rudebusch, G. D., and L. E. Svensson (1999): Policy Rules for Inﬂation Tar-
geting, in Monetary Policy Rules, ed. by J. B. Taylor, pp. 203246. University of
Chicago Press.
Ruge-Murcia, F. (2002): A Prudent Central Banking, IMF Staﬀ Papers, 49 (3),
456469.
(2004): The Inﬂation Bias when the Central Bank Targets the Natural Rate
of Unemployment, European Economic Review, 48, 91107.
(2007): Methods to Estimate Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Mod-
els, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 31, 25992636.
Sack, B., and V. Wieland (2000): Interest-rate Smoothing and Optimal Monetary
Policy: A Review of Recent Empirical Evidence, Journal of Economic and Business,
52, 205228.
Salemi, M. (1995): Revealed Preferences of the Federal Reserve: Using Inverse Con-
trol Theory to intrepret the policy equation of a vector autoregression, Journal of
Business & Economic Statistics, 13, 419433.
Salleh, I., and S. D. Meyanathan (1993): Malaysia: Growth, Equity and Structural
Transformation. World Bank.
236
Sarno, L., and M. P. Taylor (2001): Oﬃcial Intervention in the Foreign Exchange
Market: Is It Eﬀective and, If so, How Does It Work?, Journal of Economic Litera-
ture, 39(3), 839.
Schmitt-Grohe, S., and M. Uribe (2003): Closing Small Open Economy Models,
Journal of International Economics, 61(1), 163185.
Sims, C. (2002): Solving Linear Rational Expectations Model, Computational Eco-
nomics, 20 (1-2), 120.
Smets, F., and R. Wouters (2002): Strict Inﬂation Targeting: A Robust Monetary
Policy Strategy under Potential Output Uncertainty, ECB Working Paper.
(2003): An Estimated Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model of the
Euro Area, Journal of European Economic Association, 1, 11231175.
Soderlind, P. (2004): What if the Fed had been an inﬂation nutter?, Applied
Economics, 36, 14711473.
Soderstrom, U., P. Soderlind, and A. Vredin (2005): New-Keynesian Models
and Monetary Policy: A Re-examination of the Stylized Facts, Scandinavian Journal
of Economics, 107(3), 521546.
Sriram, S. S. (2002): Determinants and Stability of Demand for M2 in Malaysia,
Journal of Asian Economics, 13, 337356.
Svensson, L. E. O. (1997a): Inﬂation Forecast Targeting: Implementing and Moni-
toring Inﬂation Targets, European Economic Review, 41(6), 11111146.
(1997b): Inﬂation Targeting in an Open Economy: Strict or Flexible Inﬂation
Targeting (Public Lecture held at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand,
November 18, 1997), RBNZ Discussion Paper, G97-8.
(1999): Inﬂation Targeting as a Monetary Policy Rule, Journal of Monetary
Economics, 43(3), 607654.
(2000): Open-economy Inﬂation Targeting, Journal of International Eco-
nomics, 50(1), 155183.
237
Takagi, S., and T. Esaka (2001): Sterilization and the Capital Inﬂow Problem in
East Asia, 1987-97, in Regional and Global Capital Flows: Macroeconomic Causes
and Consequences, ed. by T. Ito, and A. O. Krueger. University of Chicago Press.
Tang, H. C. (2006): Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism in Malaysia: An
Empirical and Methodological Exploration, Ph.D. thesis, Australian National Uni-
versity.
Taylor, D. (1982): Oﬃcial Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market, or, Bet
Against the Central Bank, The Journal of Political Economy, 90(2), 356.
Taylor, J. B. (1993): Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice, Carnegie-Rochester
Conference Series on Public Policy, 39, 195214.
(1999a): A Historical Analysis of Monetary Policy Rules, in Monetary Policy
Rules, ed. by J. B. Taylor. University of Chicago Press.
(1999b): The Robustness and Eﬃciency of Monetary Policy Rules as Guide-
lines for Interest Rate Setting by The European Central Bank, Journal of Monetary
Economics, 43, 655679.
(2001): The Role of the Exchange Rate in Monetary-Policy Rules, American
Economic Review, 91(2, Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred Thirteenth Annual
Meeting of the American Economic Association), 263267.
Toh, M., and H. Ho (2001): Exchange Rate Pass Through for selected Asian
Economies, Singapore Economic Review, 46(2), 24773.
Uhlig, H. (1999): A Toolkit for Analyzing Non-Linear Dynamic Stochastic Mod-
els Easily, in Computational Methods for the Study of Dyanmic Economies, ed. by
R. Marimon, and andrew Scott. Oxford University Press.
Umezaki, S. (2007): Monetary Policy in a Small Open Economy: The Case of
Malaysia, The Developing Economies, XLV-4, 43764.
Walsh, C. E. (2003): Monetary Theory and Policy. MIT Press.
Webber, A. G. (1999): Dynamic and Long Run Responses of Import Prices to the
Exchange Rate in the Asia-Paciﬁc, Asian Economic Journal, 13, 303320.
238
White, H. (1982): Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Misspeciﬁed Models, Econo-
metrica, 50(1), 116.
Woodford, M. (2001): The Taylor Rule and Optimal Monetary Policy, American
Economic Review, 91(2, Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred Thirteenth Annual
Meeting of the American Economic Association), 232237.
(2003): Interest and Prices: Foundation of a Theory of Monetary Policy.
Princeton University Press.
239
240
Deﬁnition and Source of Data
Variable Description Source
GDPt Real GDP for the quarter, in RM billion 1975Q1-1986Q4 - Abeysinghe and Lee (1998)#
1987Q1 onwards - MSB
GDP ∗t Potential output for the quarter, in RM billion Estimated by Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter
yt Output gap for the quarter in % Deﬁned as
[
log
(
GDPt
GDP∗t
)
− 1
]
× 100
Pt Consumer Price Index at end of quarter MSB
pit Inﬂation rate for the quarter in % Deﬁned as
[
log
(
Pt
Pt−1
)
− 1
]
× 100
rt 1975Q1-1978Q4 3-month Treasury Bills in % MSB (average for the quarter)
1979Q1 onwards 3-month Interbank rate in %
Qt Index of Real Exchange Rate for the quarter International Financial Statistics (IFS)
Q∗t Index of Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate Estimated by Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter
RERt Deviation of real exchange rate from its Deﬁned as
[
log
(
Qt
Q∗t
)
− 1
]
× 100
equilibrium level for the quarter, in %
M3 Broad Money Supply, in log MSB (outstanding at end quarter)
y∗t US's output gap for the quarter in % IFS
pi∗t US's inﬂation rate for the quarter in % IFS
r∗t US's 3-month interbank rate for the quarter in % IFS
comt Index of World Oil Price, in log IFS
# Data for Malaysia's quarterly GDP is only available from 1987 onwards. Abeysinghe and Lee (1998) apply
interpolation method to estimate Malaysia's quarterly data from 1973Q1.
MSB - Monthly Statistical Bulletin, published by Bank Negara Malaysia
IFS - International Financial Statistics, published by International Monetary Fund (IMF)
This thesis was produced using Lyx version 1.6.2. See http://www.lyx.org/
for details.
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